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Fatigue related to sleep deprivation has a degrading effect on human performance. In critical 
care health settings this represents a potential hazard to the safety of patients. This thesis 
aimed to identify and assess possible effects of acute clinician fatigue using a measure with 
direct relevance to safe and effective clinical performance. The focus was on critical care 
clinicians, particularly those who work in the high risk and somewhat isolated setting of 
intensive care patient air transfer. The specific research objectives for the thesis were to 
assess the degree of fatigue the clinicians experience in the course of routine duties, develop 
and test a meaningful method of measuring clinical performance, and assess the effect of 
routinely-experienced levels of fatigue on clinical performance.  
Methods 
In an initial field-based study doctors and flight nurses from two intensive care inter-hospital 
transport teams routinely completed subjective fatigue report forms before and after patient 
transport missions, over a 4 month period. Multivariate hierarchical linear and logistic models 
were used to evaluate the influence of various mission characteristics on post-mission fatigue. 
In the next phase of the research an existing non-technical skills measurement system was 
adapted to the aeromedical setting, using data collected directly from clinician groups and 
published literature. It was evaluated by: surveying experienced clinicians; testing it in the 
field; and undertaking a clinical simulation study, to determine whether the tool distinguished 
the different levels of performance expected in clinicians experienced versus inexperienced in 
patient transfer. Rank-based statistical tests were used to examine performance differences 
and associations between assessment approaches. Finally, a second clinical simulation study 
utilising a randomised crossover design compared the non-technical performance of individual 
clinicians when they were fatigued versus non-fatigued. Within-subject differences in 
performance were analysed using paired t-tests. Analysis of covariance was used to examine 
the relationship between possible covariates and within-subject performance differences, 





Results from the initial field-based research showed there was at least one clinician reporting 
severe fatigue on 11.2% of routine interhospital transport missions. Fatigue levels were 
influenced by clinicians’ baseline fatigue, their workload, and working during any part of the 
night. From the second phase of research the adapted aeromedical non-technical skills 
framework showed good face and content validity, and the ability to distiguish between 
differing performance levels, with clinicians experienced in interhospital transport performing 
more highly than those without experience, according to both non-technical skills ratings 
(Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.001) and independently observed general performance ratings 
(Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.003). Self ratings did not distinguish experienced from inexperienced 
transport clinicians (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.32). The main finding from the third phase of 
research was that the non-technical skills performance scores of clinicians were higher when 
they were in non-fatigued versus fatigued states (mean difference with 95%CI, 2.8 [2.2 - 3.4]), 
as assessed by raters blinded to the fatigue status of the clinicians.This finding remained 
consistent when controlling for an order effect and examining the impact of a number of 
possible co-variates. There was no difference in self-ratings of clinical performance between 
non-fatigued and fatigued states (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.153).  
Conclusion  
In critical care settings clinicians’ non-technical skills are recognised as being directly linked to 
safe and effective treatment of patients. The findings of the research undertaken here support 
a conclusion that non-technical skills performance is degraded at levels of fatigue clinicians 
routinely experience. In addition, clinicians may fail to recognise their performance is 
compromised. Non-technical skills frameworks provide an ideal foundation for assessing a 
range of clinically-relevant behaviours, and could be routinely incorporated into critical care 
training programmes and practice. In combination with an active fatigue-education approach, 
they could also be used to identify and develop methods for managing or mitigating fatigue 
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This thesis is an exploration of the impact of fatigue in the setting of interhospital aeromedical 
retrieval. The research plan was conceived as a result of contact with critical care-level clinicians 
who frequently work outside daytime hours. Their shifts are often of extended duration and 
may include periods of time outside hospital environs. The clinicians can express their 
understanding of fatigue as being a hazard, but they work these demanding long shifts without 
any practical means of assessing the degrading effect of fatigue or other hazards on their 
performance. The idea was born both to understand the degrading effects of fatigue and to try 
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This thesis examines fatigue in an operational workplace setting. The central objective is to 
understand the degrading effects of fatigue as they relate to critical-care health settings, 
focusing in particular on assessing the impact of fatigue in a way which is accessible and 
relevant for clinicians. More specifically, the objectives are to understand the degree of 
fatigue critical care clinicians routinely experience, identify a meaningful method for 
measuring potential degradations in clinical performance, and directly examine the impact of 
fatigue on clinical performance. This chapter introduces the issue of workplace fatigue and the 
particular clinical setting of critical care aeromedical retrieval. It outlines the scope of the 
thesis, specifies the thesis aims, and provides an outline of the research programme and thesis 
structure. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Most people intuitively understand what it is like to be fatigued. They have experienced an 
unpleasant feeling of tiredness when they were perhaps lacking in sleep or had been active 
over a prolonged period of time. The problem is that fatigue can represent more than simply a 
disagreeable experience. People who are fatigued are demonstrably less productive and can 
also be significantly compromised in terms of their ability to perform or function (Lerman et 
al., 2012). When not fatigued, individuals’ minds and bodies have a far greater capacity to 
function optimally (Van Dongen and Dinges, 2000). 
The likelihood of fatigue is lower when access to night time sleep is unrestricted. However in 
today’s world many occupational settings are logistically complex and have ‘around the clock’ 
demands. Individuals within these settings often work when they would usually be sleeping, 
and their sleep opportunities can become restricted, meaning fatigue is probably ubiquitous. 
If the setting is one such as transportation or health care, where a high level of human 
performance is essential, fatigue is a hazard because of the potential impact on safety 
(Akerstedt, 2000, Gaba and Howard, 2002, Gander et al., 2011, Lockley et al., 2006, Rosekind, 
2005). 
An extensive body of work over the last few decades has examined the science of fatigue. It is 
a relatively complex phenomenon which can broadly be thought of as being either acute or 
chronic in nature. Acute fatigue refers to the feeling of tiredness arising from short-term sleep 
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loss or from short periods of heavy physical or mental work. Its distinctive characteristic is that 
it is essentially of short duration, and can be reversed within a short time (such as a week at 
most) by sleep and relaxation. Chronic fatigue refers to the more constant and severe state of 
tiredness that is not relieved by rest. It is the type of fatigue associated with illness or a 
disease such as cancer or chronic fatigue syndrome. This thesis focuses on acute fatigue; 
specifically the impact it may have in operational settings where safety is of key importance. 
That is, in real-world settings where the outcome is critical and human performance is critical 
to that outcome, as distinct from highly-controlled laboratory settings. Examples of safety 
critical operational settings include various modes of transportation, mining, energy 
generation, and health care (Fletcher et al., 2015).  
The motivation for the thesis arises from within the sphere of advanced-level health care, 
often generically referred to as ‘critical care’. While safety is important in all aspects of health 
care, the stakes are particularly high in critical care settings, where people with severe (often 
life-threatening) injuries and illness are treated. For example emergency departments (EDs), 
intensive care units (ICUs), operating theatres, or specialised trauma centres. The National 
Library of Medicine website explains critical care as involving ‘close constant attention by a 
team of specially trained health care providers’ (U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2018). It is 
the clinicians who provide this advanced level of care on whom the programme of research 
focuses. The 24 hour a day nature of critical care means these clinicians are often working 
when sleep deprived and during hours when they would more usually be asleep. It makes 
them susceptible to the hazard posed by fatigue, and is the reason fatigue-related risk is of 
concern in medicine (Gaba and Howard, 2002). Yet despite a generalised recognition that risk 
exists and fatigue is likely to be common, clinician fatigue levels are rarely monitored or 
reported, and the level of fatigue-related risk associated with clinical contexts can be difficult 
to understand in absolute terms. Because clinical performance is challenging to measure, 
much of the understanding we have regarding the impact of clinician fatigue is based on 
laboratory studies, or on measures that are presumed to approximate aspects of clinical work. 
The problem is that these measures are not necessarily meaningful for individual clinicians in 
terms of understanding how their clinical performance or safety is likely to be affected by 
fatigue.  
One particular critical care setting where fatigue is a potential issue is that of air-based 
interhospital patient transfer, referred to throughout the thesis as aeromedical retrieval. 
Aeromedical retrievals are relatively common in modern-day health care because advanced 
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clinical resources tend to be centralised (Shirley and Hearns, 2006). For example in the New 
Zealand (NZ) context, tertiary level care is essentially provided in only five cities; or in the case 
of population subsets like paediatrics or spinal cord injury there are only one or two specialist 
facilities in the entire country. Consequently, interhospital aeromedical retrievals can be a 
daily event for clinical teams based in tertiary centres. As an example, the Wellington 
Intensive Care Flight Service transfers two critical care patients on average per day (Myers et 
al., 2012). The aeromedical clinical role is demanding due to the nature of the work and 
relative isolation of the environment (Hearns and Shirley, 2006). In addition, the clinicians 
often work overnight and for extended durations of duty (Myers et al., 2012). If they 
experience performance decrements due to fatigue there may be an important impact on 
planning and delivery of the advanced levels of clinical care needed. Despite the potential 
hazard fatigue represents, the prevalence and impact of fatigue for aeromedical retrieval 
clinicians has not been reported. It is this specialised clinical subset of critical care 
interhospital transfer clinicians which was utilised in the thesis research programme to test 
the impact of fatigue as a hazard in clinical settings. 
1.2 THESIS AIMS AND OUTLINE 
1.2.1 THESIS AIMS 
The overarching aim of the thesis is to identify and assess possible effects of acute fatigue 
related to sleep deprivation. The focus is on clinician performance in high risk critical care 
settings, since degraded clinician performance is a risk to patient safety, particularly in acute 
medical settings when clinicians are working in isolation. 
 The general aims for the thesis are as follows: 
1. To assess current evidence regarding the degree and nature of the risk posed by 
fatigue, for clinicians working in critical care health settings 
2. To identify and employ methods of assessment relevant to evaluating the impact of 
fatigue within clinical settings 
3. To assess the level and characteristics of fatigue experienced by clinicians working in a 
sensitive, complex and demanding critical care setting 
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4. To determine whether an instrument for assessing non-technical skills performance 
can be adapted to a specific critical care environment of interest, one where 
performance decrements present risk for an adverse outcome 
5. To determine whether performance decrements associated with fatigue-state in 
critical care clinicians can be detected using an instrument for assessing their non-
technical skills performance 
6. To make recommendations regarding research and fatigue management in critical 
care settings 
1.2.2  OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
The research for the thesis was undertaken in three main phases. The main objective of the 
initial phase was to establish the extent to which clinicians working in challenging and safety 
sensitive settings routinely experience high levels of fatigue. Using a prospective observational 
design, the levels and patterns of fatigue in clinicians undertaking interhospital transfers of 
critical care patients were assessed over a four month period. Having established the extent 
and nature of fatigue reported by the clinicians, the next phase of research focused on 
adapting and evaluating a relevant measurement framework, to directly assess potential 
degradations in their clinical performance associated with fatigue. Based on review of 
background literature and knowledge of the clinical setting, a non-technical skills 
measurement framework was chosen for this purpose. The framework was adapted from an 
existing well-validated non-technical skills tool, using data collected from a number of sources 
including the literature, clinician groups, and field observations. A clinical simulation study was 
also undertaken to examine the ability of the newly adapted tool to distinguish different levels 
of clinical performance. For the final phase of the research, the objective was to prospectively 
evaluate the impact of fatigue on clinicians’ non-technical skills performance. The a priori 
assumption, based on literature reviewed as the background to the thesis, was that non-
technical performance represented a relevant marker for clinical performance in critical care 
settings. A second clinical simulation study was undertaken to assess the impact of fatigue on 
performance, with clinicians acting as their own controls. The aim here was to determine 
whether performance degradations associated with fatigue state were detectable when 




1.2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 1 has introduced the thesis topic and outlined its main aims. It has described the 
scope of the work and provided an outline of the research programme. The next three 
chapters provide background and justification for the research. In Chapter 2 the key 
contributing factors and detrimental effects of fatigue are explained, illustrating the potential 
problems fatigue poses in safety critical settings like health care. Approaches to managing and 
measuring fatigue, and the implications of fatigue for operational settings are also discussed. 
In Chapter 3 the concept, application, and relevance of evaluating non-technical skills as a 
measure of clinical performance is examined. Chapter 4 introduces the specialised clinical 
subset of aeromedical retrieval, used in the research to test the impact of fatigue as a hazard. 
It illustrates the relevance of utilising the aeromedical setting as a model for examining fatigue 
impact in critical care clinicians. Chapter 5 is the methods chapter for the thesis, describing 
the methods for the three phases of research. The results of the studies are presented in 
Chapter 6. The final chapter is Chapter 7, in which the implications of the research findings 
and strengths and limitations of the research methods are discussed, and recommendations 
are made.  
1.2.4 PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE THESIS 
Papers based on findings from the PhD programme of research have appeared in international 
critical care journals, or been presented at international conferences. While the papers are 
multi-authored, I was the lead author on all papers, and was responsible for more than 85% of 
the work with regards to manuscript writing, data analysis and interpretation, and the journal 
submission process. Thesis supervisors and advisors who are co-authors assisted by providing 
specialist clinical expertise for some aspects of the research, providing assistance or oversight 
with some aspects of the proposed study designs and statistical analysis, and providing critical 
feedback on the journal manuscripts.  
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In this chapter a working definition of fatigue for the thesis is presented. The key contributing 
factors and detrimental effects for fatigue are explained, and used to illustrate the potential 
problems fatigue poses in safety critical settings like health care. Approaches to managing and 
measuring fatigue are examined and the chapter concludes with a section discussing the 
implications of fatigue for operational settings, including the question of which outcomes or 
measures should be used to evaluate the impact of fatigue in a clinical health care 
environment. 
2.1 DEFINING FATIGUE 
Despite a large body of research examining sleep and fatigue it is hard to identify an agreed 
upon and comprehensive definition of fatigue, perhaps because it can be attributed to so 
many different factors. Fatigue is related to sleep, and a large proportion of sleep research has 
taken place in laboratory-based settings, examining the impact of both acute and chronic 
sleep restriction (Caldwell et al., 2012). In these settings fatigue is often conceptualised as 
being synonymous with drowsiness, sleepiness and tiredness (Akerstedt, 2000), though strictly 
speaking there is a clear distinction between fatigue and sleepiness; that is, they are related 
but not necessarily the same thing (Akerstedt, 2000). Fatigue may be accompanied by 
sleepiness, but sleepiness is the tendency to fall asleep, whereas fatigue is the body’s 
response to sleep loss or to prolonged mental or physical exertion (Lerman et al., 2012). The 
point of highlighting this distinction is that from an operational perspective, fatigue may be 
reduced somewhat by sedentary activity without sleeping, whereas subjective sleepiness is 
often actually exacerbated when people sit and rest (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). 
 A definition of fatigue for the purposes of discussing fatigue-related risk management in 
regulatory and operational settings of the transport sector has been offered by Gander et al 
(2011) as follows: 
‘Fatigue is the inability to function at the desired level due to incomplete 
recovery from the demands of prior work and other waking activities. 
Acute fatigue can occur when there is inadequate time to rest and recover 
from a work period. Cumulative (chronic) fatigue occurs when there is 
insufficient recovery from acute fatigue over time. Recovery from fatigue, 
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i.e., restoration of function (particularly of cognitive function), requires 
sufficient good quality sleep’ (Gander et al., 2011) (p.574).  
Similarly, researchers who have focused extensively on the management of fatigue in aviation 
settings have defined fatigue as: 
‘The state of tiredness associated with long hours of work, prolonged 
periods without sleep, or requirement to work hours that are ‘out of synch’ 
with the body’s biological or circadian rhythm’ (Caldwell, 2003) (pg. 15). 
There may not be a universal or single definition for fatigue (Flin et al., 2008) but for research 
aiming to measure fatigue and study its impact, a relevant working definition for the concept 
of fatigue is essential (Lamb, 2010). The working definition of fatigue for this thesis is based on 
that of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). (International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), 2016), (pg xvi). It is chosen for its relevance to acute fatigue and the 
complex operational setting on which the thesis research focuses, as follows: 
A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability 
resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, and/or 
workload (mental and/or physical activity) that can impair a person’s 
alertness and ability to safely carry out clinical duties  
2.2 KEY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR FATIGUE  
As illustrated by the definition of fatigue selected for this thesis, fatigue is not a simple or one-
dimensional phenomenon. Rather, it tends to be the product of a number of inter-related 
factors, most of which are linked to sleep (Caldwell et al., 2009). Humans need sleep to survive 
and a number of vital brain, behavioural, and body, functions depend on having enough sleep 
on a daily basis (Van Dongen and Dinges, 2000).  
2.2.1 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SLEEP 
Sleep is an active physiological process and is essential for maintaining health (Buysse, 2014). 
During an extended period asleep we cycle through distinct stages, which can be classified as 
either rapid eye movement (REM) or non-REM sleep (Altevogt and Colten, 2006). Studies 
using electroencephalogram (EEG) monitoring of electrical activity in the brain have tracked 
the brain wave patterns associated with each of these stages. Stage one non-REM is where we 
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change from wakefulness to sleep, and can still be aware of what is going on around us. This 
stage typically lasts from a few seconds to a few minutes. Stage two non-REM is light sleep 
and lasts about 10 – 20 minutes. At this point heart rate and breathing slow, body 
temperature decreases, and brain waves become slower with occasional rapid bursts. Stages 
three and four non-REM are deep sleep, and considered important for feeling refreshed in the 
morning (Åkerstedt and Gillberg, 1990). During deep sleep, brainwaves become even slower 
and there is limited muscle activity. People in deep sleep may be difficult to wake and groggy 
when woken, also known as sleep inertia (Caldwell, 2003). Stage five REM sleep is 
characterised by rapid eye movement behind closed eyelids, heart rate and brainwaves speed 
up and breathing becomes rapid and shallow. This is the stage of sleep associated with 
recalling dreaming, and storing memories. The first REM cycle often occurs when we have 
been asleep about 90 minutes. It is usually only five to 10 minutes long, and is then followed 
by a return to cycle through the various sleep stages again. Most slow wave restorative sleep 
(stages 3 and 4) occurs during the first half of a typical night’s sleep, with increasingly longer 
REM periods towards morning. The exception to this when a person is severely sleep-
deprived; in this case REM sleep is pushed later and a higher proportion of time asleep is 
spent in stages three and four (Caldwell, 2003).  
2.2.2 SLEEP DEPRIVATION  
In operational settings an individual may experience total deprivation of sleep, or they can be 
partially but consistently sleep deprived. Total sleep deprivation would occur when they are 
up all day and then also work all night; partial sleep deprivation would occur when they 
routinely lack sufficient opportunity to obtain adequate sleep (Alhola and Polo-Kantola, 2007). 
When humans don’t sleep they become fatigued; to function at optimal level, we require 
sufficient good quality sleep on a daily basis (Banks and Dinges, 2007).  
The commonly accepted recommendation for the ideal amount of regular sleep is between 
seven and nine hours a night (National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention (CDC), n.d). It is 
also recognised however that physiologically, the exact amount of sleep needed per night 
varies from one individual to the next, and that individual susceptibility to the effects of sleep 
loss can vary (Van Dongen et al., 2011). For example the majority of work accidents at night 
are caused only by a limited number of workers (Van Dongen, 2006). Age may also change 
susceptibility to sleep restriction. For example in a study of chronically sleep deprived healthy 
adults aged between 18 and 39, the younger adults became sleepier more quickly and their 
performance degraded sooner, though they also recovered more quickly (Rupp et al., 2009). In 
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the same study the younger individuals demonstrated a more limited awareness of the degree 
of their sleepiness and the associated impairment, lending support to the notion that younger 
adults may be at greater risk for fatigue-related incidents (Caldwell et al., 2012). 
Notwithstanding the likelihood of individual susceptibility, in operational settings most people 
with less than five hours sleep in the past 24, or 12 hours sleep in the past 48, are likely to 
become fatigued to the level where safety can be at risk; specifically, once their ‘time awake’ 
has extended past their ‘total time slept in the past 48 hours’ (Dawson and McCulloch, 2005).  
The contribution of total sleep deprivation to fatigue has been extensively studied in 
laboratory-based settings, where it is relatively easy to control conditions and keep research 
participants awake for very long periods of time. These studies have yielded vital and 
consistent information regarding various cognitive and other performance deficits associated 
with lack of sleep (Lim and Dinges, 2010, Caldwell et al., 2012). There have been fewer reports 
describing how these findings may apply outside the lab in operational settings, where for 
example people may not be totally sleep deprived, but the nature of their role may mean they 
obtain inadequate amounts of sleep on a regular basis. In other words they may potentially be 
chronically as well as acutely sleep deprived. The impact of chronic sleep restriction appears 
to be similar to that of acute total sleep restriction. For example sleep restriction to less than 
six hours a night for 14 days in a group of young healthy adults has been shown to cause 
similar fatigue effects (cognitive performance deficits) as two days total sleep deprivation (Van 
Dongen et al., 2003).  
Sleep quality is a term that is often used alongside or instead of sleep deprivation, when 
considering factors contributing to fatigue. Conceptually, sleep quality has been measured in a 
variety of ways which includes sleep duration, sleep fragmentation, ease of falling or returning 
to sleep, when during the 24 hour period the sleep occurs, or simply the subjective experience 
of whether the sleep was “good” or “poor” (Buysse, 2014). Settings where individuals are 
rostered on-call during a night can result in fragmented or reduced quality of sleep, even in 
the absence of an actual call (Ziebertz et al., 2017). When sleep is fragmented it can impact on 
memory, vigilance and mood (Caldwell et al., 2009). Reduced quality or duration of sleep, 
even for a single night, clearly increases the risk of fatigue and any associated impairments 
(Dawson and McCulloch, 2005). The nature of the performance deficits associated with fatigue 
is described in greater detail in an upcoming section, 2.3. 
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2.2.3 CIRCADIAN VARIABILITY 
Another key influence for fatigue involves our internal biological clock, the circadian system, 
which regulates various functions on a 24 hour a day basis (Van Dongen and Dinges, 2000). A 
summary description is as follows: 
‘The circadian pacemaker interacts with sleep-wake regulatory processes 
to influence many physiologic variables including hormone levels, 
autonomic nervous system activity, neurobehavioral performance, and the 
propensity, timing and internal structure of sleep. Environmental, social, 
behavioural, genetic, pharmacologic, and age factors influence all elements 
of this system’ (Czeisler et al., 2005) (p 375).  
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIRCADIAN CYCLE  
A range of body functions are programmed by the circadian system to vary in a rhythmic and 
set manner throughout the day. The cycle is essentially biphasic, resulting in peak and low 
times for a variety of biological and neurobehavioural factors such as body temperature, 
cortisol levels, melatonin levels, alertness, subjective fatigue, cognitive performance and sleep 
patterns. One circadian cycle runs over approximately 24 hours, though if individuals have 
absolutely no interaction with external time cues like daylight, it naturally actually runs slightly 
longer (Czeisler et al., 2005). The influence of environmental light is a key influence on 
maintaining or retraining the circadian cycle; and other stimuli such as exercise may also assist 
with shifting circadian phase (Czeisler et al., 2005).  
Under the circadian influence humans demonstrate daily highs and lows in performance and 
alertness, as well as a clear preference for sleep to occur at night (Czeisler et al., 2005, Van 
Dongen and Dinges, 2000). With respect to time (in people who customarily obtain their sleep 
during the night), the lowest point in cognitive performance, short term memory and 
alertness tends to occur between approximately 0200 and 0600, though the low point may be 
up to 0800 depending on when sunrise is (Johnson et al., 1992). A manifestation of this low is 
thought to be observed in the rate of traffic and occupational accidents, which tend to peak 
between 0100 and 0600 (Flin et al., 2008); it is also illustrated when reviewing evidence for 
safety and productivity both of which are compromised at night (Folkard and Tucker, 2003). 
After waking in the morning, our circadian drive builds, with alertness, cognitive performance 
and short-term memory increasing steadily, and remaining at a relatively constant high 
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between approximately 1200 and 2100 (Czeisler et al., 2005). In some individuals a mid-
afternoon ‘dip’ in alertness can be observed, a tendency which may become more prevalent 
with age (Czeisler et al., 2005). In industrial settings the dip has been observed as a 
demonstrable drop in productivity between about 1100 and 1400 (Folkard and Tucker, 2003). 
The mid-afternoon dip is not consistently observed however, and some researchers believe it 
is more a propensity to fall asleep than a dip in actual performance (Van Dongen and Dinges, 
2000). In late evening the circadian clock reduces its ‘alerting’ functions and starts stimulating 
the production of melatonin, the sleep inducing hormone.  
Circadian rhythm is relatively resistant to adjustment and there are also individual differences 
in circadian rhythm with respect to sleep propensity and timing over the 24 hour period. For 
example about one in ten people naturally like to wake up early in the morning and two in ten 
stay up well after midnight, while the rest tend to be relatively flexible and function 
somewhere in between (Smolensky and Lamberg, 2001).  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIRCADIAN INFLUENCE ON FATIGUE IN OPERATIONAL SETTINGS 
Working at night and sleeping during the day will disturb circadian rhythm, and have a 
detrimental effect on sleep, performance, and fatigue-related error (Akerstedt and Wright, 
2009). At certain points in the circadian phase the human body has a high propensity for 
sleep, and at others it is more naturally awake and alert. This has a number of implications. 
Firstly, if the available sleeping period occurs during the biological day, sleep is likely to be 
shorter and of lower quality than if it was obtained overnight. So someone on an alternating 
work-shift pattern won’t obtain the same level of restorative sleep during a daytime 10 hour 
rest break as they do during a night-time 10 hour break (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). In 
addition, from the circadian perspective the individual’s cognition is optimally stimulated 
during the biological day and in relative terms likely to be impaired during their night-time 
shift. The relative risk for injury or accident does tend to be much higher for individuals on 
night shift compared to shifts worked during the day (Folkard and Tucker, 2003).  
The final issue of relevance for operational settings is that the circadian clock does not 
immediately adapt to change. This means someone on a rotating shift pattern would have 
several days before the circadian cycles came into phase with a new sleep/wake cycle, by 
which time their shift timings may have changed again. The parallel problem is experienced 
when crossing time zones, where the generally accepted understanding is that it takes about 
one day to adjust per hour of time zone shift (Flin et al., 2008). If work schedules change 
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relatively frequently, time zones change, and overnight work is required, high levels of fatigue 
are likely to occur during work hours.  
2.2.4 SLEEP HOMEOSTASIS 
Homeostasis refers to the body’s tendency to maintain a stable equilibrium, with sleep 
homeostasis the propensity to achieve the required level of sleep. After a period of sleep 
homeostatic sleep drive is low, gradually increasing with increasing time spent awake (Banks 
et al., 2012). This biological drive for sleep also responds to sleep quantity and sleep quality 
(Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). In other words elevated sleep drive can result from increasing 
time continuously awake, inadequate sleep duration over one or more days in a row, or sleep 
that is disrupted in some way (either by a medical condition or environmental factors) 
(Belenky et al., 2003, Dinges et al., 1997, Van Dongen et al., 2003). 
The homeostatic mechanism also interacts closely with circadian rhythm to influence fatigue 
through its effect on sleep regulation (Borbély et al., 2016). After an extended period of sleep 
overnight there is little homeostatic sleep pressure and alertness is high. Later in the day after 
a continuous period of wakefulness, sleep drive would otherwise cause alertness and 
cognitive performance to decline. By now however circadian drive is elevated, enabling a 
higher level of performance to be sustained throughout a working day (Czeisler et al., 2005). 
More or less the opposite applies at night, when high homeostatic sleep drive will facilitate 
sleep for the first half of the night. Then in the second half of the night when homeostatic 
sleep drive will be reducing, the circadian sleep drive becomes greatest. Under the influence 
of these two mechanisms a consolidated period of sleep can be obtained (Czeisler et al., 
2005).  
In concert with the circadian system, homeostatic sleep drive is a key contributor to fatigue. 
Most people who have been continuously awake for at least 16 hours, or have had inadequate 
amounts of sleep for one or more days in a row, demonstrate fatigue effects such as 
sleepiness and performance deficits (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009, Van Dongen et al., 2003). If 
the long period of wakefulness coincides with the period of the circadian trough the effect on 




2.2.5 SLEEP INERTIA  
As noted in section 2.2.1, sleep inertia refers to the feeling of grogginess that is often 
experienced upon waking. It is essentially an interim state between sleep and wake, and is 
associated with lower arousal and performance levels. The effects of sleep inertia are likely to 
last between one and 20 minutes (Scheer et al., 2008). They tend to be more pronounced 
when waking from deep slow wave sleep (non-REM stage 3 and 4) than from non-REM stage 1 
or 2 sleep; also when waking near physiologically programmed low points in alertness like the 
circadian trough (Caldwell, 2003). The potential for fatigue due to sleep inertia is particularly 
important to consider in settings where complex or life and death tasks may be necessary 
soon after waking (Burke et al., 2015). It should also be considered in settings where 
individuals are chronically sleep deprived and therefore highly fatigued; such individuals may 
spend more time in the stages of deep sleep so may be harder to wake or very groggy when 
they are woken (severe sleep inertia) (Caldwell, 2003). Notwithstanding these points there is 
some evidence that if it is an emergency, the effects of adrenalin may help to counteract the 
negative effects of sleep inertia (Rosekind et al., 1995). A more recent review of the evidence 
however, cautions that being more alert (perhaps due to adrenalin or caffeine) does not 
necessarily translate to improved performance in terms of more complex cognitive tasks 
(Killgore, 2010). 
2.2.6 HEALTH CONDITIONS  
Chronic and profound fatigue states such as those associated with serious autoimmune and 
viral illnesses are outside the scope of this thesis. That is because this type of chronic fatigue 
will not be relieved by the rest or sleep that ameliorates more acute states of fatigue. 
However health conditions that are relevant to the research undertaken here include those 
that contribute to fatigue because they interrupt or prevent sleep. Some common sleep 
disorders include sleep apnoea, insomnia, and restless leg syndrome. It has been 
demonstrated by electroencephalogram (EEG) brain wave activity that in people with such 
disorders there are generally frequent brief stages of arousal during the night (only 3 to 15 
seconds) although people do not actually wake; something similar is also often observed as 
people age (Roehrs et al., 2005). Whatever the cause of frequent arousals of this type, the 
overall period of sleep is not necessarily any shorter; it is the fragmentation of the sleep that is 
associated with the daytime sleepiness and fatigue (Roehrs et al., 2005). 
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In operational settings, the individual with a disorder such as obstructive sleep apnoea or 
insomnia demonstrates excessive sleepiness during the day, and has reduced alertness and 
performance; if they work in settings where there is already potential for fatigue, perhaps 
because night work is required, then the fatigue effect of the underlying sleep disorder can be 
magnified (Roehrs et al., 2005).  
2.2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
The impact of sleep and circadian rhythm disturbance was outlined in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, 
and there are often specific environmental elements which can affect the quality and quantity 
of sleep. For example if an individual is on night shift and trying to sleep during the day, the 
ideal environment would be as dark as possible, and relatively quiet (Caldwell, 2003). Their 
sleep may be disrupted by factors like other people in the house going about their normal 
daily routine, the need to care for family, and by ambient noise from outside. Even when 
there is opportunity to sleep during the usual biological night, sleep may be disrupted by 
circumstances like having a young baby in the house.  
There are a number of other environmental conditions which may also contribute to fatigue. 
In settings where there is a high degree of monotony for example, the effects of fatigue 
become more pronounced. This is illustrated by research which shows drivers are actually 
more likely leave the road on a long straight stretch of road than they are when negotiating 
corners (Dinges, 1995). Environmental factors known to be highly fatiguing include stress, 
extremes of temperature, noise levels higher than 80 decibels, and vibration (Flin et al., 2008) 
(pg 194). These conditions are prevalent in many operational settings including the aviation 
environment, where excess noise and vibration have been associated with known fatigue 
effects like reduced performance in vigilance and complex tasks (Banbury et al., 2001). 
Frequent noise exposure is also associated with fatigue-inducing health conditions such as 
sleep disorders (Bronzaft et al., 1998). A further aviation-related contributing factor for fatigue 
is exposure to altitude. Even in a pressurised commercial aircraft cabin altitude can be the 
equivalent of 8000 feet, resulting in arterial hypoxia which can be clinically significant for 
some individuals (Muhm et al., 2007). While this is not likely to represent a major health 
hazard to most healthy adults, after three to nine hours of exposure to this altitude the 




Under the effects of circadian rhythm and homeostatic pressure fatigue levels will be 
influenced by the nature and timing of shifts, but workload can be an additional influence 
(Dorrian et al., 2011). The relationship between workload and fatigue is not straightforward to 
characterise; still it is noted as a key consideration for managing fatigue in safety critical 
settings (Dawson et al., 2012, Dorrian et al., 2011, Folkard and Akerstedt, 2004). To some 
extent it depends on how workload is conceptualised and therefore how it is measured. For 
example workload is often broadly conceptualised according to duration, such as ‘number of 
work hours’, ‘overall time on duty’, or ‘time spent on a particular task’. It can also be defined 
in terms of task difficulty or complexity (Belenky et al., 2003). Popkin (1999) provides a useful 
definition for workload in an operational setting, presenting it as ‘(1) the demands of your 
work in terms of difficulty, complexity and time pressure; and (2) the effort you have to 
expend in meeting those demands’ (Popkin, 1999) (pg 998).  
For research in operational settings, workload has often been conceptualised in terms of shift 
duration. As could be logically expected, there is evidence that fatigue increases as shift 
duration lengthens, and this is associated with deteriorating performance on various 
psychophysiological performance measures and increased risks of injury or error (Caruso et 
al., 2004, Folkard and Tucker, 2003). What is less clear is whether a particular length of shift 
(for example an eight hour, ten hour or 12+ hour shift) is optimal with respect to fatigue-
related safety or productivity (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). For some groups of health care 
workers, extended shifts are associated with increased rates of fatigue and medical error 
(Gaba and Howard, 2002, Gander et al., 2007, Lockley et al., 2007). Yet there is also evidence 
that longer shifts do not result in increased rates of fatigue-related error (Anderson et al., 
2017), and that cognitive skills, as a marker of fatigue, are not influenced by shift duration 
(Guyette et al., 2013, Patterson et al., 2012a, Thomas et al., 2006). Such an apparent 
contradiction is no doubt due at least in part to the experimental designs used and not 
controlling for factors like time of day, type of work or the variable nature of an ‘in-shift’ 
workload (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). For example many health care or emergency service 
workers operate on an ‘on-call’ or ‘standby’ basis so may still have significant rest or even 
sleep opportunities during their shift.  
When considering workload in terms of time on task, complexity, or pressure, there is a high 
degree of mental fatigue associated with having to maintain focused attention and vigilance 
(Johns, 2009). It may also depend on the level of training an individual has received in order to 
17 
 
prepare them for completing those tasks (and therefore the effort expended (Popkin, 1999)). 
Short breaks may alleviate this degree of mental fatigue to some extent (Caldwell et al., 2012), 
but high workload may eventually exceed the capacity of a fatigued individual to perform 
(Mehta and Agnew, 2012). It is also important to consider that low workload may actually 
unmask the presence of physiological sleepiness (Caldwell et al., 2012). The detrimental 
effects associated with all-cause fatigue are described in greater detail next. 
2.3 DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FATIGUE  
Much of the evidence regarding the detrimental effects of fatigue is based on 
conceptualisation of fatigue in terms of the degree of sleep deprivation, and sometimes in 
terms of workload. For this thesis, where the focus is on individuals’ ability to function 
effectively or safely in an operational setting, the most relevant fatigue effects are those 
related in some way to cognition. These effects are most usually reported in terms of specific 
aspects of cognitive performance, or related endpoints such as accuracy in performing or 
completing tasks, or error/accident rates (Dawson et al., 2012). 
2.3.1 FATIGUE AND COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE 
Cognitive function is about the mental processes our brain undertakes like thinking, 
synthesising, remembering, judging and problem-solving. They are the processes we use to 
acquire knowledge and to understand. A plethora of studies have examined the impact of 
fatigue on human cognitive processes. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 
the impact of fatigue on every aspect of cognition in detail, the literature has broadly 
approached cognitive performance from two interrelated perspectives. Either by attempting 
to capture (measure) discrete aspects of cognition like alertness and vigilance, processing 
speed, or aspects of memory (Lim and Dinges, 2010); or by measuring outcomes based on 
complex or executive cognitive processes, for example mental flexibility, planning, decision 
making and language (Killgore, 2010). 
THE EFFECT OF FATIGUE ON VIGILANT ATTENTION (SIMPLE ATTENTION) 
Human beings’ ability to maintain sustained focus is considered a fundamentally important 
part of most other aspects of cognitive functioning (Lim and Dinges, 2008). Vigilant attention 
is the cognitive process for which most evidence exists regarding the impact of fatigue (Lim 
and Dinges, 2010), and it appears to be the aspect of cognition most reliably and intensely 
affected (Lim and Dinges, 2008). Tests to measure vigilant attention involve noticing a single 
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type of stimulus, while ignoring other perceivable information. No other discrimination or 
executive attention is required. Commonly this is a simple reaction time test like the 
Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT), which measures the time participants take to respond to a 
visual stimulus appearing at random intervals (Dinges and Powell, 1985).  
Evidence from studies using the PVT to measure the vigilant attention aspect of cognitive 
performance shows that as people become more sleep deprived, their overall reaction times 
slow and they make more errors (they have lapses where they fail to respond within 500 
milliseconds or respond when no cue has been made)(Lim and Dinges, 2008). When the 
fatigue is due to multiple nights in a row with reduced sleep (less than four hours a night) their 
vigilant attention continuously worsens in a ‘sleep-dose-dependent manner’ (Belenky et al., 
2003) (p.9). Even when sleep is restricted by only two hours a night there can be a significant 
degradation of performance, though the rate of decline levels off after about four days; if 
however the sleep restriction continues for up to two weeks, the effects are the same as if 
sleep had been totally restricted for two days (Van Dongen et al., 2003).  
Circadian influences on fatigue have already been discussed, and in terms of vigilant attention 
it manifests as improved cognitive performance (vigilance) during daytime hours when 
compared to performance during the night immediately preceding; this is sometime referred 
to as ‘circadian rescue’ (Lim and Dinges, 2008). Evidence based on the PVT also suggests there 
may be individual differences in the degree to which the cognitive performance of different 
people will be impacted by fatigue (Van Dongen et al., 2011). There may also be some 
moderating effect from age, with older people apparently less affected by losing one or more 
night’s sleep (Killgore, 2010). There is also a ‘time on task’ effect when people are fatigued; it 
manifests as a progressive worsening of ability to maintain focus on vigilant attention tasks 
the longer they run, even after relatively short periods of time (Lim and Dinges, 2008). 
THE EFFECT OF FATIGUE ON PROCESSING SPEED 
Processing speed refers to the time it takes to do simple or previously learned mental tasks; it 
is the ability to automatically process information. When cognitive processing speed is low, 
tasks involving maths, note taking or conversation tend to be slow, and there is interference 
with executive functions like planning, or making decisions. When processing speed is higher, 
the ability to think and learn is higher. In fatigue research, processing speed is often measured 
by tests requiring sequential addition or subtraction (Lim and Dinges, 2010). However analysis 
of its relative effect in explaining or predicting real-world cognitive failures compared to other 
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cognitive tests seem to suggest it may actually have limited practical significance in terms of 
predicting real-world cognitive failures (Monk, 2007). 
THE EFFECT OF FATIGUE ON MEMORY  
Short term memory is the system we use to temporarily store and manage the new 
information needed to carry out complex cognitive tasks like learning, reasoning and 
comprehension. It is tested by requiring the encoding or retrieving of information, for example 
having to remember and recall a word list or a series of numbers. There is a range of evidence 
showing that aspects of memory processing are degraded when sleep is restricted and ability 
to form new memories is more limited; though the effects appear to be less if the information 
which must be remembered has negative connotations (Killgore, 2010).  
Working memory is generally considered to be the part of memory used in immediate 
conscious perceptual and linguistic processing. The brain would need to use working memory 
when it processes briefly held new information required to complete complex cognitive tasks, 
so it is central to almost all executive function tasks. The types of tests which tend to be used 
to measure working memory require holding information for a brief period then making some 
type of decision or response. For example a list of items like words are provided, then the 
participant is asked if a particular item was in their list (Sternberg, 1969), or to repeat as many 
words from the list as they can. Sometime they are being asked to remember numbers, which 
is referred to as a digit span test (Wechsler et al., 1997). The time they take to respond is 
timed, or the number of items they can remember is counted. Both accuracy and response 
times in working memory tests appear affected by fatigue (Lim and Dinges, 2010), though the 
observed effects may be due to the well-recognised impact fatigue has on being able to 
maintain simple attention, rather than an actual decreased ability to juggle and utilise or 
remember cognitively held information (Killgore, 2010, Tucker et al., 2010). 
THE EFFECT OF FATIGUE ON COMPLEX ATTENTION 
Complex attention (cognitive control) is about being able to selectively maintain attention 
while being exposed to a range of information, and being able to multitask. Some aspects are 
measured using tests which require rapid switching of tasks (Couyoumdjian et al., 2010), as 
may be required if a person needs to modify their behaviour in response to the environment. 
Another aspect of complex attention involves being able to ignore irrelevant information and 
reduce cognitive interference. This is measured using tasks which include distracting 
information or stimuli. One example of such a task is the Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935) where 
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participants undertake a timed test involving naming the colour of words that are incongruent 
with what the word actually says, for example the word may be printed in green ink but the 
word itself spells ‘red’. The evidence for fatigue impact on complex attention is mixed. Task 
switching activities appear to be significantly affected, and this is independent of the effect of 
reduced simple attention or alertness (Couyoumdjian et al., 2010). However interference 
tasks, which require some aspect of resolving conflict, are not consistently impacted by 
fatigue (Sagaspe et al., 2006).  
THE EFFECT OF FATIGUE ON EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING  
Executive functioning is essentially an umbrella term used to describe the control or 
interaction of a range of cognitive processes; it is about processing and managing all the 
information and actions required to achieve specific objectives (Killgore, 2010). For example 
both working memory and complex attention are an essential influence in the executive 
functions of being able to maintain a dynamic awareness of what is going on around us 
(situational awareness), in adapting to challenges introduced by the environment, making 
decisions, controlling impulses, or to engaging in goal-directed behaviours without becoming 
distracted (Burke et al., 2015).  
The capacity to appropriately inhibit behaviour is also a key part of executive functioning, in 
that some behaviour is appropriate in some situations but not in others. This is often 
measured in the form of a go/no-go task where the participant has to respond to incoming 
stimuli but also prevent an automatic response (Drummond et al., 2006). Evidence based on 
this type of test shows inhibitory control of automatic responses (‘no-go’) is significantly 
impaired at relatively low levels of fatigue (after only 23 hours of sleep deprivation) whereas 
the ability to maintain attention and respond to the stimuli (‘go’) remains relatively intact 
(Drummond et al., 2006).  
In terms of emotional processing, modulating or integrating various aspect of emotion are key 
influences on many executive functions like communicating, maintaining control, and 
understanding (Walker, 2009). Fatigued individuals have been observed to be more aggressive 
in terms of social exchanges (Killgore, 2010). They may have difficulty in finding and delivering 
the right word and their speech is often less expressive. As fatigue increases people often 
become withdrawn, less likely to converse, increasingly irritable, increasingly distracted by 
discomfort, and may also neglect smaller tasks or be more accepting of their own errors (Flin 
et al., 2008). Fatigue also increases risk taking behaviours, and this is even more pronounced 
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when the outcome is framed in terms of ‘gain’ compared to ‘loss’ (Killgore et al., 2007b). 
Decision making is slower and less able to adapt, particularly when based on a choice dilemma 
that is emotive in nature or contains an element that is personal in some way to the person 
making the decision (Killgore et al., 2007a). These effects are not moderated by applying 
short-term fatigue reduction strategies such as administering caffeine, which improves simple 
alertness (Killgore et al., 2007b).  
Overall, evidence for the impact of fatigue on executive cognitive functioning does not appear 
to support definitive conclusions. Findings from some studies show fatigue is associated with 
degraded executive function (Jones and Harrison, 2001) whereas those from other studies do 
not (Pace-Schott et al., 2009, Tucker et al., 2010). A review of evidence up to the year 2000 
concluded that cognitive processes which involve solving problems based on critical reasoning 
and logical deduction are not significantly affected by fatigue, whereas fatigue does have a 
detrimental effect if innovation or flexibility is required (Harrison and Horne, 2000). For 
example it significantly impairs decision making in situations where effective communication 
is required, when plans need to change, and when there are unexpected challenges or 
distractions (Harrison and Horne, 2000). This was supported by a 2010 meta-analysis, which 
synthesised the results of more than 70 studies classified according to the measures used to 
evaluate cognitive performance (Lim and Dinges, 2010). The findings were that fatigue has a 
universally degrading effect across most cognitive domains (other than crystallised 
intelligence and reasoning) but simple attention is the cognitive domain most affected by 
fatigue (Lim and Dinges, 2010). Interestingly, the authors of this review also contended that 
while they accept decrements in decision making or working memory do contribute to real 
world accidents or errors, their analysis suggested the simplest explanation for most of these 
occurrences were deficits in sustained attention (Lim and Dinges, 2010); it is a view which 
appears to have some support from others (Killgore, 2010, Tucker et al., 2010). 
SUMMARISING THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON COGNITION 
It is not possible to quantify or predict the impact of fatigue on specific domains of cognitive 
function, though most aspects of cognitive performance are likely to be degraded including 
vigilance, memory retention, sensory perception, decision making and creative thinking 
(Alhola and Polo-Kantola, 2007). The domain most consistently and significantly affected 
appears to be vigilance (Lim and Dinges, 2010) which may explain why the degrading effects of 
fatigue appear to be so global. That is, without the ability to remain alert or maintain 
attention it is not possible to engage in more complex cognitive processing (Killgore, 2010). In 
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addition it appears possible that most accidents or errors can plausibly be explained simply by 
failures to remain vigilant (Lim and Dinges, 2010). Where the literature is inconsistent 
however, is that some studies have also shown that complex cognitive function deficits often 
remain even after simple alertness or vigilance is restored (for example via a stimulant like 
caffeine) (Killgore et al., 2007a, Killgore et al., 2007b).  
2.3.2 FATIGUE AND TASK PERFORMANCE  
Many studies also describe the effect of fatigue using some sort of task completion as the 
endpoint, for example a simulated driving task or medical task, or an advanced motor skills or 
hand-eye coordination task. Degradation is generally expressed in terms of reduced accuracy 
or timing. One such 1997 study which stimulated particular interest demonstrated that 
performance in hand-eye tracking and coordination tasks was affected by fatigue to the point 
that after only 17 hours of continuous wakefulness, participants’ performance was statistically 
equivalent to having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05% (Dawson and Reid, 1997). This is 
the same alcohol limit above which driving is illegal in many countries and a doctor would be 
considered unsafe to be on duty (Lockley et al., 2007). The 1997 findings were confirmed by 
subsequent studies which demonstrated similar levels of impairment after similar times 
awake when measuring dual task tracking and vigilance tests, hand-eye coordination, and 
simulated or actual driving performance (Arnedt et al., 2005, Williamson and Feyer, 2000, 
Powell et al., 2001).  
Studies of car, truck and train driving tasks (Gillberg et al., 1996, Philip et al., 2003, Dorrian et 
al., 2007) have noted fatigue effects in terms being able to maintain speed consistency, speed 
limits, lane positioning, and avoid braking errors. A more recent study measuring 
marksmanship accuracy showed that precision (shot accuracy) was not affected by fatigue; 
but the time taken to react and distinguish between friendly and unfriendly targets was 
significantly slowed (especially when the targets were ‘friendly’), the wrong choice was often 
made, and participants did not recognise that their performance was degrading (Smith et al., 
2017). A very recent randomised trial compared performance in a ‘self-prepared’ detailed 
planning task (breakfast preparation) between a group who slept overnight after making the 
plan, and a group who remained awake (Barner et al., 2018). Overall performance, and 
performance in one task sub-category (adherence to the plan), were not significantly different 
between the two groups. However performance in another subcategory (accuracy in carrying 
out aspects of the task) was significantly degraded, and the authors concluded their findings 
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were a tentative indication of the role sleep plays in supporting aspects of complex plan 
execution (Barner et al., 2018). 
In health care-related research, the tasks are often clinically relevant activities like intubation 
of a patient, equipment checking, or detecting and correcting abnormal clinical events. The 
authors of a 2005 meta-analysis noted that while accepted wisdom may be that vigilance is 
the aspect of cognition most vulnerable to fatigue, their synthesis of the evidence from 60 
studies showed that performance of clinically relevant tasks was 70% more negatively 
affected than vigilance (Philibert, 2005). They did however acknowledge the somewhat 
heterogeneous nature of their study sample, which comprised of outcome measures based on 
clinical tasks, clinical performance, and high fidelity simulation (Philibert, 2005). Findings from 
individual studies have revealed little detrimental effect in terms of performing well-practiced 
tasks like patient intubation (Allen et al., 2001) or a range of tasks specific to anaesthesia 
(Garden et al., 2012, Howard et al., 2003), whereas other tasks like those requiring high levels 
of hand-eye coordination (in surgeons performing laparoscopy) have shown susceptibility to 
fatigue (Taffinder et al., 1998, Grantcharov, 2001 #854, Grantcharov, 2001 #854). The 
somewhat inconsistent picture may be due in part to methodological issues within individual 
studies (Gaba and Howard, 2002), but logically it is also likely to depend what aspects of 
neurocognition the tasks being evaluated actually require. It is clearly important to consider or 
evaluate the effect of fatigue according to tasks that are specific and relevant to the 
operational setting in question.  
2.3.3 FATIGUE AND ERROR 
In many safety critical settings there is specific interest in the impact of fatigue on endpoints 
like rates of error or accidents. While it is challenging to encapsulate the evidence in 
quantified terms, fatigue has definitively been linked to increased error rates in health care 
(Lockley et al., 2006), aviation (Caldwell et al., 2009), and the rail industry (Dorrian et al., 
2007). In general transport settings fatigue is considered the main cause of up to 20% of all 
accidents (Akerstedt, 2000), with a single night of reduced sleep associated with attentional 
lapses and causation of traffic accidents (Komada et al., 2013). In shift workers generally, 
fatigue has been shown to significantly raise the risk of accidents in the workplace (Akerstedt 
and Wright, 2009), with the risk of incidents or accidents 30% higher on night shift compared 
to morning shift and 36% higher on the fourth consecutive night shift compared to the first 
(Folkard and Tucker, 2003). People are particularly likely to make errors when the tasks they 
are undertaking are also repetitive, or require sustained vigilance (Gillberg et al., 1996) 
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With respect to medical error, a series of studies examined the impact of fatigue due to 
extended work hours in both physicians and nursing staff, finding that when nursing shifts 
exceeded 12.5 hours they were at least twice as likely to make an error (Lockley et al., 2007). 
Junior doctors who worked more than 4 extended-hour shifts (>24 hrs) a month (averaging 85 
work hours a week) made 36% more serious errors than those who were limited to shifts of 
no more than 16 hours (averaging 65 work hours a week); they also made five times as many 
diagnostic errors (Landrigan et al., 2004). Moreover, their risk of having a motor vehicle crash 
on their way home from work doubled (Barger et al., 2005). In a study evaluating the effect of 
prolonged wakefulness on the management (simulated) of critical care patients, medical 
residents made increasing numbers of serious medical errors with increasing time awake 
(Sharpe et al., 2010). In terms of self-reported error, survey-based studies have noted the 
association between fatigue and medical error with 32% of doctors working in anaesthetics 
reporting having made a fatigue-related error in the previous six months (Gander et al., 2000), 
and the odds of a medical error or adverse event reportedly 2.3 times higher among 
emergency medicine clinicians who were fatigued, compared to those who were not 
(Patterson et al., 2012a). Similarly, a prospective longitudinal study showed that higher levels 
of fatigue were independently associated with self-perceived medical errors (West et al., 
2009).  
2.3.4 HEALTH EFFECTS OF FATIGUE 
The detrimental effects of fatigue on general health are outside the scope of this thesis, but 
briefly, sleep disruption is known to affect general health in terms of increased rates of 
mortality and morbidity (Buysse, 2014). It is associated with a 48% higher risk of developing or 
dying from heart disease and a range of other health conditions including type 2 diabetes, 
hypertension, obesity and poor self-rated health (Cappuccio et al., 2011). 
2.3.5 SUMMARISING THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FATIGUE 
With respect to operational settings the most significant detrimental effects from fatigue 
involve cognition. There is strong evidence fatigue slows response speed and varies 
performance on measures of alertness, attention and vigilance; there is less clarity on whether 
this has a flow-on effect to higher level executive function, perception or memory, or whether 
some aspects of higher level cognitive capacities are independently affected. For example it 
appears from the evidence presented in 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 that fatigue may have less of a 
degrading impact on reasoning, decision making and planning tasks which are rule-based. In 
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contrast it has a clear detrimental effect on tasks requiring innovation, divergence, creativity, 
or emotional processing; furthermore, degradation may not be resolved by commonly used 
fatigue countermeasures which stimulate alertness.  
In health care settings fatigue has been shown to have a number of detrimental effects when 
evaluated in terms of cognitive performance, decision making, communication and medical 
error (Gander et al., 2008, Lockley et al., 2007, Maltese et al., 2016, West et al., 2009, Sharpe 
et al., 2010). One meta-analysis determined that fatigue due to working a shift 24 to 30 hours 
in duration reduced clinical performance in physicians by more than 1.5 standard deviations 
(Philibert, 2005). Unfortunately it is a reality of many 24 hour a day environments, including 
healthcare, that most individuals operating in these settings are at risk of fatigue-related 
degradations in performance. The implications of this for healthcare will be discussed further 
in section 2.6.3 but next, general strategies for minimising or managing fatigue are 
considered. 
2.4 MANAGING FATIGUE 
The nature of work has changed markedly in the past 50 years. In previous less technologically 
advanced eras, fatigue may have been largely physical in nature and work generally took place 
during daylight hours. In today’s world fatigue is more likely to reflect neurocognitive 
demands than physical demands, and there may be the added influence of night work 
resulting in circadian and sleep disruption (Fletcher et al., 2015). Researchers from aviation 
and other transport-focused industries have been particularly active in determining 
appropriate evidence-based strategies for minimising or recovering from the cognitive effects 
of fatigue. In aviation, the focus has been on implementing appropriate shift design and flight 
crew configurations in light of the effect of time zone changes and circadian misalignment 
(Caldwell et al., 2012, Gander et al., 1998, Gander et al., 2013). In ground-based transport 
settings there has also been a focus on facilitating opportunities for obtaining adequate 
quality of sleep, managing task monotony, and using warning systems to monitor fatigue 
(Fletcher et al., 2015). In medicine and general shift work settings the focus has been on 
prescribing specific timings, patterns and durations for duty shifts (Akerstedt and Wright, 
2009, Landrigan et al., 2007). What is clear, as illustrated by the evidence presented in section 
2.2 is that effective strategies to manage fatigue must take into account sleep and circadian 
factors, including what time of day the opportunities to sleep take place (Dawson and 
McCulloch, 2005).  
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2.4.1 SLEEP RECOVERY 
Sleep is of key importance in minimising or recovering from the degrading cognitive impacts of 
fatigue (Dawson and McCulloch, 2005). For example after a night of total sleep deprivation, 
non-REM/REM sleep cycles and performance return to baseline levels within two nights when 
at least eight hours sleep on each of those nights was obtained (Balkin et al., 2008). This takes 
longer if the recovery sleep is not night based or the individual is not adapted to the local time 
zone (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2016). Recovery from chronic but 
partial sleep restriction appears to happen more slowly, and can take between a few days and 
at least a week depending on the tasks being measured and the degree of sleep deprivation 
each night (Axelsson et al., 2008). For example lab-based studies suggest three 8-hour night 
sleep opportunities are not enough to recover from the cumulative effects of seven 
consecutive nights of restriction to a 7-hour sleep (Belenky et al., 2003). Recovery is likely to 
be faster if people have obtained sufficient amounts of sleep (pre-loading) in the time leading 
up to the period of sleep restriction (Rupp et al., 2009), though one 10 hour night sleep is not 
enough to recover from the effects of five nights when only four hours of sleep was obtained 
per night (Banks et al., 2010). 
2.4.2 SHIFT DESIGN 
Optimal shift design takes into account impacts on sleep quality, but also circadian influences 
on sleep and performance. The amount of sleep a shift worker obtains during the day is likely 
to be between one and four hours less than if the sleep was at night (Lockley et al., 2006, 
Mitler et al., 1997), a trend which tends to continue even if individuals work a series of 
nightshifts (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). In fact when several night shifts in a row are worked 
sleepiness increases and there is a greater likelihood accidents will occur (Folkard and Tucker, 
2003). However in terms of the risks shift work presents overall, it is not completely clear 
whether most risk arises because of sleep disturbance, or from the effect of being awake for 
extended periods of time and working during the circadian trough (Akerstedt and Wright, 
2009). The crucial factors in shift design are: how quickly and in what direction shift changes 
should occur; how long the shifts should be; what time changeovers should occur; and what 
length of breaks should be taken (Flin et al., 2008).  
DIRECTION AND SPEED OF SHIFT ROTATION 
Generally the recommendation is that work shifts are best rotated in a clockwise direction 
with workers moving from a day shift to an evening shift to a night shift (Sallinen and 
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Kecklund, 2010). The premise is that under the circadian influence it is easier to delay sleep 
rather than advance it, and most people tend towards a circadian cycle that is just slightly 
longer than 24 hours (Burgess, 2007). This pattern of rotation may also provide longer 
recovery time for sleep between shifts (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). In terms of speed, shift 
rotation can range from fast (every two to three days), to very slow (three to four weeks) or 
there may be no rotation at all, (permanent night shift for example). One pattern not 
recommended is for people to work between four and seven nights then change to day shift 
(Flin et al., 2008). With this pattern the circadian rhythm is disrupted, then some partial 
adjustment occurs, then it is disrupted again. Working on permanent night shift is also not 
recommended because of the impact on general health, well-being and socialisation, and the 
evidence that most people do not ever fully adapt (Flin et al., 2008). Some authors point out 
that the evidence for the benefit of forward rotating shifts is not clear cut (Akerstedt and 
Wright, 2009), and that generally there are a low number of controlled intervention studies 
examining shift scheduling (Sallinen and Kecklund, 2010).  
In settings like mining and air-traffic control rapid shift rotations in an anticlockwise direction 
(day-night-evening) has been shown to not degrade performance any more than a clockwise 
rotation (Cruz et al., 2003). They may result in less sleep when the worker is on night shift but 
more when on the evening shift (Sallinen and Kecklund, 2010). However objective sleep 
measurement has shown there is a rapid accumulation of sleep debt with this shift pattern, 
and if this pattern is to be employed obtaining adequate sleep (at least six hours) the night 
previous to working the night shift is vital (Signal and Gander, 2007).  
The overall summary would appear to be that circadian rhythm is probably least disrupted by 
working as few nights in a row as possible, though if more nights in a row are required slow 
rotation does at least allow the circadian system to adapt, albeit slowly. Which pattern is most 
suitable may depend on the nature of the operational setting, and the tasks being carried out 
within that setting. For example a quick shift rotation may well result in individuals who are 
maladapted and acutely sleep deprived, and this is clearly not a good condition where 
demanding or high risk tasks are to be undertaken (Flin et al., 2008). Rotating shifts in a 
forward direction is generally recommended, though a key aspect of this pattern is to roster 
for sufficient time off between shift changeovers (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). 
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SHIFT DURATION AND TIME OFF BETWEEN SHIFTS 
The evidence regarding optimal shift duration is somewhat mixed, as already discussed in 
section 2.2.8. The optimal duration in terms of managing fatigue is again likely to depend what 
the operational requirements are, whether sleep or rest is possible during shifts, whether 
there is a high cognitive load, a degree of monotony, and what the consequences of error are 
(Dorrian et al., 2011).  
In general, shifts of no longer than 12 hours are advisable because they encourage better 
sleep between shifts; there should also be a break of at least 12 hours between each shift 
worked (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). One recommendation is that no more than five to 
seven days in a row should be worked, and then only if the duration of the shifts are not 
extended beyond eight hours (Knauth and Hornberger, 2003). Another useful approach may 
be to compress the working week by working increased hours per day and thus allowing 
longer breaks (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). Having adequate time off following successive 
night, or long duration shifts, is understandably also important. Again, a recommendation is at 
least two days off after completing night shift/s, and in general single days of work 
sandwiched between two days off should also be avoided (Knauth and Hornberger, 2003). It 
may also assist if the workers can have a degree of influence and also some flexibility, when 
planning shift patterns and rosters; this is known to positively influence the quality and 
quantity of their sleep, how they feel about their work, and other aspects of their personal 
lives like being able to spend time with family (Costa et al., 2006).  
TIME OF CHANGEOVER 
Over a 24 hour day, shifts tend to be worked in two or three-shift blocks. The optimal start 
and finish times need to take into account circadian and sleep impacts, but also try and avoid 
negative flow-on effects to those who start or finish on the following shifts. There is not one 
ideal pattern because it obviously will depend on a range of factors such as whether fewer 
people will be working the late evening or night shifts (as is often the case in health care 
settings), and of course what the nature of the work is. So in general, aligning the impact of 
the circadian system alongside operational requirements is likely to be the key consideration 
in determining ideal shift changeover times. A morning shift is best not started until 0700 to 
maximise the opportunities for sleep before the shift starts, and for the same reason the 
evening shift should ideally end as early as possible (by 2200 or 2300) (Knauth and 
Hornberger, 2003). The conflict of course is that night shift should also ideally end as early as 
possible to maximise sleeping opportunities, but this is unlikely to be possible without then 
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impacting on the next (morning) shift. For some settings there may be solutions such as 
supplementary staffing on night or long duration shifts, such as can occur in aviation (Roach et 
al., 2011) and health-care (Poynter et al., 2012). The aim then is that supplementary staffing 
levels can provide some opportunity for night staff to sleep/nap during shift. 
2.4.3 FATIGUE COUNTERMEASURES  
It is a reality of many operational settings that some degree of fatigue is unavoidable. Many of 
the measures taken to counter fatigue are aimed at trying to limit as opposed to prevent 
fatigue, using strategies aimed at mitigating or minimising fatigue effects (Williamson and 
Friswell, 2013).  
SLEEP HYGIENE  
Sleep hygiene is really about the strategies which can be used to improve the length and 
quality of sleep, the main purpose being to avoid sleep restriction. Many recommendations 
relate to the fact that sleep may be taking place during daylight hours, so the environment 
should generally be cool, and as quiet and dark as possible (Burgess, 2007). White or 
continuous noise (like fans) can be useful, along with ear-plugs, avoiding sleeping in rooms 
close to roads, turning off phones and so on. In general, good sleep habits include not 
watching electronic screens within the bedroom, using a consistent ‘wind-down and getting 
ready for bed’ routine, not consuming caffeine within four hours of bed, not exercising heavily 
or smoking just before bed, not using alcohol as a sleep aid, and exercising regularly (Knauth 
and Hornberger, 2003). 
REST BREAKS 
A potential mechanism for reducing fatigue impact is to take frequent short rest breaks when 
possible, but there is not a large body of research which informs this issue (Williamson and 
Friswell, 2013). Light exercise and a break from operational tasks are known to improve 
productivity, reduce subjective sleepiness, provide mental simulation and improve mood 
(Folkard and Tucker, 2003, Neri et al., 2003). Monotony can intensify the effects of fatigue and 
unmask the presence of physiological sleepiness (Gillberg et al., 1996), and these effects can 
be reduced through strategies like rotating duties where possible, talking to colleagues or 
moving around, and changing posture (for example working standing up for a while) (Roehrs 




Napping is not a viable option in many operational settings, and naps do not replace the need 
for adequate sleep, but they can be useful either before or during a shift (Smith-Coggins et al., 
2006). If fatigue is present and there is time for some sleep, napping may be the most 
effective non-pharmacological way of improving alertness (Caldwell et al., 2012). Naps can 
improve reaction times, decision making, memory, and decrease risky behaviours and 
incidents or accidents, even when they are relatively short, but the general rule is the longer 
the nap the greater the benefit (Neri et al., 2003). In terms of actually using naps to mitigate 
fatigue during night work, a prophylactic hour long nap prior to a night shift results in less 
sleepiness than taking a two hour nap during the night shift, although this finding may be due 
more to the impact of sleep inertia which is worst when waking from deep slow wave sleep 
(such as may have occurred during the two hour night time nap) (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). 
In aviation, pilots who use inflight napping report significantly lower levels of fatigue (Petrie et 
al., 2004). Some general recommendations for maximising the effect of napping as a fatigue 
countermeasure are as follows (Caldwell, 2003): 
 Take them with the circadian cycle in mind, so best at night between 0100 and 0600, 
and during the day between 1400 and 1600 
 Be mindful of the effects of sleep inertia and the fact it may take 15 to 20 minutes to 
overcome post-nap sluggishness. It is probably not wise to undertake safety-critical 
tasks immediately after waking 
 Time pre-duty naps close to when starting duty to receive the maximum benefit 
 Nap early in the period of sleep deprivation as a preventative measure, so before 
extreme fatigue effects are noticed 
 Make naps as long as possible (40 minutes to two hours) but even 10 minutes of sleep 
is better than nothing 
DIET 
Everyone should eat regular meals and a balanced diet, but in terms of fatigue due to working 
at night it is generally recommended that the largest meal should not be taken prior to going 
on shift. Rather, it should be taken after the main sleep period, with a light one in the middle 
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of a night (perhaps protein rather than carbohydrate rich), and a small snack or drink before 
going to sleep (Flin et al., 2008, Knauth, 2003 #830). There is some evidence that a high fat 
meal reduces alertness and vigilance but overall it may be the size of the meal that is more 
sleep-inducing that the precise nutrient content of that meal (Lieberman, 2003). Being 
dehydrated does not appear to affect cognitive or neurophysiological function but it can 
increase subjective drowsiness and concentration (Szinnai et al., 2005).  
Strategic ingestion of caffeine can be useful in maintaining or improving alertness, particularly 
in those who do not consume large amounts on a regular basis. Lab-based studies show that 
effects on performance and physiological sleepiness can be observed within 30 minutes and 
may last four to five hours, with the effective dose between 200 and 600 mg (a cup of coffee 
contains approximately 100 mg of caffeine, a cup of tea or glass of coke about 50mg) (Caldwell 
et al., 2009). In operational settings caffeine (250 – 400mg) could proactively be taken after 
the first two hours of night shift, but should probably be avoided close to the end of shift 
because it may affect subsequent sleep (Knauth and Hornberger, 2003). It could also be used 
in combination with a short nap because it takes up to 30 minutes to enter the bloodstream; if 
taken just prior to the nap the alerting effects can coincide with waking from the nap. Lab-
based studies show that combining caffeine with a nap, or bright light with a nap, improves 
alertness more than each measure on its own (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009).  
The key feature of caffeine use is that it must be used judiciously, because tolerance can 
develop and it is also associated with insomnia, increased blood pressure, and stomach issues; 
no more than 1000mg in a 24 hour period should be used (Caldwell et al., 2009).  
MEDICATION 
The use of stimulant medications like Modafinil and Dexedrine to counter fatigue is really only 
associated with military aviation; it requires careful medical monitoring and is generally only 
approved during times of active combat or exceptional circumstances when it is impossible for 
sleep to be restored (Caldwell et al., 2012). More commonly used medications are hypnotics 
(sleep medications) and melatonin, both of which are aimed at counteracting circadian effects 
on sleep because they may promote sleep at times ‘out of sync’ with the circadian cycle. The 
long term use and safety of melatonin is still debated, but it may have a beneficial effect in 
improving daytime sleep, assisting adjustment to new shifts, and advancing circadian rhythm 
(Burgess, 2007, Caldwell et al., 2009). Some hypnotic sleep medications have been shown to 
be useful in improving day time sleep and night time performance, but they should not be 
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used unless there is a guaranteed break from duty requirements (chance to sleep) for at least 
eight hours after ingestion due to possible ‘hangover’ effects. In aviation contexts pilots are 
generally restricted from flying in the 24 hours after ingestion; in addition it has been 
suggested that because they have potential to be addictive they should be used only 
occasionally (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2016). 
BRIGHT LIGHT 
Bright light during the night suppresses melatonin production, and within 30 minutes it can 
promote alertness; it also plays a key role in shifting the circadian clock to an earlier or later 
time, so can be extremely beneficial in adapting to new time zones or shifts (Czeisler et al., 
2005). In general terms it is probably useful to be exposed to bright light in the evening when 
starting night shifts and to limit exposure to sunlight (for example with sunglasses) on the way 
home. The converse applies when moving back to day shifts with bright light in the morning 
and limiting evening light exposure. While bright light is a useful countermeasure for acute 
fatigue, care must be taken in terms of the timing to ensure that the level of light exposure 
does not have the opposite of the intended effect, such as can happen when workers are 
exposed to sunrise driving home from work and then have trouble sleeping due to the alerting 
effects (Caldwell et al., 2009). Others express reservations about using bright light during night 
shifts to alleviate sleepiness, because of its potential negative effect on mood and motivation 
(Burgess, 2007) 
EDUCATION  
An important feature of the role of education in managing fatigue is that it needs to include 
both those organising roster schedules (who may not necessarily be experienced shift 
workers) and the workers themselves (Knauth and Hornberger, 2003). In fact Rosekind (2005) 
made the point that from a societal perspective ‘there is gross underestimation and very little 
acknowledgement of the risks and costs related to sleep loss, circadian disruption, sleep 
disorders, reduced alertness and performance’ (Rosekind, 2005) (p S21). He further suggested 
that providing education for the general public and professionals was vital if effective 
strategies for managing fatigue were to be implemented, and this has been supported by 
others (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009, Caldwell et al., 2009, Williamson and Friswell, 2013).  
In terms of specific content the education should particularly cover the causes and effects of 
fatigue; the key point being fatigue is physiological in nature, so cannot be overcome simply 
by training or willpower (Caldwell et al., 2009). Other key factors to include are the 
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importance of maximising and protecting sleep opportunities, recognising likely times of 
vulnerability to fatigue during shift (when individuals have been awake for 16 hours or longer, 
or are on shift between midnight and 0600), and potential measures which can be taken to 
counteract fatigue effects (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). Also, factors like implementing 
advantageous scheduling strategies, safe driving, the importance of physical activity, and the 
impact shift work can have on family and social life (Knauth and Hornberger, 2003). It is 
helpful if families can understand the importance of having enough sleep at home, and how to 
achieve this. 
PLANNING FOR AND MONITORING FATIGUE 
If night work is unavoidable there are going to be negative effects on sleep, performance and 
alertness. Countermeasures aimed at promoting either sleep or wakefulness will assist in 
reducing some of the negative effects but will not change human physiology or behaviour 
(Akerstedt and Wright, 2009, Rosekind, 2005). The science of fatigue and sleep can specifically 
inform the design of work rosters and work activities (Burgess, 2007). It is ideal to avoid the 
need for high risk or complex activities between 0200 and 0600, or employ some of the 
additional countermeasures previously outlined if such tasks are unavoidable during those 
times. Measuring fatigue levels would also be useful as a means of monitoring the effect of 
scheduling and other fatigue management strategies, or to illustrate where individuals may be 
highly fatigued. Potential methods for doing so are discussed next. 
2.5 APPROACHES TO MEASURING FATIGUE  
Measuring fatigue has challenges, in that it is a relatively complex phenomenon and there are 
no biochemical markers which quantify it (Rosekind, 2005). Though fatigue itself cannot be 
measured, the impact of fatigue can. The approach researchers take is to ‘infer’ or estimate 
levels of fatigue based on the known effects of fatigue on various cognitive tasks or 
behaviours, or on subjective experience (Gander et al., 2011). Whether measurement is for 
the purpose of managing fatigue-related risk, or for fatigue-related research, one or more of 
the following is usually undertaken: direct estimation of an individual’s level of fatigue, 
measurement of fatigue-related performance, or measurement of the likely contributing 
factors to fatigue such as sleep or workload.  
In laboratory settings it is possible to employ a range of fatigue-relevant measures to try and 
gain a picture that is as comprehensive as possible. It is also relatively easy to tightly control 
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the environment. When fatigue is being measured in an operational context however, 
conditions are likely to be far less standardised and there are limitations on the number of 
measures which can practically be applied. It is also important that the measurement process 
does not impinge on operational duties (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
2016). Whatever the purpose or setting, the key principles of measurement still apply in that 
measures must provide valid and reliable measurements for whatever they purport to 
measure (Balkin et al., 2004, Streiner et al., 2015). Measures can be both subjective and 
objective, each option possessing various weaknesses and strengths. 
2.5.1 SUBJECTIVE MEASUREMENT 
FATIGUE MEASURES 
Subjective fatigue measures require individuals to rate aspects of their own fatigue or 
performance on a visual analogue or Likert-type scale. Fatigue-relevant wording descriptors 
are used to represent various levels along the scale. Examples of well-established fatigue 
scales include: 
 A visual analogue scale (VAS), which is typically 10cm in length and anchored with 
descriptors such as “no fatigue” at one end and “extremely fatigued” at the other end. 
The individual rating their fatigue marks the line at the appropriate point, and the 
distance along the line is then measured. The key advantage of the VAS is that it may 
be sensitive to small changes. In addition, while not all authors agree (Wewers and 
Lowe, 1990), data from such scales is generally be assumed to represent interval or 
ratio levels of measurement, thus potentially allowing for higher levels of statistical 
analysis (Price et al., 1983).  
 The Samn-Perelli (SP) fatigue scale is a Likert-type scale which was originally 
developed to measure fatigue in US aircrew (Samn and Perelli, 1982), also provides a 
numerical measure of fatigue. There are seven levels described on the scale ranging 
from 1 = “fully alert, wide awake” through to 7 = “completely exhausted, unable to 
function effectively”, yielding data that is essentially ordinal in nature. 
 A more recent occupationally focused scale is the Occupational Fatigue Exhaustion 
Recovery Scale ©, designed to assess current, or recent, work-related fatigue and 
recovery. There are 15 items on the scale in total, with the initial five a subscale to 
assess the presence of chronic work-related fatigue (OFER-CF), the next five assessing 
35 
 
acute work-related fatigue (OFER-AF), and the last five items assessing intershift 
recovery from fatigue (OFER-IR) (Winwood et al., 2006). Each subscale produces a 
score between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating higher levels of the domain 
the subscale represents. For example for the OFER-IR scale, higher scores indicate 
greater recovery from fatigue between shifts (Winwood et al., 2005). 
SLEEPINESS MEASURES 
 A VAS can also be used to measure sleepiness, for example the anchor descriptors at 
either end may read “alert” at the lower end of the scale, and “drowsy” at the upper 
limit. 
 The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) is a validated measure of sleepiness (Åkerstedt 
and Gillberg, 1990). It is closely associated with measures known to be sensitive to 
fatigue such as electroencephalographic (EEG) activity and psychomotor vigilance 
(Kaida et al., 2006). The Likert-type KSS scale has nine numbered levels (though only 
every second level on the scale has a word descriptor) ranging from 1 = “Very alert” 
through to 9 = “Very sleepy, great effort to keep awake”.  
 The Stanford Sleepiness Scale (SSS) is also a single item measure of sleepiness, 
requiring respondents to select one of seven statements best representing their 
current level of perceived sleepiness (Hoddes et al., 1973). The Likert-type scale has 
seven points ranging from 1 = Feeling active, vital, alert, or wide awake through to 7 = 
No longer fighting sleep, sleep onset soon; having dream-like thoughts. 
 The Epworth Sleepiness Scale © (ESS) provides a numerical measure of an individual’s 
usual daytime sleep propensity, based on their retrospective recall of being likely to 
doze off during eight activities of daily life (Johns, 2009). These include watching TV, 
sitting talking to someone, or while in a car stopped for a few minutes in traffic (Johns, 
1991). Ratings are made for each statement between 0 = “would never doze” through 
to 3 = “high chance of dozing”. Scores are summed to provide a possible total 
between 0 and 24, with scores of more than 10 indicative of excessive daytime 
sleepiness (Johns, 2009).  
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MEASURES OF SLEEP OR SLEEP QUALITY 
Sleep diaries are aimed at determining an individual’s sleep pattern, and the amount and 
quality of their sleep. Morning questions are ideally completed within an hour of getting up, 
night questions just prior to getting into bed. The morning questions should include items 
such as time they got into bed, time they started attempting sleep, time it took to get to sleep, 
number and length of any periods of wakening during the night, morning wakening time, time 
of rising for the day, and the quality of the sleep overall (that is, very poor, poor, fair, good, 
very good) (Carney et al., 2012). Night questions are related to events during the day, such as 
whether the individual had any naps, how long and how many, their alcohol intake for the day 
if any, number and timing of any caffeinated drinks, and the details of any medications they 
used to assist sleep (Carney et al., 2012). 
The Pittsburgh sleep quality index (PSQI) assesses various aspects of sleep over a one month 
period, including subjective sleep quality, sleep latency, sleep disturbances, use of sleeping 
medication and daytime dysfunction (Buysse et al., 1989). Scores can range between 0 and 21 
with scores ≤ 5 indicating good sleep quality and scores higher than this indicating poor sleep 
quality (Buysse et al., 1989). 
2.5.2 OBSERVED MEASURES  
Observed fatigue-related measures generally aim to assess sleep, sleepiness, or fatigue-
related performance 
SLEEP MEASURES  
Polysomnography (PSG) is considered to be the gold standard for measuring sleep in 
laboratory-based settings (van de Water et al., 2011). Multiple physiologic signals are 
recorded including brainwaves (via EEG), eye movements (via electrooculogram, or EOG), chin 
muscle activity (via chin electromyogram, or EMG), leg movements (via leg EMG), and heart 
rate and rhythm (via electrocardiogram, or ECG). The EEG, EOG, and chin EMG signals 
determine whether a person is awake or asleep,  and also what stages of sleep they are in at 
various times. It is a relatively specialised and labour-intensive process, with electrodes 
attached to relevant parts of the body and the results scored manually by experts to define 
sleep stages (van de Water et al., 2011). Increasing fatigue prior to sleep may also be detected 
as microsleeps and rolling eye movements, though the latter indicator may have some 
limitations in operational settings, for example when people are driving, where the rolling 
movements may be indistinguishable from scanning the environment (Johns, 2009). 
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Actiwatches are wrist-worn devices which can monitor activity through means of an inbuilt 
accelerometer. Actigraphy has been used and validated in a number of populations including 
healthy people, relatively inactive older people, and insomniacs, to indicate when an 
individual may be asleep. While it can be used to estimate the timing and quality of periods of 
sleep, it cannot actually distinguish between sleep and wakefulness, so lying very still for 
example will be measured as sleep. The degree to which various devices and scoring 
algorithms agree with PSG reference results depend on which specific population and sleep 
variables are being compared. This should be taken into account when selecting which device 
and scoring algorithm to use. It is useful for measuring sleep in field-based or clinical settings 
because of its relative simplicity, though a general caution is that actigraphy tends to 
overestimate sleep when compared against gold standard PSG (van de Water et al., 2011). 
‘SLEEPINESS’ MEASURES 
The Multiple Sleep Latency Test (MSLT) is performed in lab-based settings, essentially 
measuring daytime sleepiness in terms of how long an individual takes to fall asleep. The 
individual is asked to try and fall asleep while lying in a warm, darkened room and monitored 
via EEG, EOG and EMG electrodes to determine the time taken for sleep to occur (Carskadon 
and Dement, 1982). A sleep latency score of less than less than five minutes indicates 
vulnerability to falling asleep in low-stimuli situations (Carskadon, 1986). However it should 
also be noted that some individuals are able to initiate sleep even in the absence of sleep debt 
(Harrison and Horne, 1996) so the test does not necessarily predict ability to perform in an 
operational setting (Balkin et al., 2004).  
The Maintenance of Wakefulness Test (MWT) is very similar to the MSLT, except that the 
individual sits up (supported by pillows except for the head) and they are asked to stay awake 
rather than fall asleep (Arand and Bonnet, 2008). 
As already noted, ocular movements can provide a means of monitoring the onset of 
sleepiness. Camera-based technologies have been developed for settings like car, truck or 
cockpit cabins, and utilise metrics based on the percentage of time eyelids remain closed 
(PERCLOS). In certain settings PERCLOS metrics may be a good predictor of impending sleep 
(Caldwell et al., 2009) though they may not discriminate as well between levels of fatigue as 
measures which can assess movements of the eye and eyelid also (Sommer and Golz, 2010). 
This can be done using infrared reflectance devices which can constantly track and assess both 
eye and eyelid movements (Johns et al., 2007). In short, they work by directing infrared light 
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at the eye, with the reflection of that light then captured by a video camera. They are 
reported to be commensurate with lab-based polysomnography as a means of monitoring the 
onset of sleepiness (Anderson et al., 2010). Measures of this type have particular relevance for 
research or fatigue risk management in field-based settings, because a device can easily be 
fitted to a truck/train cabin, or to specialised glasses and provide ‘real-time’ monitoring and 
warning systems without interrupting operational duties. The types of factors measured with 
such devices include blink speeds and durations, eyelid closure, and pupil size or reactivity 
(Johns, 2009, Ftouni et al., 2013).  
PERFORMANCE-BASED MEASURES 
Performance-based fatigue measures infer fatigue levels based on known effects of sleep 
deprivation. Most often the measures focus on psychomotor and attention behaviours, which 
are rated in terms of response speed or attentional lapses (Roehrs et al., 2005).  
One such measure widely applied in laboratory and operational settings (Johns, 2009) is the 
psychomotor vigilance task (PVT). Over a period of 5 or 10 minutes (or longer) respondents 
must maintain a sustained level of attention, reacting as quickly as possible (for example by 
pushing a button) to a visual stimulus which appears intermittently (Dinges and Powell, 1985). 
In the presence of fatigue mean reaction time increases, even if all stimuli are reacted to; the 
frequency of ‘errors of omission’ (failing to respond within a set time such as 500 ms) or 
‘commission’ (response before the stimulus appears) increases; and reaction time gets 
progressively longer if the testing period (time on task) is longer than a few minutes (Johns, 
2009). Psychomotor vigilance is sensitively and consistently affected by sleep restriction, does 
not appear susceptible to learning effects, and is considered practical and feasible for use in 
an operational environment (Balkin et al., 2004).  
Performance-based measures can be embedded within an operational setting, the aim being 
continuous or field-based measuring or monitoring of fatigue. For example lane tracking and 
steering performance can be continuously measured in drivers (Eskandarian et al., 2007). The 
embedded measures are essentially monitoring for the presence of fatigue rather than 
measuring fatigue; they are doing this by capturing known fatigue-related behaviours that are 
also likely to lead to unsafe conditions. A key requirement for using embedded performance 
measures in the field is to identify or develop suitable measurable tasks for that environment, 
and for complex settings (for example health care) this may well be a significant challenge 
(Balkin et al., 2011). 
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2.5.3 LIMITATIONS TO APPROACHES FOR MEASURING FATIGUE 
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with all fatigue measures, whether it is 
their utility or ease of use, the expense associated with using them, their suitability for certain 
settings, or their susceptibility to bias.  
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF SUBJECTIVE MEASURES 
The strength of subjective fatigue scales is that they are quick and easy to administer, either 
via paper or electronically. It is also possible to collect relatively large amounts of data, or 
‘real-time’ information, so they can be very useful in a field setting as a means of routine 
monitoring of fatigue or identifying where possible problems exist which may require further 
investigation (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2016). If the measures are 
widely used like the SP fatigue scale, the KSS, the PSQI, or sleep diaries, there may also be 
opportunities for comparisons across study populations or clinical groups.  
The key limitation of subjective scales is that there are a wide range of factors which may bias 
the measurement. For self-reported fatigue individuals may overestimate their level of 
alertness and performance, in that their estimations may not correspond well with objective 
performance measures (Van Dongen et al., 2003) or their ability to perform actual tasks like 
driving (Rosekind, 2005). After a certain point there appears to be a ceiling effect, for  example 
with increasing days of partial sleep restriction vigilance lapses continue to increase whereas 
subjective sleepiness scores level off after about four days  (Van Dongen et al., 2003). An 
explanation for this apparent reduced sensitivity is that individuals who are chronically sleep 
deprived may adapt to the feeling of sleepiness and therefore lose awareness of what it feels 
like to be fully alert. This contrasts with people who are acutely sleep deprived (after only one 
night of sleep deprivation), who can generally estimate alertness quite accurately (compared 
to objective EEG readings) (Roehrs et al., 2005). The accuracy of subjective reporting is also 
likely to depend on when during the circadian phase reporting is occurring, with discrepancies 
between subjective reporting and objective measures likely to be far higher during the 
biological night; in the case of chronic partial sleep deprivation this finding persists even after 
relatively recent periods of sleep (Bermudez et al., 2016). This may well be an issue in 
operational settings like health care where chronic partial sleep deprivation is common, and 
those on night shift may therefore overestimate their ability to remain vigilant; particularly if 
they have recently slept and thus lack a strong homeostatic drive to sleep (that is, they feel 
less sleepy). With respect to measuring sleep quality, self-reports may be subject to recall 
bias. In the case of sleep diaries the additional issue is that few are well validated, and 
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because they must be filled out over multiple days they are somewhat burdensome (Carney et 
al., 2012).  
STRENGTH AND LIMITATIONS OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES 
The strength of objective measures in general is that they are likely to be more precise and 
less subject to bias, in that that they are collected by instruments less easily open to 
interpretation or influence, either by the person being measured or the observer.  
In terms of sleep and fatigue, measures utilising polysomnography may be considered gold 
standard, but they are relatively intrusive, time consuming, expensive, and labour intensive to 
administer. They are also likely to require a high degree of expertise for both measurement 
and interpretation of the various physiologic variables. This makes them less practical for 
measuring or monitoring fatigue in the field. By comparison actigraphy is far less intrusive and 
relatively easy to administer, so more suitable for operational settings, particularly as an 
adjunct to subjective measures. However cost of the device plus analysis software is still 
relatively high, and analysis of the data is time consuming. In addition because the technology 
is accelerometer-based it cannot always distinguish when people are sleeping or just very still 
(van de Water et al., 2011).  
Measures of fatigue-related behaviour like those capturing eyelid movements, or aspects of 
driving performance, are relatively unobtrusive. They have particular strengths for certain 
purposes, such as when safety can be improved by monitoring real-time drowsiness or 
performance. For example in a study of nurses driving home after night shift, pre-drive 
subjective sleepiness ratings did not reliably predict driving incidents, whereas objective 
monitoring of sleepiness through eye and eyelid movements was associated with driving 
events (Ftouni et al., 2013). However a barrier to the use of measures such as those using 
oculography (Johns et al., 2007) is their proprietary technology and specialised equipment, 
which may mean they are costly. A simple objective performance measure like the PVT may 
have the highest general utility for operational settings (Balkin et al., 2004), though it still 
requires specialised equipment, and a relatively well-controlled environment in which to take 
the test. For some settings the fact the test requires five to 10 minutes without being 
disturbed may be particularly challenging to achieve; that requirement may also have an 
impact on other activities or operational responsibilities. A final caution is that in terms of 
relevance, it is that it is not clear how fatigue levels as measured by PVT relate in a 
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quantifiable way to people’s actual performance in a real-world operational setting (Rosekind, 
2005).  
2.6 IMPLICATIONS OF FATIGUE FOR OPERATIONAL SETTINGS  
Fatigue represents a hazard in any safety sensitive setting because of its potential impact on 
human performance. The problem is that fatigue is difficult to avoid in any setting where 
individuals work at a time when they would usually be asleep (Signal et al., 2008). In more 
specific terms, there is risk from the hazard of fatigue in domains where individuals do one or 
more of the following: routinely work during the night or very early in the morning; have shifts 
of 12 or more hours in duration; have breaks of 10 hours or less between shifts; work seven or 
more days straight without time off; have few chances for short breaks and naps; often report 
to work after less than seven hours of sleep; work irregular schedules; chronically use caffeine 
to stay awake; or have a sleep disorder (Lerman et al., 2012).  
As discussed so far, current understanding of fatigue-related performance comes largely from 
research undertaken in laboratory settings. Results from such studies show alertness and 
performance vary according to biological time of day (circadian phase), how long an individual 
has been awake, how much sleep they have had, and how long it is since they woke (Lockley 
et al., 2006). The types of performance most consistently demonstrated to be affected are 
those which rely on aspects of maintaining attention and vigilance, but fatigue is also 
associated with degraded motor skills, communication, and social skills (Lim and Dinges, 
2010). Areas of cognition like the ability to think innovatively, make flexible decisions, or 
inhibit behaviour, are all likely to be degraded by fatigue, and it also tends to increase 
individuals’ acceptance of lower standards of performance (Killgore, 2010). In operational 
settings such fatigue effects may manifest as: reduced performance when faced with 
unforeseen rapid changes, poor adjustment of plans even when new information becomes 
available, forgetfulness, failure to observe warning signs, preoccupation with single tasks, 
irritability and distraction, risk taking or apparent lack of motivation, and reduced manual 
dexterity (Lerman et al., 2012). There may be a tendency to adopt more rigid thinking and go 
directly to a solution that has worked previously, rather than reason a new one (Harrison and 
Horne, 2000, Dawson et al., 2012). These are all factors which have implications for an 
individual’s ability to function safely and effectively in an operational setting. 
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2.6.1 THE LINK BETWEEN FATIGUE AND SAFETY 
In view of the various ways fatigue can affect human beings, an inescapable conclusion is that 
fatigue compromises safety. Considering the issue from even the most simplistic perspective, 
a common response to being highly fatigued is uncontrollable sleepiness; we also know 
individuals can actually fall briefly asleep even if they are not overtly sleeping (microsleeps) 
(Dinges and Kribbs, 1991). Either of these situations have the potential to compromise safety 
if that individual is undertaking a safety critical activity at the time; like driving a train, truck or 
car, flying an aircraft, or working in an air traffic control tower. However fatigue levels do not 
have to be at the stage where sleep-onset episodes are actually occurring for accidents to 
occur while working or driving (Dinges, 1995). Most accidents probably occur when an 
individual is awake but responds slowly or inappropriately, as opposed to failing to respond 
completely. For example even if only moderately fatigued, a driver will probably have reduced 
ability to remain visually attentive and react quickly, so they may still have an accident without 
actually falling asleep or drifting off the road. This has been illustrated in findings from video-
based observations of drivers in real-life settings, showing the odds of crashing or nearly 
crashing when drowsy to be 2.9 times higher than when non-drowsy (Klauer et al., 2006). 
Detailed reviews covering a range of evidence have revealed direct links between fatigue and 
safety (Dinges, 1995, Williamson et al., 2011). Extensive post-accident analyses of serious 
incidents in a range of settings including road transport, aviation, rail transport, maritime 
operations, health care and emergency services, have revealed the contributory role of fatigue 
(Williamson et al., 2011). There have also been particularly high profile accidents historically 
where subsequent investigation showed that the personnel involved had inadequate sleep 
and/or were working overnight (Mitler et al., 1988). Some specific examples that made 
headlines worldwide include incidents at nuclear power facilities on Three Mile Island (1979) 
and Chernobyl (1986), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), all of which happened during the 
night (Caldwell, 2001); shift scheduling and fatigue were cited as playing a key role in all these 
incidents (Price and Holley, 1990). The Challenger space shuttle explosion occurred after sleep 
deprived managers approved the launch despite concerns about safety (NASA Researcher 
News, 2009); and while not all members of the accident investigation team agreed on the role 
fatigue played, in 2009 when Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on approach into Buffalo, New 
York (killing all on board and one on the ground), both pilots were subsequently shown to 
have been substantially sleep deprived (the evidence included black box recordings revealing 
audible yawning and expressions of how fatigued the pilots felt) (National Transportation 
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Safety Board, 2010). In road transportation fatigue is considered to be the largest identifiable 
and preventable cause of accidents, higher even than drugs or alcohol (Akerstedt, 2000); while 
in aviation fatigue may be involved in four to seven percent of civilian accidents (Kirsch, 1996) 
and up to 25% of military accidents (Caldwell and Gilreath, 2002).  
One aspect of the evidence not so far discussed in this thesis is the likelihood that human 
beings will be aware of the degree to which their performance is degraded when they are 
fatigued, and thus take steps to minimise these effects. Research from laboratory (Van 
Dongen et al., 2003), rail (Dorrian et al., 2007), and health care (Maltese et al., 2016) settings 
suggests individuals are not particularly adept at detecting when aspects of their cognitive 
performance are starting to degrade due to fatigue. They can also become highly ‘disengaged’ 
at very high levels of fatigue (Killgore, 2010), as illustrated by observations that fatigued 
individuals often fail to act even when they know they have made an error (Dorrian et al., 
2007). With respect to health care, clinicians can be quite poor at judging their own clinical 
performance whether fatigued or not (Davis et al., 2006, Noveanu et al., 2017). These factors 
are all likely to represent a risk to safety, because an individual’s awareness of their own 
fatigue related performance deficit is what is required in order to cue some sort of protective 
response or behaviour (Fairclough and Graham, 1999).  
A final point to be considered regarding the relationship between fatigue and safety is that 
fatigue is rarely the independent cause of an accident or incident. James Reason illustrated 
with his ‘Swiss Cheese’ model how accidents can generally be ascribed to a series of flaws 
which may combine both individual failures and system defence failures (Reason, 1998). This 
is acknowledged in critical care health settings where despite only positive intentions, harm to 
patients can arise due to failures in any one of many organisational or human interactions; or 
due to complications that were not related to any medical error at all (Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 
2016). One or two failures in isolation may not lead to an accident because other defence 
mechanisms (either individual or system-based) catch or mitigate the error. However if the 
‘holes of the cheese’ all line up (all possible defence mechanisms fail), a serious incident 
occurs (Reason, 2000). In many settings the final lines of defence are likely to be front-line 
operational personnel, who may need to catch their own or others’ errors. For example in 
aviation cockpits, pilots make an average of two errors and face two threats per flight, but 
almost all are caught and corrected by the air crew themselves (Helmreich, 2000). Even when 
an operational setting is highly automated or has a number of inbuilt safety mechanisms or 
warning systems, failures often still require a ‘final defence’ human response of some type 
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(Flin et al., 2008). An individual must be maintaining sufficient attention to at least note or 
detect there is a problem arising; the problem with this is that degradation in ability to remain 
vigilant is one of the most consistently observed effects of fatigue (Killgore, 2010). Even if the 
safety-threatening issue is detected, a fatigued individual may have inadequate capacity 
(ability to think innovatively or respond to unforeseen circumstances) to react to, or manage, 
an emerging safety critical situation appropriately (Lerman et al., 2012). 
While a link between fatigue and safety has been established, what is far less clear is whether 
a ‘safe’ level of fatigue can be determined, or rather, whether it is possible to accurately 
predict when levels of fatigue are present which pose a risk to safety. 
2.6.2 QUANTIFYING THE RISK OF FATIGUE FOR PERFORMING SAFETY CRITICAL 
TASKS 
There are a number of questions and methodological challenges to address in trying to 
quantify the impact of fatigue on safety outcomes; ascertaining the degree of risk posed by 
fatigue in a particular operational setting is not straightforward (Williamson et al., 2011). 
While error or poor performance do not always result in an adverse event, the implicit 
assumption driving most research examining fatigue and error is that they will certainly be 
forerunners for adverse safety outcomes (Williamson et al., 2011). To fully understand the 
safety risk a fatigued individual poses however, the operational and organisational context of 
the setting in which that individual is working (including any particular restrictions or 
motivations there are for working in that setting) must be taken into account (International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2016). For example there may be inbuilt safety mechanisms 
within the operational system (including other workers) which mitigate the effects of 
degraded performance in one or more individuals. The other important factor to take into 
account when attempting to quantify risk is that one person’s capacity to perform will be 
influenced by so many different factors (Williamson et al., 2011). For example, summing up 
evidence already presented: 
 Performance tends to fluctuate across the daily cycle of the circadian biological clock 
but because these effects interact with the effects of homeostatic sleep pressure 
(time awake also has a strong influence on performance) it is difficult to determine 
the relative risk from each of these factors singly or combined (Carrier and Monk, 
2000, Williamson and Friswell, 2011). 
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 Performance tends to reduce in a cumulative and dose-dependent manner when 
sleep is restricted, and as continuous time awake or time on task increases (Belenky et 
al., 2003, Van Dongen et al., 2003).  
 Being chronically, even if only partially, deprived of sleep can have similar effects to 
total sleep deprivation when measured in terms of cognitive performance (Van 
Dongen et al., 2003) or accident risk, particularly if night work is involved (Folkard and 
Akerstedt, 2004). 
 Factors specific to the individual are likely to play some part. For example fatigue-
related performance appears to decline at a slower rate as people age, but younger 
people are also likely to recover their performance levels more quickly; performance 
will also decline at a slower rate if extended sleep periods can be obtained (sleep 
‘banking’) in the period leading up to a period of sleep deprivation (Rupp et al., 2009).  
 There is evidence that some people are simply ‘biologically’ more susceptible to the 
causes of fatigue than others (Van Dongen et al., 2011).  
 The rate at which performance declines depends on the nature and intensity of the 
safety critical tasks being undertaken, and the specific performance function being 
measured (Gander et al., 2011, Carrier and Monk, 2000). More specifically, the 
greatest likelihood of performance deficits due to fatigue occur when tasks are both 
monotonous and require sustained attention, though strategic use of certain types of 
interactive cognitive tasks may reduce this to some extent (Williamson et al., 2011).  
An approach to quantifying risk taken by researchers from a number of contexts including 
shift work, long-haul air travel, and continuous operation (like the military), has been to 
develop bio-mathematical models which aim to predict when, and how much, fatigue is likely 
to affect human performance (Mallis et al., 2004). While the models vary slightly in terms of 
their stated aims and abilities, they all tend to include consideration of the circadian cycle 
(Mallis et al., 2004). The other factors generally utilised for the various models relate to 
aspects of sleep and work duration. One such model developed for Civil Aviation is the System 
for Aircrew Fatigue Evaluation (SAFE) model (Belyavin and Spencer, 2004). The purpose of 
SAFE was to have a tool which could be used to quantify the risks associated with particular 
duty schedules; it utilised data that was originally derived from a range of laboratory tasks 
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(visual vigilance, continuous memory recall, unstable tracking, multi-attribute task battery), as 
well as sleep and alertness data collected from actual long haul flights (Belyavin and Spencer, 
2004).  
Another approach proposed for aviation settings has been implementing routine collection of 
real-world data, which becomes the first step in being able to quantify fatigue-related risk 
associated with key times of the flight. For example automated collection of fatigue ratings ‘at 
the top the descent’ has been trialled, for the eventual purpose of quantifying safety 
consequences associated with particular levels of aircrew fatigue (Powell et al., 2011). Others 
have proposed developing a shared (global) database of safety performance indicators which 
are collected at key times during, before, or after flight; these indicators would be based on 
factors like sleep, subjective fatigue ratings and PVT performance (Gander et al., 2013). 
Aviation is an example of a safety critical setting where it is recognised that it is not possible to 
completely eliminate fatigue effects when multiple time zones are being crossed and flights 
are long, so there is interest in determining whether perhaps there are certain levels of fatigue 
at which performance may remain safe. Unfortunately, the data does not yet appear to exist 
to be able to do so.  
2.6.3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FATIGUE FOR HEALTH CARE 
Health care is another safety critical setting where fatigue may unavoidable, so it would be 
useful to predict how, or to what extent, fatigued clinicians’ performance will be degraded. 
Researchers have been able to report the degree to which the risk of making medical errors 
appears likely to increase due to fatigue (Gander et al., 2000, Lockley et al., 2007, Patterson et 
al., 2012a, Sharpe et al., 2010, West et al., 2009). They have also been able to report the 
degree to which tasks that may be relevant for clinical performance, such as psychomotor 
vigilance (Gander et al., 2008) or a range of cognitive skills (Maltese et al., 2016), are likely to 
degrade under the influence of fatigue. However it is not clear to what extent this 
demonstrated degradation ultimately translates to degraded clinical skill or patient harm 
(Rubulotta et al., 2016). Clinical performance and patient safety outcomes do not appear to 
consistently be impacted by fatigue (Allen et al., 2001, Govindarajan et al., 2015, Howard et 
al., 2003), and individual clinicians’ susceptibility to fatigue may also differ (Banks and Dinges, 
2007). In addition, fatigue-related performance will probably only be one factor contributing 
to an ultimate adverse event or outcome (Flin, 2018). It is not yet possible in any setting, 
including healthcare, to predict which specific people will commit errors, when they will do so, 
and how serious any errors are likely to be.  
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Evidence presented in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 illustrated that fatigue is linked to health care-
related error. Error in health care is defined as ‘an act of omission or commission in planning 
or execution that contributes or could contribute to an unintended result’ (Grober and 
Bohnen, 2005). The unintended result referred to in Grober’s definition (2005) may be an 
adverse event like additional disability or lengthened hospital stay (due to medical 
management as opposed to just the underlying condition of the patient) (Grober and Bohnen, 
2005). Modern day healthcare is provided 24 hours a day so clinicians routinely work for 
extended periods, during the night, and while lacking sufficient sleep. This means is it is more 
than likely clinicians will sometimes be working when they are fatigued (Lockley et al., 2007). 
It follows then there will also be a higher risk of error, and an ensuing adverse event. To safely 
look after patients, clinicians need to be able to maintain attention, make well considered and 
appropriate decisions, and sometimes react quickly in emergent situations (Jha et al., 2001). 
Because fatigue is likely to affect a clinician’s ability to do all of these things there are a 
number of potential implications for fatigue with respect to both clinician and patient-related 
outcomes (Lerman et al., 2012).  
THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON CLINICIANS 
While clinicians are likely to routinely work in conditions which predispose them to becoming 
fatigued, many factors can influence the extent to which the clinicians are affected. For 
example, the characteristics of individual clinical domains can be highly variable in terms of 
factors like the opportunities clinicians have to sleep or rest within their shifts; the duration of 
the shifts they work; the total number of weekly hours clinicians generally work (including 
perhaps secondary employment); the intensity and nature of the clinical tasks they are 
undertaking; and the level of technical support or oversight they are receiving from junior or 
senior colleagues. This is why real-world studies may provide different evidence to laboratory 
based studies, and why any field-based evidence should be considered critically against the 
specific domain from which it was gathered. 
As an example of how the characteristics of a particular setting should be considered 
alongside evidence, two studies from a critical care air transport setting examined the impact 
of fatigue on the cognitive performance of clinicians; and the results showed cognition was 
not influenced by whether clinicians worked shifts of 12 versus 18 hours (Thomas et al., 2006), 
or 12 versus 24 hours (Guyette et al., 2013). However in this particular setting clinicians often 
have the chance to sleep during a shift, so the impact of shift duration may not be as 
important as what the workload during the shift was, or how much sleep clinicians were able 
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to obtain. Unfortunately neither of these studies reported actual in-shift workload or rest 
opportunities. From another critical care setting where virtually the same cognitive markers 
were examined, sleep opportunities were reported and appeared minimal; these clinicians 
had significantly diminished cognitive performance when they worked a 24 hour shift (Maltese 
et al., 2016).  
Field studies which focus on discrete aspects of clinician performance like cognition are doing 
so under the premise that cognitive function is highly likely to be a marker for ‘near misses’ in 
clinicians (Rubulotta et al., 2016). However there is also evidence to consider which focuses 
more directly on patient or clinician outcomes.  
THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON PATIENT OR CLINICIAN HEALTH 
For studies where patient and clinician focused outcomes were examined, one relatively large 
randomised study compared resident duty schedules of 12, 18, or 24 hours. Over almost 1000 
ICU admissions there was no difference for the differing shift schedules in terms of patient 
safety, continuity of care, or the well-being of the participating physicians (Parshuram et al., 
2015). The primary outcomes measured were patient adverse events and mortality; and 
physician sleepiness, somatic symptoms (various types of pain, anxiety, and gastrointestinal), 
and burnout. Rates of adverse events in patients were the same for all three duty schedules. 
The 12 hour shift schedule (three or four consecutive nights) was disliked by many physicians 
because they lost opportunities to interact both professionally (ICU team-mates) and socially 
(family/friends). The authors also noted that none of the schedules protected against fatigue 
when working overnight, or against the degree of physician burnout (Parshuram et al., 2015). 
Similarly, in a matched cohort study examining the surgical outcomes of almost 39,000 
patients, there were no significant differences in death, readmission or complication rates, 
whether the patients’ daytime procedure was performed by an attending surgeon who had 
provided medical services during the previous night, or not (Govindarajan et al., 2015). There 
was however a small increase in complication rates if the cohort of physicians who had 
performed more than one procedure overnight was analysed separately, a result perhaps 
related to a greater degree of sleep loss. The other outcomes of death, readmission rates, and 
length of stay, were no different whether surgeons had performed only one, or more than 
one, procedure overnight. 
Another study from the critical care air ambulance setting took the slightly different approach 
of classifying clinicians into two comparison groups, “fatigued” or “non-fatigued’ while at 
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work. The odds of medical errors or adverse events were 2.2 times greater for the group 
where fatigue was present; the odds of personal injury were 1.9 times greater; while the odds 
of safety-compromising behaviour were 3.6 times greater (Patterson et al., 2012a). This fits 
with the series of studies from Lockley at al (2007) which showed clinicians likely to be 
fatigued (because they had worked extended hours) made more errors and posed risks to 
either their patients or themselves (Lockley et al., 2007).  
THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON CLINICAL PERFORMANCE 
A large amount of useful evidence for the impact of fatigue has arisen from laboratory-based 
studies, but it is not always clear to what extent it can be applied to real-world settings 
(Harrison and Horne, 2000, Gaba and Howard, 2002). For example while vigilance is 
undoubtedly highly susceptible to fatigue, one systematic review of the impact of fatigue in 
healthcare found clinical tasks were actually 70% more negatively affected than vigilance 
(Philibert, 2005). Laboratory research has suggested the effect of degraded performance may 
be mitigated by strategies like letting an individual work at their own pace, particularly if they 
are highly motivated (Harrison and Horne, 2000). Unfortunately in most clinical settings this 
would not be feasible; moreover working more slowly is unlikely to compensate if a clinician 
has impaired executive function, an inability make appropriate decisions, and perhaps does 
not even recognise they are becoming impaired.  
Findings from some field-based studies suggest extended or overnight shifts do not always 
have a demonstrable detrimental impact (Thomas et al., 2006, Guyette et al., 2013) but other 
studies have shown that extended shifts, lack of recovery time, and night work are linked to 
increased rates of medical error, errors in diagnoses, poorer performance on both clinical and 
non-clinical tasks, and increased risk of personal injury at work or while driving home (Gaba 
and Howard, 2002, Gander et al., 2007, Lockley et al., 2007); also to lower quality patient care 
(Muecke, 2005). Well-practiced and discrete clinical tasks may not be severely affected in the 
presence of fatigue (Allen et al., 2001, Garden et al., 2012, Howard et al., 2003), but those 
requiring high levels of planning and coordination do appear susceptible (Taffinder et al., 
1998, Grantcharov, 2001 #854, Grantcharov, 2001 #854, Barner et al., 2018).  
2.6.4 EVALUATING FATIGUE IMPACT IN CRITICAL CARE HEALTH SETTINGS: WHAT 
OUTCOMES SHOULD BE MEASURED? 
Fatigue is well recognised as a hazard in settings where care is provided on a 24 hour a day 
basis, but the precise nature of the relationship between fatigue and impaired clinical 
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performance has been challenging to ascertain (Gaba and Howard, 2002, Gander et al., 2008, 
Sexton et al., 2000, Sturm et al., 2011). While fatigue has been shown to impact adversely on 
individual tasks pertinent to clinical performance, for example reducing attention and 
vigilance, impairing decision making and reducing the quality of communication (Gander et al., 
2008, Howard et al., 2003, Lockley et al., 2006), there is also evidence that some aspects of 
clinicians’ performance may not be demonstrably affected. For example they may remain able 
to perform technical skills they are practiced in, such as intubating a patient or applying 
anaesthetics (Allen et al., 2001, Howard et al., 2003). The general picture of evidence for the 
impact of fatigue in healthcare can thus appear somewhat contradictory, perhaps because 
most clinical roles are complex and challenging in nature. It can be difficult to control for the 
range of factors likely to impact on fatigue levels and patient outcomes when the investigation 
takes place within the clinical field itself.  
A number of approaches have been taken to examine the impact of fatigue in clinical settings. 
There are widely used measures which can be used to detect the presence of fatigue as 
outlined in section 2.5. Measuring outcomes like error and accident rates have also been 
important, and at the population level they have been invaluable in demonstrating risk levels 
associated with clinician fatigue. Measuring various clinically relevant tasks under well-
controlled conditions has been a useful approach in adding to understanding of fatigue impact 
in individual clinicians. Results from myriad studies demonstrate that when individuals are 
highly fatigued their performance can degrade in a variety of ways likely to increase the risk to 
patient or clinician safety. What is less well understood is how closely the evidence from these 
studies (based on proxy markers) resembles what will actually happen in a clinical setting 
(Gaba and Howard, 2002). That is, there is little evidence about the extent to which surrogate 
measurements of performance are associated with actual clinical performance or patient 
safety (Rubulotta et al., 2016, Sturm et al., 2011). A key challenge in gathering such evidence is 
that there is no gold standard method for measuring clinical performance.  
2.6.5 AN OUTCOME WITH DIRECT RELEVANCE FOR CLINICAL PERFORMANCE 
Perhaps because clinical performance is complex and challenging to measure, few studies 
(Garden et al., 2012, Howard et al., 2003) have prospectively and directly attempted to do so 
when evaluating the impact of fatigue. To add to current understanding it would be useful to 
evaluate clinical performance in a global or overarching manner, as opposed to measuring 
discrete aspects of performance. In addition, because many health care domains are safety-
critical, it would be ideal to do so using a measure with relevance for patient safety. An 
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approach that would incorporate both the aforementioned ideals is to evaluate clinical 
performance based on frameworks of clinically relevant behaviours, known as non-technical 
skills (Flowerdew et al., 2013, Kodate et al., 2012). In the absence of a universally 
recommended method for measuring clinical performance, non-technical skills may provide a 
relevant performance framework for evaluating the impact of clinician fatigue. The concept, 









3 NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS  
This chapter provides a general definition for non-technical skills, discussing their relevance 
for safety, their role and application in health care, and their relevance for clinical 
performance standards. The process of developing a measurement framework for non-
technical skills is examined and individual non-technical skill categories are described in detail. 
Existing methods for measuring non-technical skills in health care (and associated limitations) 
are outlined, and the relevance of non-technical skills for evaluating critical care clinical 
performance is discussed. The chapter concludes by introducing the concept that critical care 
aeromedical retrieval represents a relevant clinical setting on which to base an exploration of 
fatigue impact. 
3.1 DEFINITION 
Non-technical skills are defined as:  
The cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement 
technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance (Flin 
et al., 2008) (p. 1) 
The term non-technical refers to the range of human factors and behaviours individuals and 
teams use to minimise, catch, and mitigate errors, and work as effectively and safely as 
possible (Flin et al., 2008). In other words it refers to the process of utilising technical 
knowledge or available information to organise and manage key tasks; it is the observations 
and thought processes individuals apply when they make or change decisions appropriately, 
and the skills they use when interacting effectively with the people and the environment 
around them. Examples of effective non-technical behaviours individuals may exhibit are as 
follows (Flin et al., 2003b):  
 A more junior team-member who speaks up when they believe someone (who may be 
more senior) is about to make an error. 
 Someone who takes active steps to collect, evaluate and share relevant information in 
case a current plan needs to change. 
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 A person who manages workload by thinking ahead to what comes next, what is likely 
to change, and by planning and prioritising what is essential. 
3.2 THE RELEVANCE OF NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS FOR SAFETY CRITICAL 
OPERATIONAL SETTINGS 
The aviation industry was early to recognise the importance of non-technical skills, examining 
a series of major accidents from the 1970s that did not appear to arise as a result of a 
technical failure (Flin et al., 2008). Retrospective analysis revealed that technical ability did not 
necessarily guarantee safety; that is, well trained and competent pilots had still crashed 
airworthy aircraft because factors like teamwork or communication broke down, or because 
pilots became fixated on one problem or one solution and did not consider other necessary 
tasks or alternatives (Helmreich, 1997). The cockpit recordings from aircraft were a key factor 
in demonstrating how breakdowns in a range of human-related factors contributed to the 
ultimate outcome during emergencies. These human factors included poor leadership, lack of 
team coordination, lack of assertiveness, poor communication, inattention, focusing on only 
one aspect of flying, and poor decision making (Helmreich, 1997).  
In response to the recognition that skills beyond technical competence are a vital aspect of 
maintaining safety, the aviation industry introduced Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
training in the early-1990s (Flin et al., 2003b). The explicit focus of CRM was on raising 
awareness of the non-technical skills and behaviours crew members need to maintain safety, 
and manage error (Wiener et al., 2010). It is an effective approach in improving knowledge 
and performance of teamwork behaviours, and providing pilots with the ability to translate 
that knowledge into more effective performance (Salas et al., 1999). However it is more 
difficult to demonstrate that CRM training has definitively translated into a reduction in the 
incidence of catastrophic errors, due largely to the technological advances achieved over the 
same period and the nature and rarity of airline accidents (Helmreich, 2000). Nevertheless, 
there is widespread acceptance that non-technical skills play an essential role in aviation 
safety; pilots working in most civil aviation settings must undergo non-technical skills training 
and assessment in order to maintain their certification (Flin et al., 2003b, International Civil  
Aviation Organization). This type of CRM training for teaching non-technical skills has also 
gradually been adopted or encouraged within a number of other high-risk operational settings 
(Flin et al., 2008).  
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There is always the likelihood human beings in safety-critical settings will make errors or 
perform below their level of ability for some reason. Their non-technical skills can influence 
how they respond (Flin et al., 2008). While they are a vital aspect of managing a critical 
situation or an emergency (which an individual themselves may or may not have contributed 
to), non-technical skills are also important in routine workday environments because ‘when 
workers are attentive, make sound decisions, share information and co-operate with fellow 
workers, then errors and accidents are less likely to occur’ (Flin et al., 2008) (p. 92). The core 
non-technical skills  are considered to be situation awareness, decision making, 
communication, team work, leadership, managing stress and coping with fatigue (Flin et al., 
2008). These skills are relevant for all safety critical settings, including healthcare (Walton et 
al., 2011). 
3.3 THE ROLE OF NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS IN HEALTH CARE 
During the last two decades the role of non-technical skills in reducing the likelihood of clinical 
errors or adverse events has become increasingly recognised (Kodate et al., 2012, Kohn et al., 
2000, Manser, 2009). One recently published review of fatal medical accidents in Japan 
reports that almost 50% were attributable to failures in non-technical skills (Uramatsu et al., 
2017). Non-technical skills in health care are the organisational processes, clinical reasoning, 
and team interactions clinicians utilise in the course of treating patients. For example 
clinicians must be monitoring closely enough to notice when a patient’s condition changes, 
understand how to appropriately modify treatment, and provide clear instructions about any 
treatment changes to other team-members (Flin and Patey, 2011). Adverse events often arise 
because clinicians fail to act or behave in a particular way, as opposed to simply lacking the 
requisite clinical or technical expertise (Yule and Paterson-Brown, 2012). For example a 
surgeon may have excellent clinical knowledge or technical ability, but if they or another 
member of their team does not follow procedure, think and plan ahead, share their plans with 
fellow team members, or speak up when they have concerns, the risk of an error (for example 
‘wrong-site surgery’) increases significantly (Flin and Patey, 2011).  
Despite increasing recognition of their importance, the usefulness and precision of the terms 
‘non-technical’ and ‘skill’ have been debated in the healthcare domain. There has been some 
concern the terms mask the complexity and range of requirements actually needed to operate 
safely and effectively in a clinical setting (Glavin, 2011, Nestel et al., 2011). In addition, the 
non-technical skills of clinicians have sometimes been referred to as “soft skills” (Cooper et al., 
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2010b), which can sound somewhat derogatory and have the connotation of underestimating 
their value. They are skills which have an integral role in complementing the knowledge and 
technical skills of clinicians, and protecting from human error, so the word “soft” is not a 
helpful or accurate way to describe non-technical skills (Engel et al., 2008, Flin et al., 2008) 
(pg. 10). The pragmatic viewpoint could perhaps be that there is already an inherent 
understanding of what the term ‘non-technical skills’ refers to with respect to clinical 
contexts, and the term is certainly in common usage in health care literature (Flowerdew et 
al., 2012b), so modifying the terminology at this late stage is probably not feasible or required 
(Gaba, 2011).  
There is some evidence that incorporating non-technical skills training and assessment into 
medical curricula and in-service clinical training is likely to improve patient safety (Gordon et 
al., 2012, Johnson and Kimsey, 2012, Mazzocco et al., 2009, Cosby et al., 2008). There is also a 
broadly shared understanding regarding the types of behaviours and thought processes which 
represent the key non-technical aspects of clinical performance (Gaba, 2011). However the 
precise behaviours required within a specific clinical domain will depend on what the clinical 
tasks and organisational culture are, within that setting.  
3.4 APPLICATIONS FOR NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS MEASURES IN HEALTH CARE 
There are a number of potential reasons to measure the non-technical skills of clinicians. 
Firstly, a robust system of measurement can assist the teaching and assessment of clinical 
performance; it can provide a common language for discussing key aspects of performance 
that may otherwise be missing from curricula (Gordon, 2013). While most clinicians would 
perhaps recognise effective error avoidance or crisis management behaviours if they saw 
them, such behaviours can be difficult to conceptualise and thus formally address in training 
(Flin et al., 2008, Flowerdew et al., 2012a). In addition, a measurement framework could 
provide a useful basis on which to provide specific feedback to clinicians about their level of 
skill; be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a training programme; evaluate whether skills 
are transferring to a clinical setting; or be applied in an audit fashion to identify future training 
needs (Kodate et al., 2012). Of particular relevance to this thesis is the notion that a non-
technical skills measure, in capturing key aspects of clinical performance, could be utilised to 
evaluate the impact of fatigue. This approach has rarely been taken (Neuschwander et al., 
2017), but would be a direct and relevant alternative to using proxy markers like vigilance or 
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other discrete aspects of cognitive function to evaluate the impact of fatigue in clinical 
settings (the limitations of which have already been noted).  
Measurement frameworks for non-technical skills are often referred to as behavioural marker 
systems (Flin et al., 2008), because they are based on well-defined behaviours that can be 
observed, and that are considered to contribute to superior or substandard performance (Flin 
et al., 2002, Klampfer et al., 2001). While the types of skills and behaviours key to maintaining 
patient safety are broadly generic, the precise makeup of skill categories and elements for 
different clinical domains varies from one health care setting to the next, because clinical roles 
and requirements vary (Reader et al., 2006). Accordingly, the specific behaviours which 
demonstrate those skills also differ. For this reason, a key requirement of assessing or 
teaching non-technical skills is that a targeted approach is taken, using measurement tools 
which have been specifically customised to the clinical setting in question. The measurement 
framework itself can be based on an existing taxonomy, but it must be modified using data 
gathered directly from the relevant clinical setting (Kodate et al., 2012).  
3.5 DEVELOPING A NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS FRAMEWORK 
The first stage in developing or adapting a non-technical skills framework for a specific setting 
is to identify the skills and behaviours believed to influence safe and efficient performance in 
that particular setting (Flin et al., 2008). The key clinical tasks and skills are determined using 
methods like examining the literature for published skills taxonomies or events-based analyses 
(reports of critical incidents or adverse event rates); also by examining training curricula (Flin 
et al., 2008). Next, or in parallel, the literature-based knowledge must be augmented with 
question-based methods like interviewing or surveying experienced practitioners and field-
experts. The third recommended technique is to directly observe clinicians within their clinical 
setting (Flin et al., 2008).  
Once the the key non-technical skills (often known as skill ‘elements’) for that setting have 
been identified, they can be grouped into overarching ‘categories’ or skill domains. These skill 
categories generally contain a number of individual skills with the same broad focus (Flin et 
al., 2008). For example two individual skill elements may be ‘using authority and 
assertiveness’, and ‘co-ordinating activities with team members’; these two skill elements can 
be grouped into the overarching skill category of ‘team working’(Flin et al., 2003a). Each skill 
element also needs to be linked with explicit behavioural markers that illustrate good or poor 
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practice of that skill. For example a positive behaviour illustrating the ‘using authority and 
assertiveness’ element of teamwork might be something such as “states case and provides 
justification” whereas a negative behaviour might be “does not advocate position when 
required”(Fletcher et al., 2003). 
A number of behavioural marker systems for health care have been developed. Some of these 
take a team focus (Andersen et al., 2010, Cooper et al., 2010a, Mishra et al., 2009, Sevdalis et 
al., 2008, Weller et al., 2011) and some are focused more on skills at an individual level, even 
if those individual clinicians generally work within a team (Fletcher et al., 2003, Flowerdew et 
al., 2012a, Jepsen et al., 2015, LYK‐JENSEN et al., 2014, Mitchell et al., 2013, Rutherford et al., 
2015, Yule and Paterson-Brown, 2012). The frameworks are all based on core non-technical 
skills categories, and usually tend to encompass some combination of situation awareness, 
teamwork, communication, decision making, leadership, and management of tasks. However 
the precise composition and organisation of skill categories within the various frameworks are 
slightly different, depending on the nature of the clinical setting and purpose for which they 
were developed. As examples: 
 The Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) tool was designed so experienced 
anaesthetists could rate the non-technical skills of another anaesthetist (with at least 
a basic level of technical competence) directly in the operating theatre, or in a 
simulated setting. It can be used as a basis for evaluating competence and for 
developing non-technical skills curriculum (Flin and Patey, 2011). The four main skill 
categories in the ANTS framework are situation awareness, decision making, task 
management, and team working (Fletcher et al., 2003). 
 The Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) tool was developed as an educational 
system for teaching and assessing surgeons’ intraoperative skills. The four key skills 
categories for this framework are situation awareness, decision making, 
communication and teamwork, and leadership (Yule and Paterson-Brown, 2012).  
 The developers of the Anaesthetic Non-Technical Skills for Anaesthetic Practitioners 
(ANTS-AP) tool identified three key non-technical skills categories for anaesthetic 
practitioners as being situation awareness, team work and communication, and task 
management (Rutherford et al., 2015).  
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 The Ottawa Crisis Resource Management Global Rating Scale (Ottawa GRS) was 
developed as a measure of performance for clinicians resuscitating a critically ill 
patient. The developers describe key crisis resource management skills in this 
measurement framework as being leadership, problem solving, situational 
awareness, resource utilisation, and communication (Kim et al., 2006). 
 A tool developed to assess and teach emergency physicians’ nontechnical skills 
(Flowerdew et al., 2012a) categorises the main skills required in the emergency 
department (ED) as being situational awareness, decision making, teamwork and 
cooperation, and management and supervision. 
The various non-technical skill categories referred to in the preceding frameworks will be 
explained next; with specific reference to key concepts and definitions, and the relationship of 
the skills to clinical performance.  
3.5.1 SITUATION AWARENESS  
Situation awareness is a key non-technical skill on which many other skills rely (Yule and 
Paterson-Brown, 2012). It is essentially about maintaining a dynamic awareness of an overall 
clinical situation (Flin et al., 2008). Clinicians maintain this awareness by constantly collecting 
data from their patients, colleagues, or monitors, and interpreting these data to anticipate 
what may happen next. For example when they are actively monitoring a patient and notice 
when something changes; or when they think to ask about previous history or how easy a 
ventilated patient was to intubate. It is also the way clinicians consider the meaning of any 
information (or changes) against what they already know or believe; in other words when they 
are creating a mental model of the situation in light of any information they collect. For 
example when they note a rising blood pressure and realise that a head-injured patient they 
presumed was stable may actually be showing signs of a rise in intracranial pressure (ICP), 
their mental model is changing. They are also likely to use that understanding to anticipate or 
run through the possibilities of what may happen next and think about how they might 
manage that rising ICP. The three distinct skill elements within situation awareness are 
considered to be: gathering information, interpreting information, and anticipating future 




In clinical settings information may be gathered from monitors, other clinicians, family 
members, or of course by directly examining the patient. Failures in gathering information 
might occur because the information is not available to the clinician, they have difficulty in 
accessing it for some reason, or they simply fail to scan appropriately and therefore they miss 
the information. Clinicians may also fail to perceive the information they do gather (Endsley, 
1995). For example in a ventilated patient the blood pressure (BP) alarm may be flashing 
because BP is dangerously high, but a clinician may not actively check to see what it signifies, 
perhaps because they are not monitoring closely or are focusing on something else.  
Interpreting information 
Interpreting information is about a clinician recognising and comprehending the information 
they are gathering. Generally this occurs in conjunction with the ‘mental model’ they have of 
what is going on. This mental model might be based on their own knowledge or previous 
experience, or perhaps information given to them by others. However if their mental model is 
poor or incorrect, or they are relying too much on previous experience, their understanding of 
the current situation may be inadequate (Endsley, 1995). For example if a clinician has been 
told a monitor alarm is faulty, or their experience is that the alarms are often not accurate, 
they may inappropriately fail to actively check or analyse the situation when the alarm sounds. 
Anticipating future states  
The anticipation element of situation awareness is what a clinician does when they use their 
comprehension of a current situation (interpreting information) to consider what might 
happen next, in other words to ‘think ahead’ of the present situation (Flin et al., 2008). For 
example when managing a patient with a head injury they may be thinking ahead to how they 
might need to manage a potential rise in ICP.  
The aspects of cognition mostly used in situation awareness are maintaining attention or 
concentration, and using working memory to process or make sense of information, so 
situation awareness is vulnerable to interruptions, distractions, or task overload (Flin et al., 
2008).  
3.5.2 DECISION MAKING 
Decision making is essentially about the analytic process clinicians use to decide what course 
of action they should take in a given situation. They work out what a situation is and weigh up 
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the various options, implement the most appropriate option, then evaluate the impact to see 
whether it had the desired result. The three distinct skill elements of decision making are: 
identifying options; balancing risks and selecting options; and reviewing outcomes (re-
evaluating) (Flin et al., 2008).  
Identifying options 
Identifying options is about working out what the various courses of action are, for example 
by actively running through the various intervention options with another colleague. A 
negative illustration of this skill would be the clinician who jumps directly to one option 
without considering alternatives (Fletcher et al., 2003).  
Balancing risks and selecting options  
Balancing risks and selecting options is about weighing up the various pros and cons of an 
intervention, for example when a surgeon decides on a specific operative procedure having 
weighed up the potential advantages versus risks to the patient (Yule and Paterson-Brown, 
2012). A negative illustration of this skill might be in a situation when a patient has multiple 
comorbidities and the surgeon doesn’t review the potential risks with other members of the 
clinical team.  
Reviewing outcomes  
The final skill element in decision making is re-evaluating, which is the important aspect of 
reviewing the impact of any clinical decisions. For example reassessing a patient’s condition 
after a providing treatment to manage rising ICP, or re-assessing their pupil size if the original 
decision had been to ‘wait and see’ before intervening further. 
Clinicians use decision making skills routinely and repeatedly during their shift, and they may 
also sometimes do so in a time-pressured or crisis situation. A particular challenge for decision 
making is that it requires a relatively high degree of working memory, which can be highly 
influenced by stress and time pressure (Flin et al., 2008). The specific decision making 
processes clinicians use are likely to be influenced by whether the situation is familiar to them, 
how experienced they are (can they draw on previous experience), whether there is a rule-




3.5.3 TEAM WORKING 
Team working is the category used to describe the skills a clinician uses to work effectively 
with others in a team context. It is how they interact with others to facilitate a shared 
understanding of what is happening currently, and what the ultimate goal is (Flin et al., 2008, 
Yule and Paterson-Brown, 2012). The generic skills elements for team working include: 
supporting others, solving conflict, exchanging information, and coordinating activities (Flin et 
al., 2008). 
Supporting others 
Supporting others is about teamwork behaviours like appropriately sharing work load or 
providing advice or information to other team members, or perhaps acknowledging their 
concerns. It can create a positive environment and can improve team coordination. An 
environment where speaking up is expected and welcomed contributes to effective 
teamwork. An example of a positive supportive behaviour would be to provide reassurance or 
encouragement to another team member, while a negative behaviour would be to use a 
dismissive tone in response to requests from others.  
Solving conflict 
The skill of solving conflict does not refer only to managing the negative aspects of 
disagreement or interpersonal differences which can lead to dysfunction; debate can also be 
positively framed and can often lead to a deeper analysis of a problem (Flin et al., 2008). The 
conflict may be ‘potential’ rather than actual, and avoided by clarifying what roles and 
responsibilities are in advance, or encouraging all team members to be assertive but do so in a 
positive or respectful way. For example the clinician may need to make their requirements 
known with the necessary level of assertiveness when a fellow team member does not appear 
to be listening to an important update, using words like “give me a few minutes while I tell 
you”. Or they may firmly and politely state their case and provide justification even though 
others have put forward a different opinion, rather than not being prepared to advocate their 
position (Flin et al., 2008).  
Exchanging information 
Exchanging information is one of the key requirements in effective team work (Flin et al., 
2008). Knowledge and data from a number of sources must be shared amongst the team to 
coordinate their activities and facilitate the completion of tasks. For example a surgeon may 
understand that a patient is seriously deteriorating. However it is not effective to concentrate 
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only on their own role in attending to the patient, they should update other team members 
such as the assistant, anaesthetist, and scrub nurse, so there is a shared understanding of the 
current issues and what needs to happen next. If a clinician is handing over to a new team 
they need to provide all the relevant details, and do so in a logical and clear way. Effective 
information exchange involves a number of communication-related techniques such as using 
an open and supportive style; using active listening techniques; paying attention to non-verbal 
communication; and promoting an open flow of communication through good interpersonal 
habits, like taking time to greet other team members or engage in appropriate small talk (Flin 
et al., 2008). 
Coordinating activities  
Coordination within teams requires the roles and responsibilities of all team-members to be 
clear, and for workload to be appropriately distributed among the team so one member is not 
overloaded (Flin et al., 2008). In an emergent critical case a senior clinician often facilitates 
team coordination by taking the time to confirm the roles and responsibilities of all team 
members including themselves, rather than relying on team familiarity or in-built assumptions 
about ‘who is going to do what’. Or they provide explicit information regarding an 
intervention they have requested (perhaps a precise drug dosage which should be ‘given as a 
slow push’) as opposed to just saying “give the drug”, and the other team member then 
having to come back and clarify dosage or method of application. Good coordination requires 
cooperating with others, and considering the requirements of other team members before 
acting.  
3.5.4 COMMUNICATION 
Communication is how people exchange information and ideas. The key skill elements of 
communication are: sending information clearly and concisely; including content and intent 
during information exchange; receiving information, especially by listening; and identifying 
and addressing barriers to communication (Flin et al., 2008). It is a skill considered integral to 
all other non-technical skills and is a particularly important aspect of effective teamwork. 
Leaders of teams communicate effectively when they encourage input from the team, listen 
without evaluating, and establish safety protocols or contingency plans. Members of teams 
communicate effectively when they verbally indicate understanding, consistently provide both 
verbal and non-verbal signals, and provide timely responses to queries (Flin et al., 2008). In 
aviation CRM training a key aspect of communication is to ‘close the communication loop’; the 
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receiver signals what message they have received and the sender confirms this as correct 
(Helmreich, 1997).  
Because communication is such an integral part of non-technical performance, and is often 
the means by which non-technical behaviours are illustrated, many non-technical skills 
frameworks do not contain communication as a separate skill category (Cooper et al., 2010a, 
Fletcher et al., 2003, Flowerdew et al., 2012a, LYK‐JENSEN et al., 2014, Mishra et al., 2009), 
instead capturing elements of communication within the other skills categories. 
3.5.5 LEADERSHIP 
The main elements of leadership are considered to be: using authority; maintaining standards; 
planning and prioritising; and managing workload and resources (Flin et al., 2008). An example 
of using authority and assertiveness in leadership terms might be to take initiative in order to 
ensure a task is accomplished. The maintaining standards element of leadership would be 
demonstrated by a clinician intervening when the task was deviating from required standards. 
An example of planning and coordination behaviour is a clinician who clearly states what the 
intention and goals are in a particular situation. Workload management may require allocating 
enough time to complete tasks and not overloading other team members with tasks.  
While the skills mentioned above are important, they may not necessarily apply only to a 
clinician in a leadership role, but to all related team members. For example regardless of 
seniority, a team member sometimes needs to use authority or assertiveness to question a 
decision they are unsure of; or they may take over a leadership role to manage tasks if they 
realise this is required. In many settings there is not necessarily an overt leadership hierarchy, 
and leadership elements like maintaining standards, planning and coordinating, and managing 
workload are important to all clinical roles within the setting. Like communication, leadership 
is difficult to isolate as a separate skill, and some non-technical skills measurement 
frameworks do not attempt to do so. Rather, they include leadership elements within team 
working, or in a separate category based on adequately managing tasks and resources 
(Fletcher et al., 2003, Flowerdew et al., 2012a). 
3.5.6 TASK MANAGEMENT 
Management of tasks is a specific skill category included in many non-technical skills 
frameworks (Cooper et al., 2010a, Fletcher et al., 2003, Flowerdew et al., 2012b, LYK‐JENSEN 
et al., 2014, Mitchell et al., 2013, Rutherford et al., 2015). It is the category of skills clinicians 
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use to manage and organise the various resources or tasks necessary for treating their 
patients, the main skill elements being planning and preparing; setting priorities; maintaining 
standards; and identifying and utilising resources (Fletcher et al., 2003, LYK‐JENSEN et al., 
2014).  
Planning and preparing  
Planning and preparing is about developing strategies to manage all the various tasks required 
as part of a clinical role. It includes reviewing and updating plans when required and making 
any additional arrangements that might be required (Flin et al., 2003a). For example it might 
involve sourcing and organising appropriate medication or equipment before transferring a 
critically ill patient via an air ambulance (when the medication or equipment may not be 
routinely carried); or it might be ensuring there is intravenous (IV) access available for 
administering medication before the aircraft leaves the ground (because it is challenging to 
insert an IV line in a bumpy and cramped aircraft cabin).  
Setting priorities  
Setting priorities refers to what clinicians do when they schedule tasks or activities according 
to their importance. That may depend on how much time is available, the condition of the 
patient, or what actually needs doing. Clinicians often have to decide which tasks are a priority 
and make sure they allocate attention to them, while avoiding distraction from less important 
tasks (Flin et al., 2003a). The skill of prioritising would be illustrated by a clinician who overtly 
discusses what the priority issues are in a particular case, or manages potential distractions by 
delegating others to attend to them. A clinician who is not prioritising well may become 
distracted by logistical issues within the clinical environment, or fail to adapt the order of the 
tasks they are undertaking in response to changing clinical conditions or time pressures.  
Maintaining standards  
Maintaining standards is the way in which clinicians adhere to guidelines, protocols and 
checklists which promote safety and quality (Flin et al., 2003a). There are often established 
protocols or recommended monitoring guidelines, like crossing checking drug labels before 
administration, checking key equipment prior to needing or using it, or keeping accurate 
records of patient care. An example of poor maintenance of standards might be failing to 
monitor the blood sugar of a critically ill patient who is a known diabetic.  
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Identifying and utilising resources  
Identifying and utilising resources requires the necessary and available resources for task 
completion to be established, whether this is people, expertise, equipment or time. The aim is 
to accomplish what needs to be accomplished with minimal disruption, stress, overload, or 
underload, for either an individual clinician or the wider clinical team (Flin et al., 2003a). 
Clinicians often do this by carrying out routine tasks when they have the chance before a busy 
period arises, or identifying what resources are available early, and requesting additional 
resources if necessary. Poor performance would be illustrated by a clinician who overloads 
other team members with tasks, or does not check relevant equipment is available in advance. 
3.6 MEASURING THE NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE OF CLINICIANS 
Skills frameworks specific to health care provide the basis for measuring clinicians’ non-
technical performance in a structured and objective manner. They are developed via a 
targeted and systematic process of identifying key skills, and example behaviours indicating 
good and poor practice for each skill, specific to the clinical setting in question. The skills are 
organised into key non-technical skill ‘categories’ for that setting, with each category 
containing a number of skill ‘elements’ relating to the overall category. To illustrate, in the 
ANTS framework there are four key skills categories: task management, team working, 
situation awareness and decision making; and each of these categories contains three to five 
different ‘elements’ (there are a total 15 individual skill elements in the ANTS framework). 
Within the category of task management there are four individual skills elements: planning 
and preparing, prioritising, providing and maintaining standards, and identifying and utilising 
resources. There are five skills elements for team working: coordinating activities with the 
team, exchanging information, using authority and assertiveness, assessing capabilities, and 
supporting others. The three elements for situation awareness are: gathering information, 
recognising and understanding, and anticipating. For decision making there are also three 
elements: identifying options, balancing risks and selecting options, and re-evaluating 
(Fletcher et al., 2003).  
The actual measuring of non-technical skills ability involves applying a numeric rating scale to 
the various skills. Assessors observe the clinicians in actual or simulated clinical settings, and 
rate how effectively each skill from the framework is being practiced. The rating scales 
themselves are usually simple Likert-type scales with descriptive anchors which have direct 
relevance for safety; for example the ANTS rating scale has four anchor points, with a rating of 
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“1 – poor” having the descriptor “performance endangered or potentially endangered patient 
safety, serious remediation is required”, whereas the descriptor for the highest point on the 
scale is “4 – good: performance was of a consistently high standard, enhancing patient safety; 
it would be used as a positive example for others” (Fletcher et al., 2003). The same rating scale 
is used to rate skills at both element and category levels, but assessors often find it more 
meaningful to score the individual skill elements within a category first, then rate the category 
overall, unless they are highly experienced at behavioural ratings (Flin et al., 2008). 
If non-technical performance is being measured as part of a formal assessment process, 
ratings are generally reported at category level (Flin et al., 2010), though as is evident from 
the literature the scoring of performance can be approached in a variety of ways. For 
example, scores can be reported and analysed as individual category scores (Yee et al., 2005); 
as a single summed score of the skill categories (Mishra et al., 2009, Riem et al., 2012, Bould et 
al., 2009); as a single summed score of all skill elements (Kang et al., 2015, Krage et al., 2017  , 
Gjeraa et al., 2016, McCulloch et al., 2009); or, scoring can be based on averages within 
elements or categories (Crossley et al., 2011). To illustrate, a measurement framework like the 
ANTS tool which has four skill categories, 15 separate skill elements, and a rating scale with 
four possible levels could produce: an overall summed score at category level between 4 and 
16; an overall summed score at element level between 15 and 65; or ‘averaged’ scores for 
categories and/or elements between 1 and 4. In some studies half-points in ratings have been 
allowed when assessors feel the observed performance falls between two levels on the rating 
scale (Riem et al., 2012, Yee et al., 2005). 
There are limitations associated with measuring non-technical performance, in that the 
measurement framework may not cover every aspect of performance, or there may not 
always be an opportunity to observe every skill in a given situation (Flin et al., 2008). In 
addition, rating observed behaviours is known to be challenging, and assessors require specific 
training if they are to provide ratings which are reliable, even if they already understand the 
broad concepts of non-technical skills (Flin et al., 2010). While many studies evaluating non-
technical frameworks report good to excellent levels of inter-rater reliability (IRR) for the 
rating process (Cooper et al., 2010a, Fletcher et al., 2003, Flowerdew et al., 2013, Jepsen et al., 
2016, Mishra et al., 2009, Rutherford et al., 2015), it is clear from other studies that if training 
is not sufficient there is a risk that IRR will be compromised, especially if the ratings are being 
made at the ‘elements’ level of a framework (Graham et al., 2010, Yule et al., 2009). In 
particular, it is recommended that training include some form of ‘calibration’ to ensure anchor 
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points on the scale can interpreted in a consistent manner by different raters (Flin et al., 
2008).  
3.7 EVALUATING NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS AS A MEASURE OF CRITICAL CARE 
PERFORMANCE 
While there are potential limitations associated with measuring non-technical skills, a 
customised measurement tool does appear to offer a feasible and particularly relevant option 
for assessing performance, and therefore examining fatigue impact on the performance of 
critical care clinicians. Previous sections have illustrated the range of clinically relevant 
behaviours likely to degrade due to fatigue, and most are directly related to non-technical 
skills. Critical care environments tend to be complex, dynamic and demanding clinical settings. 
They are particularly vulnerable to fatigue-related degradations in performance, because the 
clinicians must provide so much more than simply well-learned automatic responses (Lerman 
et al., 2012). Critically ill patients are often unstable so in addition to their technical expertise 
it is vital clinicians employ high quality non-technical behaviours including adapting to 
changing situations, implementing and evaluating decisions, efficiently using the resources 
available, and interacting effectively with their team members. 
3.8 IDENTIFYING A RELEVANT DOMAIN WITHIN WHICH TO ASSESS CRITICAL 
CARE NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE 
In terms of identifying a specific domain within which to base further examination of clinician 
fatigue and its impacts, the patient air transfer (aeromedical) setting is one where clinicians 
are believed to routinely experience fatigue (MacDonald, 2012). As with many critical care 
settings, the clinicians frequently work extended hours and during the night (Myers et al., 
2012). In addition, when considering the relevance of non-technical skills as a gauge of 
clinicians’ performance, the importance of non-technical clinical behaviours is widely 
recognised in this setting. For example aeromedical retrieval training standards from Europe 
(European Aeromedical Institute EURAMI, 2013), New Zealand (Ambulance New Zealand, 
2013), and the US (Commission for Accreditation of Transport Services, 2015) all mandate 
specific ‘CRM training’, and they further specify areas to be covered as including ‘decision 
making’, ‘communication’, ‘team building’, ‘workload management’, and ‘situation 
awareness’. Aeromedical retrieval is therefore an ideal clinical subset to utilise in examining 
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fatigue and critical care clinical work. The key features of the interhospital transfer setting of 








4 THE CRITICAL CARE SETTING OF AEROMEDICAL RETRIEVAL 
This chapter describes and defines the critical care setting of interhospital aeromedical 
retrieval. It explains the challenges for clinicians, the unique characteristics of the 
environment, and the risks associated with transferring critically ill patients between hospitals 
by air. The chapter concludes by outlining the relevance of utilising the aeromedical setting as 
a model for examining fatigue impact in critical care clinicians.  
4.1 AIR-BASED TRANSFER OF CRITICAL CARE PATIENTS 
Patients presenting to regional hospitals where specialist care is not available frequently 
require transfer to tertiary facilities for definitive care (Warren et al., 2004). This is known as 
“patient retrieval” and is most usually undertaken in air or land-based ambulances staffed by 
specialised medical retrieval teams (Hearns and Shirley, 2006). Patient retrieval can be 
classified as either prehospital or interhospital, but the fundamental focus for any retrieval is 
timely transfer of a patient to a medical facility appropriate for their needs (Shirley and 
Hearns, 2006). Very often, the mode of transport will be a fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, 
in which case the retrieval can be described as ‘aeromedical’, literally referring to “the use of 
aircraft for medical purposes such as transporting patients to hospital” (Dictionary, 2007).  
The clinical settings of prehospital and interhospital aeromedical retrievals have some 
similarities. In both settings clinicians are isolated from a medical facility while providing 
advanced levels of care, much of it in the restrictive and dynamic setting of an aircraft cabin. 
There are also distinctions between prehospital and interhospital retrieval settings, 
particularly in terms of the aim or type of clinical care provided out in the field (Shirley and 
Hearns, 2006). These distinctions will be briefly described so as to clarify the context in which 
fatigue and its impacts were examined for this thesis, which was primarily the critical care 
interhospital aeromedical transfer setting. 
4.1.1 PREHOSPITAL AEROMEDICAL RETRIEVAL 
Prehospital retrieval refers to patient transfer from an initial scene of illness or accident. A 
rotary-wing air ambulance will often be the mode of transport because deployment is quick, 
geographically difficult or isolated locations can be accessed, and the patient can be taken 
directly to an appropriate medical facility (without interim road ambulance transfer) (Aitken et 
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al., 2013). The emergent nature of the pre-hospital setting means an air ambulance is 
generally deployed rapidly and with little warning. The clinicians tend to have limited 
information until they arrive on scene and assess the patient for themselves. There is little 
time to plan ahead, so they usually carry standardised sets of equipment and medical 
supplies. The emphasis for clinical care is on providing medical interventions immediately 
necessary for saving life or limb, then rapid turnaround to get the patients to a primary 
medical care facility (Aitken et al., 2013). In terms of professional training, clinicians in 
prehospital aeromedical retrieval settings are often advanced care paramedics, and 
sometimes they will be accompanied by a suitably trained emergency medicine physician 
(Aitken et al., 2013). 
4.1.2 INTERHOSPITAL AEROMEDICAL RETRIEVAL 
Interhospital retrieval refers to the transfer of a patient between medical facilities, generally 
with the aim of providing access to a higher level of clinical care (Shirley and Hearns, 2006). 
Thus by definition it is almost always a critical care setting where advanced levels of care are 
required. At least some medical care (including an initial diagnosis) will already have been 
delivered, and further key clinical information can generally be sourced from the referring 
facility. In organisational terms much longer is spent planning and organising an interhospital 
air transfer compared to the prehospital setting. The patients are nevertheless very ill and 
often unstable, so interhospital transfers are still considered time-critical (Brandstrom et al., 
2014, Shirley and Hearns, 2006).  
Given the interhospital transfer will be based on a patient’s need to get to a facility where 
there is more specialised care, it is important the standard of clinical care is at least 
maintained, and certainly not reduced during the transfer process itself. The retrieval team 
will generally be small, but should have skills and experience commensurate with the 
condition of the patient they are transferring (Shirley and Hearns, 2006). The clinicians should 
also ideally have specific training to deliver that care in an aviation-based clinical setting 
(Hearns and Shirley, 2006).  
4.1.3 WHAT IS AN AEROMEDICAL RETRIEVAL CLINICIAN?  
The ‘aeromedical retrieval clinician’ is not a specific or universally-defined professional 
discipline in the way that an anaesthetist or emergency medicine specialist might be. Rather, 
the term could broadly refer to any clinician working in the aeromedical setting. The research-
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based literature for aeromedical clinical practice uses a range of slightly varying terms, 
including ‘medical personnel’ (Milligan et al., 2011), ‘intensive care transport clinicians’ 
(Brandstrom et al., 2014), ‘critical care transport clinicians’ (Alfes et al., 2015, Orr et al., 2009), 
‘clinical support crew members’ (Ambulance New Zealand, 2013), ‘flight crew’ (Braude et al., 
2011, Guyette et al., 2013), ‘retrieval clinicians’ (Hearns and Shirley, 2006), ‘transport 
clinicians’ (Ramnarayan, 2009), or simply ‘flight -nurses, -physicians, -paramedics’ (Gryniuk 
and National Flight Paramedics, 2003, Mastenbrook et al., 2015, Reimer and Moore, 2010).  
Whatever the context, or the terminology used to describe them, any aeromedical retrieval 
clinician should be qualified to practice at an advanced level in their own professional 
discipline. So the doctors in aeromedical transfer teams are usually certified or in-training 
specialists from a critical care setting such as anaesthesia, emergency medicine, or intensive 
care medicine (Shirley and Hearns, 2006). The nurses tend to be advanced-level and 
experienced intensive care nurses who have additionally been trained in flight nursing (Alfes 
et al., 2015); and similarly, the paramedics are generally qualified to practice at intensive care 
level in a flight-based environment (Delorenzo et al., 2017).  
The precise clinical skill mix included in individual aeromedical retrieval teams necessarily 
depends on the condition of the patient being transferred. For example whether the patient is 
ventilated, unstable, belongs to a specific age demographic (like paediatrics), or has a specific 
trauma or illness that requires particular care during transport. The skill mix also tends to vary 
based on the organisation and model of service delivery, which can vary across countries or 
geographical regions (Brandstrom et al., 2014, Delorenzo et al., 2017, Myers et al., 2012, 
Shirley and Hearns, 2006). In some countries and settings there is the case-load or resource to 
set up dedicated retrieval teams specialising in particular patient groups (Droogh et al., 2015, 
Orr et al., 2009). But often team members are clinicians who practice predominantly in a land-
based tertiary care facility or emergency medicine service; these clinicians undertake 
interhospital aeromedical retrievals on an ‘as-required’ or rostered basis (Aitken et al., 2013, 
Shirley and Hearns, 2006, Ramnarayan, 2009). Whatever the service model or organisation, 




4.2 RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CRITICAL CARE PATIENT TRANSFER 
Any land or air-based transfer of a critically ill patient is associated with increased risk of 
mortality or morbidity (Flabouris et al., 2006, Hearns and Shirley, 2006, Warren et al., 2004). 
The reason for transfer may be resource related; for example even in some large urban 
centres there may be lack of current bed availability, meaning transfer to another tertiary 
centre is required (Durairaj et al., 2003). The other most common reason, particularly in the 
New Zealand context, is because tertiary level health care resources tend to be centralised so 
patients are often transported some distance when they require admission to an intensive 
care unit (Flabouris et al., 2008b, Hearns and Shirley, 2006). These patients are at risk of worse 
outcomes than those already in the main centres, who can be admitted to an intensive care 
unit directly from the adjacent emergency department (Durairaj et al., 2003, Flabouris et al., 
2008a). However the level of that risk does reduce if dedicated retrieval teams are used in the 
transfer process (Bellingan et al., 2000, Orr et al., 2009, Warren et al., 2004, Wiegersma et al., 
2011), and this is the model generally employed in the New Zealand interhospital transfer 
setting (Myers et al., 2012). Some degree of transfer-related risk is unavoidable when the 
appropriate level of medical care is simply not available at a patient’s current location. With 
the additional challenges imposed by the nature of the aviation-based clinical setting, the 
potential for adverse events in the air is an important reality to consider.  
4.2.1 ADVERSE EVENTS IN THE AIR 
An adverse event can be defined as an event which has the potential to cause harm (Martins 
and Shojania, 2001). Adverse events can be broadly classified as either medical or technical in 
nature (Droogh et al., 2015). Medical events relate directly to the condition of the patient, so 
this can be issues like hypoxia, high or low blood pressure, arrhythmia, and so on. Technical 
events most often relate to equipment, for example equipment malfunction or unavailability; 
they can also be transport-related issues such as accidents, breakdowns or delays cause by 
factors such as weather. 
The rate of major adverse events associated with aeromedical retrieval is reportedly low 
(MacDonald et al., 2008, Seymour et al., 2008). Still, any transfer comes with hazards and 
logistical challenges and the potential for harm is always high (Droogh et al., 2015). It may be 
underlying pathophysiology in the patient, or characteristics of the aviation-based clinical 
environment itself, that contribute to the occurrence of an adverse event. While patients 
requiring transfer to a tertiary facility are by definition extremely unwell so already at risk of 
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poor outcomes, adverse events during transfer are frequently associated with a human 
element, and likely to be preventable (Flabouris et al., 2006). Common reported examples 
have included failures in communication, or failures to follow key processes such as checking 
equipment, planning adequately, or taking the time to consider alternatives (Flabouris et al., 
2006, MacDonald et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, human elements are also associated with 
minimising harm from adverse events, for example working as a team, regular checking of 
patient, equipment, or monitors, and good interpersonal communication (Flabouris et al., 
2006). 
4.2.2 THE CLINICAL ENVIRONMENT OF INTERHOSPITAL AIR TRANSPORTS  
The clinical environment of interhospital air transport is somewhat atypical compared to the 
conventional medical settings clinicians generally work in (Hearns and Shirley, 2006). It can be 
conceptualised as an airborne ICU, but with a clinical team often consisting of only one or two 
clinicians. In addition to providing clinical care, clinicians must also negotiate a number of 
logistical stages during the transfer process (Droogh et al., 2015). It includes travelling to a 
distant facility, taking over care of the patient, planning for and providing intensive level care 
through what may be a lengthy transfer phase, and finally handing the patient over to the 
team at the receiving tertiary-care facility. The clinicians are often interfacing with unfamiliar 
environments when they arrive at a referring facility; liaising with clinical staff they do not 
know, dealing with unfamiliar equipment, or navigating unknown layouts (Aitken et al., 2013). 
Staff in the referring centre may already be working at capacity, so clinicians in an arriving 
retrieval team may need to function relatively autonomously to prepare a patient for transfer. 
Skills which assume particular importance include the ability to communicate effectively, and 
to source the range of relevant information which is going to contribute to safely planning and 
completing the transfer (Hearns and Shirley, 2006).  
The isolated and restrictive nature of the aviation-based environment can present additional 
challenges. Notwithstanding their advanced skills, once clinicians are on the aircraft they 
cannot simply call for help or summon additional support and resources. A standard supply of 
drugs and equipment can be routinely carried, but not everything usually accessible in a 
hospital setting can be taken in the aircraft. A balance is required between equipment or 
resources the clinician anticipates they will need, and the capacity to carry them (Hearns and 
Shirley, 2006). Thus every transfer mission requires some individualised planning and 
prioritising with respect to what clinical care will be required en route. In particular, ensuring 
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specific drugs or equipment will be readily available should the patient’s condition deteriorate 
or become unstable. It requires anticipation and forward planning, as well as coordination 
with other team members (MacDonald et al., 2008). 
Once the patient is on the aircraft ability to manoeuvre around a patient is limited, so forward 
planning like ensuring appropriate venous or arterial access will be available is very important. 
Anything on an aircraft including patients, clinicians, and equipment has to be securable, and 
be able to withstand forces of acceleration, deceleration, or turbulence (Hearns and Shirley, 
2006); there is also noise, vibration, and some degree of altitude to cope with (Lamb, 2010, 
Reimer and Moore, 2010). Clinicians need to be particularly vigilant regarding patient 
condition because alarms are generally inaudible, and auscultation likely impossible. So they 
need to ensure they are regularly reviewing the condition of the patient and have good vision 
of monitors. They also need to be aware that vibration can interfere with vital-sign monitors 
such as blood pressure recordings or ECG traces (Aitken et al., 2013). Communication with 
others is really only possible via a head-set and this adds to the challenges of working well as a 
team.  
The interhospital aeromedical transfer setting is a setting requiring a range of critical care 
clinical skills. Broadly speaking the clinical expertise is similar to that required in any ground-
based critical care setting, but there are some specific additional challenges including 
restrictions on equipment, space, or accessing additional assistance (Hearns and Shirley, 
2006). Non-technical skills like planning, anticipating, adapting to a rapidly changing clinical 
situation, and working effectively in a team are important in any critical care setting, and 
particularly so in the patient air transfer setting. The clinicians must be extremely vigilant in 
anticipating or planning the advanced levels of care the patients will require during the 
transfer, and in maintaining a dynamic awareness of any changes in patient or environmental 
conditions. It is a setting where a factor like fatigue, which may reduce clinicians’ ability to 
perform at an advanced level, has definitive potential to impact on patient safety.  
4.3 THE RELEVANCE OF EXAMINING FATIGUE IMPACT IN THE AEROMEDICAL 
SETTING 
Fatigue is recognised as a hazard in safety-sensitive environments, particularly those where 
high level human performance is required on a 24 hour a day basis (Williamson et al., 2011). 
For health care settings, this recognition has given rise to research focused on determining or 
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managing risk associated with fatigue (Gaba and Howard, 2002, Gander et al., 2011, Patterson 
et al., 2012b, West et al., 2009, Lerman et al., 2012, Lockley et al., 2007). Evidence shows 
clinician fatigue will be influenced by factors like the duration of their sleep, and the duration 
and timing of their work hours (circadian rhythm). The evidence also shows that when 
clinicians work in conditions known to predispose them to fatigue the risk of medical error, 
personal injury, and poorer performance in clinically relevant tasks, increases. Less clear, and 
challenging to quantify, is the extent to which fatigue will degrade clinical performance and 
safety when clinicians are undertaking their routine (but demanding) duties (Parshuram et al., 
2015, Rubulotta et al., 2016, Sturm et al., 2011).  
The spectre of fatigue is important to consider in any critical care setting but it is particularly 
relevant in the patient air transfer setting because of the challenging nature of both the work 
and clinical environment (Lamb, 2010). There is little published evidence documenting or 
measuring the impact of clinician fatigue in aeromedicine (MacDonald, 2012, Nix and 
Brunette, 2015) and it is an applicable critical care setting within which to further examine 
clinician fatigue. The following chapters describe the methods and results of a programme of 
research undertaken to examine the impact of fatigue on clinical performance in the critical 








5  METHODS 
This chapter describes the methods for the thesis research programme. The primary aim was 
to identify and assess possible effects of acute fatigue related to sleep deprivation. The focus 
was on clinician performance in high risk critical care settings, since degraded clinician 
performance is a risk to patient safety, particularly in acute medical settings when clinicians 
are working in isolation. The clinical subset chosen as the model for critical care clinicians 
were aeromedical retrieval clinicians. That is, intensive care clinicians who transport critically 
ill patients between hospitals via air ambulance. These clinicians routinely work in isolated and 
difficult circumstances with limited opportunities to summon additional support or take a 
break. There was a particular focus on assessing the hazard associated with fatigue in a way 
that can be meaningful for clinicians, in terms of understanding how their clinical performance 
and safety may be impacted. For this reason the second and third stages of the research 
programme focused on customising and using a measurement framework based on non-
technical skills to assess clinical performance. 
 The chapter is organised into three main sections, each of which describes the methods used 
answer one of three main research questions outlined below. 
5.1   RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Q1.  Do health care personnel working in complex and demanding settings experience 
severe levels of fatigue? 
Q1a.  In an out of hospital critical care setting organised with long duty hours, how 
often are health-care professionals highly fatigued while on duty?  
Q1b. Is the degree of fatigue clinicians report while on duty associated with mission 
characteristics likely to impact on fatigue like the level of their pre-mission fatigue, the 
duration of the mission, or the time of day the mission takes place? 
Q2.  Can a relevant instrument for assessing non-technical skills performance 
decrements be adapted to a specific workplace of interest, one where performance 
decrements at work risk extreme adverse outcomes? 
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Q2a.  Can an existing validated non-technical skills assessment system be 
customised to a clinical area with highly specific and special characteristics? 
Q2b.  Can terminology and expected behaviours for the customised instrument be 
developed by triangulating data from clinical experts, review of literature, and Delphi-
like analysis of clinician focus group interactions and survey responses? 
Q2c.  Can the newly customised non-technical skills framework be internally and 
externally validated?  
Q2d.   Will the newly customised non-technical skills framework be able to 
discriminate between relatively more and relatively less experienced clinicians in the 
field for which it was customised? 
Q3. Can performance decrements associated with fatigue state be detected using a 
customised non-technical skills measurement framework? 
Q3a.   Is fatigue state in a critical care setting associated with poorer non-technical 
skills performance? 
Q3b.  Is clinician self-rating for performance predictive of actual performance level 
as measured in terms of non-technical performance? 
Q3c. Is there a learning effect associated with utilising a crossover design in 
aeromedical simulation; that is, an order effect depending on whether clinicians 
complete their first scenario when fatigued or when non-fatigued? 
Q3d.  What is the association between individual categories of non-technical skills 
performance (in both rested and fatigued states), compared to overall scores? That is, 
when measured by the AeroNOTS system, do individuals display strengths and 




5.2 STUDY I: A FIELD STUDY EXAMINING THE FATIGUE OF CLINICIANS 
UNDERTAKING CRITICAL CARE INTERHOSPITAL PATIENT TRANSFERS 
5.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
1. To prospectively assess self-reported clinician fatigue levels while on a mission 
transferring critical care patients, in a cohort of aeromedical personnel exposed to 
systematically long duty hours. 
2. To test the association of mission characteristics, with the self-reported fatigue levels 
of clinicians while on a mission transferring critical care patients. 
5.2.2 STUDY DESIGN 
A prospective observational study was undertaken over a four month period between 
November 2012 and March 2013. The time period was chosen based on staff rotations at one 
of the hospitals, enabling fatigue data for as many transport missions as possible to be 
collected before many of the recruited participants moved to a different training rotation 
(where interhospital air transfer of patients was not part of their clinical role). 
5.2.3 STUDY POPULATION 
The participants were clinicians who worked in one of two NZ-based interhospital transport 
teams, one based within a specialist paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) and the other in a 
general intensive care unit (ICU). It is the nature of service provision in NZ that interhospital 
transport teams are primarily staffed by intensive care clinicians (registrars, nurses, and 
sometimes intensive care paramedics or midwives) who are rostered to staff the flight team as 
part of their clinical role. The clinicians often leave routine ICU clinical duties when retrieving a 
critically ill patient, a practice colloquially referred to as “flying off the floor”. The clinical 
makeup of the transport team can vary according to the condition of the patient being 
transferred, but is generally one or two nurses plus a doctor. The nurses have advanced 
training in intensive care nursing and critical care flight nursing, while the doctors have either 
completed or are undergoing specialist training programmes in intensive care medicine, 
paediatrics, anaesthetics, or emergency medicine.  
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5.2.4 ETHICAL REVIEW 
Ethical review boards from the two district health boards where data collection was to be 
based reviewed the study protocol, participant information sheets and consent forms. They 
provided institutional and locality approval for the studies to take place on the basis that a 
formal ethical review process would be undertaken by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee (UOHEC). Following a process of Maori consultation, and review of study protocol, 
questionnaire content, participant information sheets, and consent forms, ethical approval 
was confirmed by the UOHEC, reference number 12/233.  
5.2.5 PROCEDURE 
Participant recruitment and confidentiality 
Staff from the research offices of the intensive care units where the flight teams were based 
identified all clinicians who had a flight team role and invited them to participate in the study. 
Participation was voluntary and no specific exclusion criteria were applied. Pre-study 
information was provided explaining that no individual information collected as part of the 
study would be identifiable or made available to participants’ supervisors or managers. This 
was facilitated by providing each clinician with a unique “study ID number” at the time of 
study enrolment, enabling clinicians to return ‘numbered’ rather than a ‘named’ fatigue 
reports. The intent was to allow fatigue reports to remain relatively anonymous while still 
being able to link them back to any relevant demographic or baseline characteristics of the 
participant who completed it. The master identification list linking participant names with 
their study ID number was stored in a locked office completely removed from the clinical area, 
and accessible only to the chief researcher (the candidate, JM). The importance of 
confidentiality, with respect to reporting potentially excessive levels of fatigue, had been 
raised as an important issue during the consultation and ethical review process. 
Confidentiality was further facilitated by provision of sealed return boxes into which the 
completed fatigue reports were to be placed; these were accessible only to the research team. 
Participant enrolment 
Participants provided signed informed consent. They then completed the initial enrolment 
questionnaire (Appendix 1 Study I enrolment form) which ascertained demographic details 
and clinical experience, and provided them with their unique study ID number. The enrolment 
questionnaire also collected questions related to participants’ sleep opportunities and fatigue 
experiences. For example it asked about routine disturbances of sleep outside of work (such 
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as living with young children); also their recall of experiencing any episodes of personal fatigue 
while on duty during the last six months that had been significant enough to prompt them to 
either refuse a patient transport mission, or to reflect in hindsight that they should not have 
undertaken a mission. The Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) completed the enrolment 
questionnaire, for which scores greater than 10 indicate an individual has a high level of 
daytime sleepiness (Johns, 2009). 
Data collection process  
For the period of the study, participants completed a personal ‘fatigue report’ for every 
interhospital transport mission they undertook. The first section of the form was completed 
when the mission commenced, part two as soon as the mission was complete. To facilitate the 
comprehensiveness of data collection, the fatigue report forms were attached to the routine 
paperwork clinicians complete as part of all transport missions. At the conclusion of the 
transfer mission (when the patient had been handed over to the clinical team in the ICU) the 
clinicians deposited their completed fatigue report into the locked return box in their ICU 
clinical area to ensure that there was access only for the research team. No individual flight or 
clinician data was provided to managers.  
Fatigue reporting form 
Pre and post-mission fatigue status of participants were measured by two self-report scales, 
the 7-point Samn-Perelli (SP) fatigue scale (Samn and Perelli, 1982) and a 100mm visual 
analogue scale (VAS). These measures were discussed in section 2.5, and pertinent details are 
repeated here. 
The SP scale is a well-established fatigue scale recommended for use in fatigue risk 
management systems by the International Civil Aviation Authority (International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), 2016), and widely used in previous research (Dorrian et al., 2011, Gander 
et al., 2013, Powell et al., 2008, Powell et al., 2007, Powell et al., 2010). The rating descriptors 
for the SP scale are as follows: 1 = Fully alert and wide awake; 2 = Very lively, responsive but 
not at peak; 3 = Ok, somewhat fresh; 4 = A little tired, less than fresh; 5 = Moderately tired, let 
down; 6 = Extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate; 7 = Completely exhausted, unable to 
function effectively. Participants were instructed to choose the descriptor that best applied to 
‘how they felt at present’. 
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The VAS is also a well-established method of measuring subjective fatigue and sleepiness 
(International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2016). The descriptors for the VAS used in 
this study were “alert” at the low end of the scale up to “drowsy” at the upper limit. 
Participants were instructed to place a mark on the line at the point which best described 
‘how they felt at present’. 
The main interest for the research was in the levels of fatigue clinicians can experience while 
actively caring for patients. However there were practical constraints with respect to asking 
clinicians to interrupt clinical work to complete fatigue reports; particularly towards the end of 
aeromedical missions where maximum clinical attention is required during aircraft descent, 
then transfer and handover in the ICU. Therefore final fatigue reports were completed as soon 
as the patient had been handed over in the receiving ICU, with the level of fatigue 
immediately post-mission considered the proxy for the level of fatigue clinicians had 
experienced while on duty during the mission. 
Other data collected on the fatigue report form was for the purpose of determining the 
characteristics of the mission and the individual clinician; that is, the potential covariates 
which might be expected to influence the fatigue levels of the clinicians. The measurement 
and classification of potential covariates is described below, with the complete fatigue report 
form available as an appendix (see Appendix 2 Study I fatigue report form). 
Potential covariates 
 Mission duration: was measured in hours. It was calculated as the time between a 
clinician commencing their mission preparation and when the mission was complete. 
It accounted for any time spent planning and preparing for the retrieval, total 
transport time (on both the outward and inward leg of the mission) and clinical 
handover of the patient to the receiving ICU clinical team 
 Day or night mission: a mission was classified as a ‘day’ mission if it commenced at 
6am or later, and was fully complete by midnight of the same day. All other missions 
were classified as ‘night’ missions. The classification was chosen based on the features 
of circadian rhythm, potential homeostatic sleep pressure and their likely impact on 
performance between midnight and 6am or during the hours of darkness. The study 
took place during the summer months of NZ so daylight hours were extensive 
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 Pre-mission fatigue level: reported on the SP fatigue scale and the VAS fatigue scale 
 Sleep duration for the previous 24 hours: self-reported and measured in hours and 
minutes. 
 The amount of sleep clinicians obtained during the mission (for example on the way to 
the referring hospital): self-reported and measured in hours and minutes  
 Shift characteristics: included whether clinicians were working on-call or on a rostered 
shift; the number of other clinicians on the flight; and the number of days in a row the 
participant had previously worked 
 Clinical role: doctor, flight nurse, midwife 
 Mode of transport: fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, or road (the specialist teams 
occasionally transfer in an intensive care road ambulance for weather or logistical 
reasons)  
 Severity of patient condition: Category A or Category B. All patients these flight teams 
transport require intensive care transport, but they were noted as ‘category A’ acuity 
if they were ventilated or needing other forms of advanced life support such as 
pacing, vasoactive medication or an intra-aortic balloon pump. They were noted as 
‘category B’ if they were high dependency, having generally undergone an acute 
incident requiring intensive care or specialist treatment with the potential for 
deterioration to the level where advanced life support may be required. Examples 
included patients with acute myocardial infarction, subarachnoid haemorrhage, spinal 
injury or multi-trauma  
 Mission difficulty: self-rated on a 100mm VAS from “straightforward” to “very 
difficult”. The instructions for rating mission difficulty contained the wording “taking 
everything into account including weather, logistical issues, patient condition or 
unexpected events”  




5.2.6 DATA ANALYSIS  
The statistical analysis was undertaken using R version 15.2 using the nlme package (R Core 
Team, 2012) and SPSS software (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0. Armonk, New 
York). 
Demographic and mission characteristics of the sample  
The demographic and baseline characteristics of study participants, and a weighted reflection 
of fatigue report numbers (based on whether they were provided by flight nurses or doctors), 
were analysed descriptively. For the numeric variables of transport experience and age, means 
with standard deviation (SD) were calculated; while for the categorical variables gender, 
regular sleep disturbance, an ESS score > 10, and missions declined due to fatigue, analysis 
was in terms of percentages and proportions. Comparisons between the baseline 
characteristics of the two clinical groups (flight nurse or doctor) were undertaken using t-tests 
for continuous variables or chi-squared tests for categorical variables as appropriate.  
Because the fatigue reporting was anonymised it was not possible to calculate an absolute 
response rate, so this was estimated based on: the total number of critical care patient 
transport missions each service undertook during the study period; the number of clinicians 
required on each mission; and an assumption that all eligible clinicians had enrolled in the 
study. 
Main outcome: post-mission SP and VAS fatigue   
Initially the prevalence and characteristics of the fatigue were analysed descriptively. Data 
from the SP scale is ordinal, but for the purposes of regression analysis it was categorised into 
two categories of fatigue severity, either < 6 or ≥6. The scores of 6 or 7 (‘extremely tired, very 
difficult to concentrate’, or ‘completely exhausted, unable to function effectively) were 
categorised as ‘severe fatigue’. This classification was based on reports demonstrating SP 
fatigue scores of 6 or higher represent the range in which performance is considered to be 
impaired (Dorrian et al., 2011, Samn and Perelli, 1982). From a clinical perspective fatigue 
severe enough to impair performance made this chosen cut-off point particularly relevant to 
examine. Consideration was made as to whether reducing the number of category levels for 
the SP scale in this way risked the loss of valuable information and power for the analysis; for 
example there are statistical methods such as ordinal logistic regression which would have 
allowed all levels of the SP scale to be considered in the analysis (Warner, 2008). However due 
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to the number of observations able to be collected in the timeframe available, logistic 
regression using all seven SP levels was not viable.  
All VAS data were treated as continuous for the purposes of the analysis. As noted in section 
2.5.1, while not all authors agree, data from visual analogue scales is generally assumed to 
represent interval or ratio levels of measurement which can allow for higher levels of 
statistical analysis (Price et al., 1983).  
Statistical analysis 
The null hypothesis examined by the analysis was as follows: 
H0 = Individual characteristics of an aeromedical mission or clinician are not associated with 
the level of fatigue experienced while on duty 
The Pearson R test was used to explore the strength and direction of any linear association 
between VAS fatigue scores and VAS self-rated performance scores, and between 
participants’ VAS and SP fatigue scores. The null hypothesis was tested using regression 
analysis to examine the extent to which one or more independent variables (in this case 
mission and clinician characteristics) influenced the dependent variable (in this case post-
mission fatigue levels). Because the nature of the study meant repeated flights were 
undertaken by the same individuals, hierarchical multivariate regression methods were 
utilised. This meant the repeated measures were allowed for by grouping missions by 
individual participant in hierarchical models. Such models tend to be referred to in a number 
of ways including mixed linear-, mixed effects-, or random effects-, models. These terms all 
essentially describe the same regression technique (Woltman et al., 2012), the key advantage 
of which is that it takes account of the shared variance inherent in repeated measures data 
(Woltman et al., 2012).  
A multivariate hierarchical logistic model was used on the categorised SP scale and a 
multivariate hierarchical linear model on the continuous VAS scale. Potential covariates were 
included in the initial models and these were then reduced by backward elimination. The 
intent of the models was to find which factors most explained the level of post-mission 
fatigue, mutually adjusted for various factors likely to be influential, including the pre-mission 
fatigue level of the clinician; also to estimate the size of any effect. For example, if pre-mission 
fatigue was found to be predictive of post mission fatigue what ‘unit-size’ of increase in post-
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mission fatigue is estimated to result from a one unit increase in pre-mission fatigue. The level 
of statistical significance was set at 0.05, though to keep the models consistent across both 
outcome measures, mission difficulty was not eliminated for the logistic model despite a 
borderline significance of p = 0.06. Goodness of fit for the models was evaluated by examining 
the residual deviance and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) scores. The AIC compares two 
models on the same dataset, the lower value AIC score representing a model with a better fit, 
that is, a model which predicts the outcome of interest with as few predictor variables as 
possible. 
Another issue considered with respect to analysis was whether clinicians with a history of 
declining to go on a patient transport mission (due to fatigue) could potentially represent a 
different group than clinicians who had never done so. To address this possibility, a sensitivity 
analysis which excluded data from any clinicians who had previously refused missions due to 
fatigue was also undertaken. 
5.2.7 SUMMARY OF METHODS AT THE COMPLETION OF STUDY I 
The purpose of this initial stage of the research was to prospectively examine the self-
reported degree of fatigue experienced by clinicians working under routine conditions in the 
critical care setting of aeromedical retrieval. This had not previously been reported. Having 
established this, the remainder of the research focused on examining fatigue impact in a way 
that had direct relevance for actual clinical performance and patient safety. After considering 
the background literature as presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, an observed 
measure of non-technical skills performance was identified as representing a relevant marker 
for clinical performance in critical care settings. The next section describes the methods used 
to develop and evaluate an aeromedical non-technical skills measurement framework, where 




5.3 STUDY II: ADAPTING A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING 
NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE TO THE CRITICAL CARE SETTING 
OF AEROMEDICAL PATIENT TRANSPORT 
5.3.1 BACKGROUND  
Developing a behavioural ratings system for a given health-care domain ‘from the ground up’ 
constitutes an extensive body of work and requires a range of approaches including 
comprehensive events-based analyses from the literature, examination of training curricula, 
and extensive collection of data from the field using observational and question-based 
methods (Flin et al., 2008). Several of the non-technical skills frameworks referenced in 
Chapter 3 Non-technical skills were developed in such a manner, and are relevant to critical 
care air transport. They are designed to be used in emergency medicine (Cooper et al., 2010a, 
Flowerdew et al., 2012a, Steinemann et al., 2012), critical care or resuscitation (Andersen et 
al., 2010, Kim et al., 2006, Weller et al., 2011), or for various roles in the operating theatre 
(Fletcher et al., 2003, Gaba et al., 1998, LYK‐JENSEN et al., 2014, McCulloch et al., 2009, 
Mitchell et al., 2013, Rutherford et al., 2012, Sevdalis et al., 2008, Yule et al., 2006). Some 
focus on evaluating individual clinicians, some on team evaluation, and some focus on 
evaluating performance during crisis situations only.  
There are no published taxonomies of which non-technical skills are essential for effective and 
safe clinical performance in the aeromedical setting. Communication has been reported to be 
a leading contributor to adverse events (Dalto et al., 2013, MacDonald et al., 2008), but aside 
from this there has been little in the way of events-based analysis. There are published 
standards from New Zealand (Ambulance New Zealand, 2013), Europe (European Aeromedical 
Institute EURAMI, 2013) and the US (Commission for Accreditation of Transport Services, 
2015), all of which refer to the importance of “crew resource management (CRM) training”. 
They mandate specific inclusion of individual aspects of CRM such as decision making, 
communications processes, team building and maintenance, workload management, and 
situation awareness. However little specific detail which defines these skills is included in any 
of the standards, except that the 2006 Air Medical Physician Association Handbook provides 
illustrative suggestions for ‘how to maximise situational awareness, communication, 
leadership and decision making in the air ambulance environment’ (chapter 58, page 542) 
(Fredriksen, 2006).  
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Given the paucity of appropriate literature, and the lengthy timeframes required to develop a 
completely novel measurement framework for non-technical skills, a pragmatic decision was 
made to modify an existing and relevant non-technical skills framework for use in the 
aeromedical setting. The recommended method for adapting an existing framework to 
another setting is to start with the literature, then augment this with question-based methods 
such as interview or survey of field experts, and direct observations from the field (Flin et al., 
2008, Kodate et al., 2012). 
5.3.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
1. To adapt a relevant non-technical skills tool by coordinating specific experts in the 
field, literature-based data, and highly experienced field-based clinicians; the 
purpose being to provide suggestions for optimal clinical-area-specific 
terminology and behaviour examples, corresponding to measurement outcomes 
in the original instrument. 
2. To engage international experts and a range of experienced clinicians to assess 
the instrument while in development, for clinical relevance, face validity, and 
content validity. 
3. To test the completed non-technical skills performance assessment instrument for 
the ability to discriminate between lower and higher levels of performance, in a 
cohort of clinicians where their level of experience was known (high or low). 
5.3.3  STUDY DESIGN 
The focus for this phase of the research was on using scientific methods to adapt an existing 
non-technical skills measurement framework, customising it to a critical care interhospital 
transfer setting. A specific aeromedical non-technical skills framework has not previously been 
identified but examination of existing frameworks from a range of health-care contexts would 
suggest the skill categories are largely generic (Fletcher et al., 2003, Flin et al., 2008, 
Flowerdew et al., 2012b, Reader et al., 2006, Weller et al., 2011, Yule and Paterson-Brown, 
2012). What varies from one health domain to the next are the individual skill elements, and 
the behaviours clinicians display in demonstrating the skills (Reader et al., 2006). Thus existing 
tools can be adapted to another setting by collecting data directly from the setting to which 
the framework is being customised (Kodate et al., 2012). 
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The extensively tested anaesthetists’ non-technical skills (ANTS) framework (Fletcher et al., 
2003) was selected to provide the foundation for a newly customised aeromedical non-
technical skills (AeroNOTS) measurement tool. The rationale for this decision is outlined 
below: 
 The Handbook of Air Medical Transport specifically references ANTS as a rating system 
which can be used to describe crew resource management performance “with minor 
modifications” (Fredriksen, 2006) (reference list, pg 547, chapter 58).  
 Parallels exist between anaesthetic and aeromedical clinical environments. For 
example the critical care transport environment is essentially an aviation-based 
ICU(Warren et al., 2004) and there is evidence of substantial overlap between the 
non-technical skills categories required in the ICU and anaesthesia environments, 
namely situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, and task management 
(Reader et al., 2006).  
 There are other parallels in that air ambulance clinicians, like anaesthetists, function 
as part of a critical care team. However the composition of the teams themselves 
tends to be highly variable in terms of individual personnel and their professional 
roles. Thus as with the ANTS system, it was considered important that the emphasis 
for an AeroNOTS framework was on individual clinicians (including how they function 
as part of a team) rather than at the overall team level.  
 While there are existing non-technical frameworks for critical care (Andersen et al., 
2010, Cooper et al., 2010a, Mishra et al., 2009, Sevdalis et al., 2008, Weller et al., 
2011) they tend to focus on measuring the team as a whole, or on crisis management 
(Kim et al., 2006). The range of requirements for clinicians working in an air transport 
environment made it important to focus on more than just crisis related performance; 
identifying behaviours likely to influence both routine clinical care and the 
development or management of crises.  
 Doctors in aeromedical transfer teams are frequently trained in anaesthesia, as this is 
a medical specialty with specific expertise in caring for ventilated patients.  
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 The anaesthetics speciality has taken a leading role in addressing patient safety and 
taking a human factors approach to clinical training and safety (Gaba, 2000).  
 The development structure of the ANTS system was originally underpinned by the 
aviation behavioural marker system NOTECHS (Fletcher et al., 2003), a factor 
considered relevant in light of the fact the clinical setting to which the tool was being 
customised was largely ‘aviation-based’. 
The process of adapting the existing ANTS system to the aeromedical setting required a 
number of individual research-focused activities, broadly carried out in two phases. The initial 
phase focused on the customisation process for the measurement framework; the second on 
evaluating the newly adapted framework.  
ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Ethical approval for the research undertaken during this phase of the research programme 
was covered by two separate ethics applications to the University of Otago (Health) Human 
Ethics Committee (HD14/44 and HD12/233).  
5.3.4 INITIAL PHASE: CUSTOMISING AN AEROMEDICAL NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
FRAMEWORK (AERONOTS) 
Several pieces of work were undertaken in parallel, using the ANTS framework as the starting 
point. As is recommended for this type of adaptation process, data specific to the aeromedical 
transfer domain were triangulated to develop an initial draft of the AeroNOTS framework (Flin 
et al., 2008, Flowerdew et al., 2012a, LYK‐JENSEN et al., 2014). A working group of expert 
transport clinicians initially defined each non-technical skills element from the ANTs tool as it 
pertained to safe aeromedical transport practice, and provided examples of good and poor 
behaviours that could be associated with each of the elements. This initial modification was 
assisted by a scoping review of the literature, and further informed by data gathered from 
focus group activity. These processes are described in greater detail next. 
WORKSHOP OF EXPERTS: DEFINING SKILLS AND EXEMPLARS FOR GOOD AND POOR 
AEROMEDICAL BEHAVIOURS 
Coordinated by the candidate (JM), a selected working group of six experienced aeromedical 
clinicians workshopped over several sessions to provide initial ‘aeromedical transfer-specific 
definitions’ and behavioural examples for the ANTS system. The specialties of the clinicians 
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participating in the workshops included intensive care medicine, emergency medicine, 
anaesthesia, intensive care flight nursing, intensive care paramedicine, and aviation medicine; 
they also had extensive experience in academic teaching, or clinical training for aeromedical 
clinicians. Much of the activity occurred in a face to face setting, but two internationally-based 
participants in the workshops provided input via web-based videoconferencing and electronic 
communication.  
SCOPING REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Immediately prior to the workshop activity the candidate (JM) undertook a scoping review of 
the literature aimed at identifying evidence of which tasks, clinical behaviours, or non-
technical skills are known to be essential for safe clinical practice in the setting. A scoping 
review was considered appropriate (rather than a systematic review) because while non-
technical skills or CRM skills are considered an essential element in aeromedical training (as 
evidenced by training standards requiring this (Aitken et al., 2013, Ambulance New Zealand, 
2013, Commission for Accreditation of Transport Services, 2015, European Aeromedical 
Institute EURAMI, 2013)) empirical evidence from this environment is scarce. The scoping 
review provided understanding of the range and nature of existing evidence for aeromedical 
non-technical skills in this environment and informed the customisation of ANTS to the 
aeromedical setting. 
Search method: A search utilising online databases (Ovid medline, Ovid nursing, AMED, 
PsychInfo and Embase) was undertaken in two stages (Figure 1 ). In stage one the following 
search terms and all derivatives were used: aero, air medical, air ambulance, transportation of 
patients, patient safety, error, patient transfer, retrieval, non-technical, crew resource 
management skills, and clinician. In the second stage of the search the ANTS tool and other 
derivatives were used as the basis for describing specific non-technical skills categories, which 
were then added as the following search terms: behavioural, teamwork, decision making, 
situation awareness, communication, leadership. For both the first and second stages of the 
search, papers were initially only retained for review if they: contained empirical data with 
relevance for non-technical skills in the aeromedical transport environment (for example 
observational data, case note analyses, interview or survey data); related to either adult or 
paediatric patient transport; and were published in English. Papers were initially excluded if 
they were: review articles (though reference lists were checked for any further relevant 
articles not picked up in the initial search); a pre-cursor or follow-on from other studies 
already included for review; or related only to pilot and aircraft safety.  
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However due to the scarcity of published material identified, the inclusion criteria were 
subsequently expanded to include: published expert opinion or review articles; and empiric 
data collection from general (non-air based) interhospital ICU patient transport settings.  
There were no date restrictions and the search was conducted in March 2014. 
LITERATURE SEARCH STAGE ONE 
 
Search terms 
Aero, air medical, air ambulance (MeSH), transportation of patients (MeSH) patient safety (MeSH), error, patient transfer 
(MeSH), retrieval, non-technical, crew resource management skills, and clinician 
 
Databases 
Ovid Medline, Ovid Nursing, AMED, PsychInfo, Embase 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Empirical data with relevance for non-technical skills in the aeromedical transport environment (for example observational, 
case note analyses, interview or survey); adult or paediatric patient transport; publication in English. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
 Descriptive review articles (reference lists were checked); pre-cursor or follow-on from other studies already included; related 
only to pilot and aircraft safety 
 
Expanded inclusion criteria 
Published expert opinion for air ambulance transport or review articles 
Empiric data collected from general inter-hospital ICU patient transport settings 
 
 
LITERATURE SEARCH STAGE TWO  
 
Search terms 
Behavioural, teamwork, decision making, situation awareness, communication, leadership 
 
Databases 
Ovid Medline, Ovid Nursing, AMED, PsychInfo, Embase 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Empirical data with relevance for non-technical skills in the aeromedical transport environment (for example observational, 
case note analyses, interview or survey); adult or paediatric patient transport; publication in English. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
 Descriptive review articles (reference lists were checked); pre-cursor or follow-on from other studies already included; related 
only to pilot and aircraft safety 
 
Expanded inclusion criteria 
Published expert opinion for air ambulance transport or review articles 




Figure 1 Search strategy for a scoping review of key aeromedical non-technical skills 
 
FOCUS GROUP ACTIVITY  
Four separate focus groups were facilitated by the candidate (JM), with highly experienced 
clinicians discussing the key tasks and skills used in critical care air ambulance transfers while 
assisting research staff compiled a ‘real-time’ whiteboard list of the tasks and skills arising 
from the discussion. Three of the groups included New Zealand and Australian-based 
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interhospital transport clinicians (physicians, flight nurses, paramedics). The other was a 
mixed international group containing experienced transport consultants and paramedics 
attending a professional development programme in Sydney, Australia. The key objectives of 
the discussions were to compile a list of answers to two main questions: 
1. What do aeromedical clinicians think are the key skills which determine the safe and 
effective transport of patients via air ambulance? 
2. What are examples of good or poor behaviours which would illustrate these skills? 
At the start of each focus group the following introduction was provided to the participating 
clinicians: 
As part of my work studying the effects of fatigue in the aeromedical 
transport environment I am interested in what sorts of non-technical skills 
aeromedical clinicians use to make the transport missions as safe and 
efficient as possible. When we talk about non-technical skills we mean 
things like the planning and prioritising, the decision making, the 
situation awareness and teamwork, and the communication that goes 
into making sure it all happens. What I’m asking you to do today is to use 
your experience of working in the transport environment to discuss all the 
important tasks and behaviours you use to safely and effectively 
transport a patient. That is, if you were observing, what would you expect 
to see the various members of the clinical team (flight nurse, doctor, 
paramedic) do over the course of the entire transport mission. What I 
want to do is start from the very start of the mission and work our way 
through the various stages, so planning and preparing to go; on the flight 
out and picking up at the referring facility; transferring back to the 
aircraft and the flight home; and handover when you get back to the ICU. 
We will be taking notes on the whiteboard as we go so we can compile a 
list and add to it as we need to.  
Prompts used during the discussion were as follows: 
 when things are being done well what do you see? 
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 when things are not being done well what do you see? 
 when fatigue is involved what do you notice? 
SYNTHESIS OF DATA TO COMPILE THE AERONOTS PROTOTYPE 
Data from the literature, and from the focus group-whiteboard lists, were synthesised to 
produce a draft AeroNOTS prototype. The process was as follows. First the candidate (JM) 
coded and categorised the data against the list of 15 non-technical skills elements the expert 
panel had already defined. The coding process of data from one focus group was checked by a 
member of the expert panel who was also one of the candidate’s supervisors (DP). Next, the 
candidate (JM) and three members of the expert working group applied a Delphi-like method 
to integrate the behaviours and tasks arising out of the focus group data and literature with 
the definitions and behaviour examples provided by the initial workshop activity. Briefly, the 
Delphi method refers to the structuring of a group communication process so that a reliable 
consensus can be reached by a group of experts. The communication is structured in such a 
way that there is feedback from individuals, some assessment of a group judgment or view, 
and an opportunity for individuals to revise their views (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). In clinical 
research a Delphi-like process is often used when some element of judgement is required and 
the opinions are coming from a range of experts who may or may not agree (Okoli and 
Pawlowski, 2004). In this way, behaviours that had not initially been included, or described, by 
the expert panel were modified accordingly. 
Once all data from the literature and field-based expertise had been incorporated, an 
exploratory evaluation of the prototype AeroNOTS system was undertaken, as described next.  
5.3.5 EVALUATING THE CUSTOMISED NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK  
Background 
Evaluation of the newly adapted AeroNOTS framework focused on ensuring it was clinically 
relevant and suitable for assessing performance in an aeromedical retrieval setting.  
For a measurement system to provide meaningful information it must be valid and reliable, so 
that systematic error (bias or confounding) is minimised. (McDowell, 2006). The term validity 
refers to whether an instrument measures what it sets out to measure, and therefore what 
interpretation can appropriately be placed on a measurement score (Streiner et al., 2015). 
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Reliability is concerned with whether scores from a measure will give consistent results on 
different occasions (intra-rater reliability) or regardless of who scores it (inter-rater reliability).  
Face validity is assessed as whether or not a measure empirically makes sense; content 
validity is assessed based on the conceptual definition and theoretical makeup of the 
parameter; construct validity is assessed based on what inferences can be made from the tool 
when it is operationalised, or how well it captures the construct it is supposed to be 
measuring; criterion validity focuses on ‘accuracy’ and comparisons with a ‘gold standard’ 
measure or another known outcome (Streiner et al., 2015). 
In this research programme it was not feasible in terms of funding or time-frames to 
undertake extensive examination of every aspect of the validity or reliability of the AeroNOTS 
system prior to utilising the tool in the clinical research setting. Because the AeroNOTS 
prototype was directly based on the ANTS tool, which was already known to be a reliable and 
valid measure of non-technical skills in the anaesthetics setting, evaluation focused on 
whether it had been adequately customised for the aeromedical transfer setting. Initial 
evaluation therefore focused primarily on evaluating content and face validity. This was 
followed by evaluation in a clinical simulation setting, testing whether the AeroNOTS tool 
distinguished between differing levels of aeromedical performance.  
5.3.6 INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE AERONOTS PROTOTYPE: SURVEY AND FIELD 
OBSERVATIONS 
A convenience sample of experienced aeromedical clinicians were surveyed about the skills 
and behaviours included in the prototype, and field-based observations were also undertaken. 
These are described in greater detail below. 
CONTENT VALIDITY: SURVEY OF EXPERIENCED CLINICIANS  
Face and content validity were addressed to some extent during initial development, by 
collecting data directly from the aeromedical transport domain in the form of clinical-expert 
groups, literature and clinician focus groups. To consult further on how relevant and 
representative the prototype skills definitions and behavioural descriptors were, clinicians in a 
range of geographical (international) locations were surveyed.  
Using a purposive sampling method and Qualtrics electronic survey software (Copyright © 
2014. Qualtrics, Provo, UT), experienced clinicians from a range of critical care flight services in 
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New Zealand, UK, Sweden, and Australia were asked to rate the importance of the skills and 
behavioural marker descriptions from the AeroNOTS framework. They did this on a five point 
scale from “1 = not at all important” up to “5 = essential”. The second part of the survey 
addressed comprehensiveness by asking respondents to suggest skills or behaviours they 
believed were important and had been missed. Sixty five exemplar behaviours were included 
in the questionnaire; examples of poor behaviours were not included. Survey requests were 
sent via a key contact identified within each service, and returns made anonymously to 
encourage candid responses. It was not possible to determine response rate as the key 
contacts were not required to reveal how many experienced clinicians in their service they 
sent it to.  
A content validity index (CVI) was calculated by dividing the total number of respondents into 
the number of participants who rated the various behavioural descriptors at 4 or 5 (“very 
important” or “essential”). As have been recommended, an index of 0.75 was chosen as the 
cutoff point for the CVI (Polit et al., 2007); behavioural descriptors not reaching that level 
were discussed and revised. The free text questions were categorised to see whether they 
could be coded against the 15 skill elements already determined for the framework by the 
expert working group. Data were also reviewed to determine whether any additional skills 
were mentioned by survey participants that had not been included in the prototype 
framework. Calculations of content validity, and qualitative data coding, were completed by 
the candidate (JM). Then, the wider working group reviewed the results to determine how any 
problem items should be revised.  
FIELD TESTING  
Field testing of the draft prototype was undertaken by experienced aeromedical clinicians in 
Wellington and Umea (Sweden), and by the candidate (JM). Transport missions were observed 
from start to finish with field notes taken for the express purpose of trialling the tool, noting: 
essential tasks observed or required but not covered by the framework; elements missing 
from or superfluous to the four main categories; and behavioural descriptions that may have 
needed modifying (see Appendix 6 Study II AeroNOTS field testing template). Both ‘four’ and 
‘five’ levels of performance on the rating scale and a seven point global rating scale were 
trialled, following suggestions from the literature that the four point ANTS rating scale may 
lack sensitivity for measuring changes in non-technical skills performance (Riem et al., 2012).  
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5.3.7 SECOND STAGE OF EVALUATION: A CLINICAL SIMULATION STUDY  
The purpose of the clinical simulation study was to examine further aspects of validity by 
applying the prototype AeroNOTS framework in a clinical research setting (simulated). The 
non-technical performance of clinicians who were ‘more’ experienced was compared with 
that of clinicians who were known to be ‘less’ experienced, in a simulated interhospital 
transfer environment. Clinical simulation was considered to provide an ideal means of testing 
the performance measurement framework for a number of reasons: 
1. It allowed inexperienced aeromedical clinicians to be studied under realistic 
conditions with no risk to patients 
2. Simulation is considered to provide a valid representation of clinical competence 
(Nishisaki et al., 2007) 
3.  Simulation-based performance has been shown to be strongly associated with actual 
hospital-based clinical performance (Gordon et al., 2010).  
The a priori assumption was that AeroNOTS scores for clinicians more experienced in 
interhospital air transports would be higher than for clinicians with similar levels of clinical 
training, but who did not have specific experience in interhospital patient transfer. This type of 
assumption has been reported as demonstrating support for construct validity in evaluations 
of other non-technical skills measurement tools (Weller et al., 2011, Yee et al., 2005), and 
relates to the ability of a measurement system to discriminate between differing levels of 
performance. A second a priori assumption for this phase of the evaluation, related to 
criterion validity, was that an independent observed rating of a clinician’s general 
performance would be strongly associated with their non-technical skills performance score 
(Riem et al., 2012).  
STUDY SETTING AND PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
Data collection for this phase of the research took place between November 2014 and March 
2015. The location was a simulation centre based within a tertiary-level hospital. The ICU flight 
service in this hospital is considered the busiest adult interhospital retrieval service in NZ, 
transporting an average of two critical care patients per day (Myers et al., 2012).  
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Potential participants were identified and recruited with facilitation from the ICU research 
office, who publicised the study and explained the voluntary nature of participation to 
clinicians who expressed interest in participating. All participants provided informed consent, 
the details of which were approved during the ethical review process and included the 
understanding that none of the collected data or analysis would be made available to clinical 
supervisors or employers. While information provided to participants explained that the 
purpose of the study was to evaluate methods for assessing aeromedical clinical performance, 
and the chance to receive feedback in a formative de-briefing session after their simulation, it 
specifically did not mention the focus on assessing non-technical skills. The intent here was to 
mitigate potential confounding for clinicians such as those from an anaesthesia training 
programme who were more likely to have been exposed to non-technical skills training, and 
thus would understand what specific types of clinical behaviours would be of interest (if they 
knew the focus was specifically on assessing their non-technical skills).  
A purposive method of sampling was used to ensure clinicians both with or without 
experience in critical care interhospital patient transfers would be recruited. However this 
limited the potential participant sample to doctors only, because at the time of the study 
there were no inexperienced flight nurses or paramedics currently working in, or due to join, 
the ICU flight team. All registrars in the ICU where the study was based are also required to 
work in the flight team, so recruiting clinicians of differing experience levels was achieved by 
timing the study to take place around a training placement changeover. In this way the 
performance of clinicians who had at least six months experience in the ICU flight team could 
be compared with the performance of clinicians who were just starting out. The experience 
level of the clinicians was classified by the ICU flight service medical director, and further 
checked during the enrolment process to ensure those classified as ‘experienced’ had 
undertaken at least 30 previous ICU patient transport missions while those classified as 
‘inexperienced’ had undertaken less than five.  
The enrolment questionnaire (see Appendix 3 Study II and III enrolment form) also included: 
demographic and specialist training details; details of simulation experience; and questions 
about workload (average hours worked per week), sleep quality [measured by the Pittsburgh 
Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) (Buysse et al., 1989)], usual daytime sleepiness [measured by the 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) (Johns, 1991)], and recovery from fatigue between shifts [The 
Intershift Recovery scale of the Occupational Fatigue Exhaustion Recovery scale (OFER-IR) 
(Winwood et al., 2005)]. Permission to use the PSQI, ESS, and OFER scales (including scoring 
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algorithms for each measure) was granted by the original developers, as per the copyright 
instructions associated with each of the measures. These measures were covered in Chapter 2 
(section 2.5) but briefly: The PSQI is a validated self-report measure for usual sleep quality 
(Buysse et al., 1989). Scores can range between 0 and 21 with scores ≤ 5 indicating good sleep 
quality and scores higher than this indicating poor sleep quality (Buysse et al., 1989). The ESS 
is a validated self-report measure of propensity to doze off (Johns, 1991). Possible scores 
range between 0 and 24, with scores of more than 10 indicative of excessive daytime 
sleepiness (Johns, 2009). The OFER-IR scale is a validated self-report measure of recovery from 
fatigue between work shifts (Winwood et al., 2006). The possible scores range between 0 and 
100, with higher scores indicating higher levels between-shift recovery (Winwood et al., 2005). 
SIMULATION SCENARIO 
The clinical scenario was based on real-life observations from two experienced clinicians who 
had also been involved in customising the AeroNOTS framework, and who had experience in 
scenario design. It was pilot tested by an experienced aeromedical clinician who was 
completely unfamiliar with the scenario. The testing phase provided useful feedback from the 
testing clinician about the scenario itself and enabled the developers to confirm an 
appropriate range of skills from the AeroNOTS framework were required. It also provided 
training for the confederate (acting) flight nurse. The assessors who would be rating the 
participants’ performance used the video of the pilot testing to train for and practice the 
ratings process. Following a process used by others (Weller et al., 2011) the assessors viewed 
the recording of the pilot scenario and rated it independently initially, before discussing their 
ratings. The aim was to develop a common understanding of the level and detail of non-
technical behaviours expected for the scenario.  
The scenario itself took approximately 20 minutes to complete and was split into two phases. 
The first part of the scenario was set in a regional ED where the doctor and flight nurse 
received a ventilated patient requiring air transfer to ICU. The second part was set in mid-
flight in a low fidelity aircraft fuselage with the patient’s condition deteriorating significantly 
and potential de-fibrillation required Full details of the simulation scenario for the evaluation 
study are provided as an appendix (see Appendix 11 Study II clinical simulation scenario).  
PROCEDURE 
Participants were orientated to the simulation suite and provided with flight uniforms. They 
completed a pre-simulation checklist which included reporting: their current state of fatigue 
102 
 
and sleepiness (SP fatigue scale and KSS); the amount of sleep and work they had undertaken 
in the last 24 hours (measured in hours); the current time; and their shift status (currently on 
shift, starting a shift later in the day, on a day off). The scenario commenced with a 
standardised pre-brief read from a script. All scenarios were recorded to enable blinded 
assessors to rate the non-technical skills performance of participants at a later date. 
Immediately following the scenario participants ‘self-rated’ their performance during the 
scenario, and the confederate flight nurse provided an ‘observed’ performance rating. Once 
this process was fully complete, an observing ICU consultant facilitated a simulation debrief 
with the flight nurse and the doctor. The debrief was for clinical teaching purposes only, and 
was not recorded. 
PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
Non-technical skills performance 
Two trained assessors viewed all recorded simulations and used the AeroNOTS measurement 
system to rate the non-technical skills performance of each participant. One of the assessors 
was a clinical expert with extensive experience as an anaesthesia and critical care patient 
transport consultant; the other was an allied health professional trained in non-technical 
skills. Both assessors were blinded to the experience level of participants, to the participants’ 
self-rated clinical performance scores, and to the observed-rating scores made by the 
confederate flight nurse. 
As recommended for formal assessment purposes(Flin et al., 2010), initially assessors scored 
the 15 individual non-technical skills elements, then made their final ratings at the level of the 
four main skill categories of task management, team working, situation awareness and 
decision making. Each assessor provided his/her own ratings scores, after which they 
examined and discussed their rating processes and scoring differences. The original scores 
from the two assessors were not changed following the discussion. Possible scores for each 
non-technical skills category and element ranged between 1 and 5, where a rating of ‘5’ was 
“Excellent – extremely good performance which could serve as a model example for others; 
patient safety enhanced”, down to ‘1’ which was “Poor - absence of behaviour required by the 
situation; performance endangered or potentially endangered patient safety”. Half marks on 
the scale were not permitted. To standardise the approach taken in this situation assessors 
were instructed to score at the lower level if they felt the performance fell between two levels 
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on the scale (as recommended (Gaba et al., 1998)). Full details of the AeroNOTS measurement 
system and rating scale are provided in Chapter 6, Results (section 6.2)  
General performance 
The rating for ‘general clinical performance’ during the scenario was made by a third 
independent assessor, who was the confederate flight nurse and highly experienced in 
aeromedical transport. Performance was scored on a five point scale, each level with its own 
descriptor, from a highest score of “5 = Excellent - performed at the highest level; all issues 
well managed and patient safety enhanced”, down to “1 = Poor - performed well below the 
expected standard; significant lapses in skills or safety” (see Appendix 16 Observed general 
clinical performance rating). 
The participating clinicians also provided self-ratings of their performance on the same five 
point scale slightly re-worded to reflect self-rating rather than observed rating of others (see 
the post-simulation portion of the form available in Appendix 4 Study II fatigue and 
performance ratings). This was of interest because in medical flight services there are strict 
rules about pilot hours whereas for clinicians the culture or expectation is that clinicians will 
self-identify if they are too fatigued to fly. If self-reports regarding performance degradation 
are shown to be useful they could be routinely collected as part of a service’s fatigue 
management programme. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Statistical analysis was undertaken using SPSS software (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 
Version 22.0. Armonk, New York).  
Demographic characteristics of the study sample 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants in each group (experienced 
and inexperienced) were analysed descriptively, then compared using t-tests or Fisher’s exact 
test.  
Main outcome: Aeromedical non-technical skills 
The four individual AeroNOTS category scores were summed to provide an overall non-
technical skills score of between 4 and 20, and this was the main outcome result. The category 
scores were also reported and analysed individually, providing a score for each category of 
between 1 and 5. Based on the measurement properties of the AeroNOTS scoring system and 
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the size of the sample, the scores were treated as ordinal data and analysed using rank-based 
methods. The non-technical skills scores provided by the two independent assessors were 
initially examined using non-parametric tests of correlation and difference, then averaged for 
the purposes of the main analysis.  
Secondary outcome: General clinical performance 
The observed and self-rated measures of general clinical performance during the scenario 
provided possible scores of between 1 and 5. This data was treated as ordinal, and analysed 
using rank-based methods. 
Estimating sample size 
The sample size required for this phase of the research was difficult to estimate due to the 
limited nature of reference material available from which to estimate the expected difference 
between the non-technical skills of experienced and inexperienced clinicians (this had not 
previously been reported). There were also logistical challenges to consider, including: limited 
funding which required the study to be carried out using local clinicians and facilities; access to 
a cohort of both experienced and inexperienced aeromedical clinicians; and simulator (and 
simulation staff) scheduling.  
The approach taken was as follows. Firstly an estimation was made that the effect size of 
experience would be large, at least 15%, or 3 points on the 20 point AeroNOTS measurement 
scale. Next, the first five data collection points were considered as pilot or feasibility data, so 
that an estimation of effect size could be made. From these initial assessments, exposure-
based (‘experienced’ or ‘inexperienced’) performance score measures were used to 
approximate potential effect sizes for the entire group. As a result it was estimated that for a 
true difference to be detected between the two groups of experienced and inexperienced 
aeromedical clinicians, with an effect size of 20% (4 points on the 20 point scale), a pooled 
standard deviation of 2 points, power of 80%, and a two-tailed alpha of 0.05, the sample size 
required for each group was four clinicians. Because this was such a low number (and 
potentially statistically unreliable), the aim was to recruit as many clinicians as was feasible 
within a four month window of a training rotation changeover. It was estimated the study had 
a reasonable chance of identifying any existing difference between two varying ‘experience’ 




The null hypotheses examined by the analyses were as follows: 
Null hypothesis 2a. There is no difference between the AeroNOTS scores of experienced 
and inexperienced aeromedical clinicians. 
Null hypothesis 2b. There is no difference between the observed general performance 
scores of experienced and inexperienced aeromedical clinicians. 
Null hypothesis 2c. There is no difference between the self-rated performance scores of 
experienced and inexperienced aeromedical clinicians. 
Null hypothesis 2d. There is no difference between AeroNOTS ratings provided by two 
independent assessors. 
Null hypothesis 2e.  There is no association between the AeroNOTS scores provided by 
two independent raters. 
Null hypothesis 2f.  There is no association between AeroNOTS scores and observed 
general performance scores.  
Null hypothesis 2g. There is no association between AeroNOTS scores and self-rated 
general performance scores.  
Null hypothesis 2h. There is no association between self-rated and observed general 
performance scores. 
Null hypothesis 2i. There is no difference between self-rated performance scores and 
observed general performance scores. 
Statistical analysis methods 
To test hypotheses 2a, b, and c, differences between the experienced and inexperienced 
groups were examined using Mann-Whitney U tests. Regarding hypothesis 2d and 2e, when 
examining scores from different assessors it is the degree of agreement between their scores 
in terms of interrater reliability is the main issue of interest. This can be assessed statistically 
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by calculating the intra-class correlation coefficient. However in Study 2 the sample size and 
distribution of the data were not appropriate, so it was decided to examine this in a future 
more appropriately powered study.  The individual scores from the two assessors were 
therefore examined visually initially (figure 5)  and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used 
simply to test whether both summed (total) AeroNOTS scores and individual AeroNOTS 
category scores from the two assessors differed overall. Spearman’s rank correlation was also 
used to examine the extent to which the two assessors’ scores were correlated. For 
hypothesis 2f Spearman’s rank correlation was used to test the association between 
participants’ AeroNOTS score and their independently observed general performance scores. 
A high association would be considered to provide evidence of criterion validity, under the 
assumption that the level of a clinician’s non-technical skills performance is expected to be 
reflected in the level of his/her general clinical performance. For hypothesis 2g Spearman’s 
rank correlation was used to test the association between participants’ AeroNOTS score and 
their self-rated general performance scores. For hypothesis 2h Spearman’s rank correlation 
was used to test the association between participants’ observed and self-rated general 
performance scores. For hypothesis 2i the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to compare 
observed and self-rated general performance scores. The level of statistical significance for all 
tests was set at 0.05. 
ADDITIONAL VALIDITY TESTING 
In a small addition to the evaluation phase of the research, two ‘exemplar’ demonstrations of 
the simulation scenario were recorded by clinicians assisting the research team. This took 
place following the scenario pilot testing but before the clinical simulation study proper 
commenced. One version of the scenario was scripted to reflect a higher standard of non-
technical skills performance, the other a lower standard of performance. The recordings were 
viewed by a small convenience sample of experienced aeromedical transfer clinicians 
attending a postgraduate professional development programme in Calgary, Canada (May 
2015). The clinicians were first given a presentation on non-technical skills and their 
assessment; they then used the AeroNOTS framework to rate the performance they observed 
in each of the scripted scenarios; and finally they discussed their responses after ratings were 
complete. The objective was to further examine the utility of the assessment tool for assessing 
(simulated) field-based non-technical skills performance. It was expected the aeromedical 
clinicians would be able to apply the AeroNOTS tool in scoring scripted scenarios of good and 
poor performance. The data was analysed descriptively. 
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SUMMARY OF METHODS AT THE COMPLETION OF STUDY II 
This section has described the methods used to develop and test a measurement framework 
for the non-technical skills of critical care clinicians working in the air ambulance setting, 
where one did not previously exist. Based on the results of the evaluation it was decided to 
proceed to the next stage of the research, the objective of which was to utilise the framework 
in further examining the impact of fatigue in the clinical setting. The aim of the next stage of 
the research was to determine whether performance degradations associated with fatigue 
state were detectable when assessed in terms of non-technical skills performance. The 
method for this stage is described in the following section. 
5.4 STUDY III: THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON THE NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL CARE AEROMEDICAL TRANSPORT 
CLINICIANS: A CLINICAL SIMULATION STUDY 
5.4.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
1. To assess the association of performance degradation and fatigue in a cohort of 
clinicians acting in a full scale controlled simulation, each assessed twice, once in the 
rested and once in the fatigued state. 
2. To assess physicians’ self-reported performance level when in both rested and 
fatigued states. 
5.4.2 STUDY DESIGN 
This phase of the research was a prospective observational study utilising a randomised cross-
over design, meaning participants acted as their own controls and the order of their fatigued 
(experimental) condition was randomised. Clinical simulation was again utilised with the 
following rationale: 
 it allowed fatigued clinicians to be studied under standardised conditions  
 it removed a potential risk of compromising patient care.  
 the increasing emergence of simulation as a training tool in health care, and the 
correlation noted between simulation-based clinical performance and actual hospital 
behaviour (Gordon et al., 2010), provided assurance that a simulated clinical 
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environment represented a valid setting within to assess the impact of fatigue on 
clinical performance.  
A high fidelity fixed-wing air ambulance simulator provided the setting for the study. While 
the high fidelity environment was not considered essential with respect to providing a more 
effective setting for evaluation compared to a lower fidelity setting (Norman et al., 2012), it 
did provide a powerful means for assessing the advanced clinical and non-technical skills 
required in the scenarios (Nishisaki et al., 2007, Reime et al., 2016).  
5.4.3 STUDY SETTING AND PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
The study took place in a New Zealand tertiary teaching hospital, using a newly installed fixed-
wing air ambulance simulator which had been developed for flight service training purposes. 
The simulator was capable of sound and limited motion (including aircraft turbulence), and 
contained exact replicas of all medical, transport-specific, and communication equipment 
used by the clinicians in their accustomed intensive care air transport aircraft.  
A consecutive sample of intensive care doctors with at least three years post-graduate 
experience and at least five months critical care air transport experience were recruited to 
participate. They provided demographic and experience information and completed baseline 
fatigue-related measures of sleep quality (Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), (Buysse et al., 
1989)), usual daytime sleepiness (Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS), (Johns, 1991)), and usual 
recovery from fatigue between shifts (Intershift Recovery subscale of the Occupational Fatigue 
Exhaustion Recovery Scale, OFER-IR, (Winwood et al., 2005)). The enrolment questionnaire is 
available as an appendix (see Appendix 3 Study II and III enrolment form). Ethical approval was 
provided by the University of Otago Human (Health) Ethics Committee, New Zealand (ref. 
14/44, October 6, 2014) and all participants provided signed informed consent. 
The data was collected between April and December of 2016.  
5.4.4 SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
Four advisors with extensive experience in critical care patient transfers, and one aviation 
medicine/fatigue expert, assisted the candidate (JM) in developing two different air transfer 
scenarios. Both scenarios were designed to have the same level of difficulty and same general 
types of events as triggers designed to provoke responses in the participants. There were also 
distractors, designed to occupy participant attention and also provoke responses which were 
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not always directly related to patient care, but also to medical resource management. 
However the two scenarios had quite different clinical details. Scenario A required transport 
of a sedated, ventilator-dependent patient with arrhythmias. Scenario B involved a sedated, 
ventilator-dependent patient with an intracerebral haemorrhage.  
A research nurse with ICU training fulfilled the flight nurse confederacy role for all simulations. 
The script for all confederate roles (flight nurse, pilot, and local receiving physicians) was 
highly standardised to maximise consistency. During the design phase there was a deliberate 
strategy of keeping the clinical requirements required for each scenario relatively routine, to 
simulate usual clinical performance. The focus was on providing adequate opportunities for 
participants to demonstrate the full range of the non-technical skills they require during a 
critical care inter-hospital air transport mission. It meant evaluation of participants would not 
simply be focused on a single brief period of crisis management, but rather on their overall 
performance from start to finish of active time in the simulator (the scripts for both simulation 
scenarios A and B are available as appendices: Appendix 12 Study III Cardiac simulation 
scenario and Appendix 13 Study III Neurological ICP simulation scenario).  
During the development phase the two scenarios also underwent pilot testing by volunteer 
clinicians and specialist staff from the simulation suite, who provided feedback regarding 
practical and clinical details. Recordings of the final pilot tests were also used to provide 
training feedback for the confederate (acting) flight nurse, and to develop a rating algorithm 
for the four assessors who would be rating study participants’ performance.  
5.4.5 PROCEDURE  
The booking of all simulations was coordinated by a research nurse, who also sent a pre-
simulation reminder to participants to record the amount of sleep they obtained in the 48 
hours leading up to each scenario. Participants were instructed to maintain usual caffeine use 
in the time leading up to simulation sessions, but were asked not to ingest caffeine within two 
hours of reporting to the simulation suite for their scenarios. The order in which participants 
completed their scenarios (fatigued or non-fatigued first; Scenario A or B first) was 
randomised by a two-step coin-toss carried out by the research nurse at recruitment. The first 
coin determined whether they would complete their initial scenario fatigued or non-fatigued, 
the second denoted whether the initial scenario would be Scenario A or Scenario B. An 
attempt was made to schedule all simulation sessions for approximately the same time of day, 
so as to be consistent in terms of allowing for the potential of ‘circadian upswings or 
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downswings’ in performance, and also to fit with shift completion times following ICU night 
shifts. The ‘fatigued’ scenario was scheduled for a morning when participants had completed 
three or four consecutive 12 hour night shifts, and were expected to be acutely sleep deprived 
having not yet been home to sleep after their most recent shift. The ‘non-fatigued’ scenarios 
were scheduled for a morning when they were expected to be more rested, having had recent 
time off and at least one usual night’s sleep prior to their simulation. 
Immediately prior to each scenario the participants completed a pre-simulation checklist 
which included self-ratings for sleepiness (KSS) and fatigue (SP Fatigue Scale) levels. The 
participants also recorded their hours of sleep and work over the last 48 hours, and how many 
hours they had currently been awake for. Current time, shift status, and the approximate time 
since last consuming a caffeinated drink were also recorded (see Appendix 5 Study III pre and 
post simulation fatigue and performance ratings). The participants also completed a five-
minute psychomotor vigilance task (Kay et al., 2013) and a Stroop cognitive function test 
(Stroop, 1935). The intent of the pre-simulation measures was to make some attempt to 
confirm and compare the fatigue status of the participants when they completed each of their 
scenarios. Coordinating a busy ICU workplace and simulation facility presented a logistical 
challenge with respect to scheduling scenarios classified as ‘non-fatigued’ for a time when 
clinicians truly were completely rested. So while the two fatigue states participants performed 
in were labelled for consistency as ‘fatigued’ or ‘non-fatigued’, the key differentiation was that 
for one scenario participants were acutely sleep deprived, and for the other they were not. 
Due to the nature of their clinical roles many of the participants were likely to be chronically 
partially sleep deprived so it was recognised that even in the state classified as ‘non-fatigued’, 
some degree of fatigue could well impact on their performance.  
It was a feature of the teaching hospital where the study took place that all participants had 
experience with simulation-based education, so a prior simulation-specific demonstration was 
not provided for study participants as preparation. However all participants were specifically 
introduced to the new air ambulance simulator because they had not previously participated 
in simulation-based training for critical care air transfer. Each simulation scenario commenced 
with a standardised pre-brief read from a script. All scenarios were recorded to enable blinded 
assessors to rate the non-technical skills performance of participants at a later date.  
Immediately following the scenario participants ‘self-rated’ their performance during the 
scenario. The participants were aware they were participating in a study to assess the effects 
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of fatigue on performance, but again were not specifically told it was their non-technical 
performance being assessed. Feedback in the form of de-briefing was not offered to 
participants until they had completed both scenarios.  
5.4.6 PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
AEROMEDICAL NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
Four trained assessors independently viewed scenario recordings and used the AeroNOTS 
measurement system to score the non-technical skills performance of the participants. All 
assessors were health professionals who had contributed to the AeroNOTS development and 
evaluation work. One was an anaesthesia and critical care patient transport consultant, one an 
emergency medicine consultant with patient transport experience, one an aviation medicine 
consultant with specific expertise in fatigue, and one an allied-health professional trained in 
non-technical skills. All were blinded to both the fatigue status and self-rated clinical 
performance scores of the participants.  
Rating process 
Each video was independently rated by two assessors, and no assessor rated the same 
participant twice. This strategy was employed to maintain as high a level of blinding as 
possible; that is, with participants acting as their own controls it ensured assessors did not 
rate (see) participants performing in both a fatigued and a non-fatigued state. An electronic 
die throw function was used to randomise which scenario each rater would assess, enabling 
the composition of the rater ‘pairs’ (that is, which two raters would assess each scenario) to 
be randomly determined. To further minimise bias and standardise the ratings process, all 
raters trained in advance to use a predefined checklist of expected behaviours specific to the 
two scenarios. The checklist provided scoring at the individual skill element level of the 
AeroNOTS framework, the element scores were then averaged to provide the score for the 
four overarching skill categories for specific skill elements. For example the individual scores 
for the four skill elements ‘planning and preparing’, ‘prioritising’, ‘maintaining standards’ and 
‘identifying and utilising resources’ were averaged to provide the final score for their 
overarching category, which is “Task Management”. Full details of the two scenario-specific 
rating algorithms are provided as appendices (Appendix 14 Study III Specific behaviours rating 
algorithm cardiac scenario, and Appendix 15 Study III Specific behaviours rating algorithm 
neurological ICP scenario).  
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Possible scores for each non-technical skills category and element ranged between 1 and 5, 
where a rating of ‘5’ was “Excellent – extremely good performance which could serve as a 
model example for others; patient safety enhanced”, down to ‘1’ which was “Poor - absence 
of behaviour required by the situation; performance endangered or potentially endangered 
patient safety”. Half marks on the scale were not permitted, and as recommended (Gaba et 
al., 1998) the raters scored performance at the lower level on the scale if they felt the 
performance fell between two levels. After the first five participants had been assessed the 
ratings scores were examined. Performance in any of the 15 non-technical skills elements 
where there had been a disparity of more than two points (on a five point scale) were 
discussed among the ratings team. This is a process used by others when evaluating or newly 
applying a non-technical skills measurement framework (Flowerdew et al., 2013, Weller et al., 
2011), and it had been found to be useful during the evaluation phase for the AeroNOTS 
system (Study II). Following the next five participants this process was repeated for any of the 
four individual non-technical skills categories which differed by more than one point (on a five 
point scale). The final group of participants were rated without further discussion.  
SELF-RATED PERFORMANCE 
Self-ratings of performance were also measured in this phase of the research, the assumption 
of interest being that clinicians who are knowingly fatigued will be aware of (more sensitive 
to) degradations in their performance. Immediately after the simulation participants rated 
their own clinical performance on the same five point scale used in the earlier AeroNOTS 
evaluation study, where the levels of self-rated performance ranged from a highest score of “5 
= Excellent - performed at my highest level; all issues well managed and patient safety 
enhanced”, down to “1 = Poor - performed well below the expected standard; significant 
lapses in skills or safety” (see the ‘post simulation’ portion of the Fatigue and Performance 
Checklist, Appendix 5 Study III pre and post simulation fatigue and performance ratings). They 
were also asked to rate the extent to which they felt fatigue had impaired their performance 
during the scenario they had just completed (on a four point scale: not at all, slightly, 
moderately, or greatly). 
5.4.7 FATIGUE AND COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Samn-Perelli (SP) fatigue scale 
As part of the pre-simulation checklist participants completed the SP scale, which asked them 
to choose the descriptor that best applied to ‘how they felt at present’. The rating descriptors 
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were: 1 = Fully alert and wide awake; 2 = Very lively, responsive but not at peak; 3 = Ok, 
somewhat fresh; 4 = A little tired, less than fresh; 5 = Moderately tired, let down; 6 = 
Extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate; 7 = Completely exhausted, unable to function 
effectively.   
Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) 
The KSS was also included in the pre-simulation checklist because it is closely associated with 
measures known to be sensitive to fatigue such as electroencephalographic (EEG) activity and 
psychomotor vigilance (Kaida et al., 2006). The Likert-type KSS scale has nine numbered levels 
(though only every second level on the scale has a word descriptor) as follows: 1 = Very alert; 
3 = Alert; 5 = Neither alert nor sleepy; 7 = Sleepy (but not fighting sleep); 9 = Very sleepy 
(fighting sleep).  
Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT) 
Prior to each simulation scenario participants completed a 5-minute PVT validated for use on a 
touch-screen android device (Kay et al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter 2 the PVT is a widely 
used measure for the cognitive ability of maintaining simple attention, and is considered 
sensitive to the presence of fatigue; it is measured in terms of the time in milliseconds (ms) 
participants take to respond to every visual stimulus appearing at random intervals on a 
screen (Dinges and Powell, 1985). A laboratory-based PVT is often 10 minutes in duration, but 
with recognition that this is not necessarily practical in a busy field-setting, shorter versions of 
the test such as the one used here have subsequently been trialled and validated (Basner and 
Dinges, 2012, Kay et al., 2013, Lamond et al., 2005, Roach et al., 2006).  
Scoring for the PVT can be approached in a number of ways including reporting simple mean 
or median reaction times, but the two scoring methods recommended as being the most 
sensitive to both total and partial sleep deprivation (Basner and Dinges, 2011) are: 
1. The total number of lapses (the number of stimuli appearances when the participant takes 
more than 500ms to react) 
2. A reciprocal transformation of the reaction time (RT) for each stimulus, mean 1/RT  
For this research the PVT was scored using recommended method 1 above, the total number 
of lapses greater than 500ms.  
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Stroop word-colour test 
Prior to each simulation participants also completed a timed Stroop word-colour task (Stroop, 
1935). It is considered to be a general measure of cognitive flexibility and control (Uttl and 
Graf, 1997), essentially measuring the inhibitory component of executive functioning (Burke et 
al., 2015). The test required participants to first name ink colours on a control card which 
consisted of 50 rows of characters (*) printed in four colours (red, blue, green, and yellow), as 
quickly as possible. Next they had to name ink colours as quickly as possible (red, blue, green, 
yellow), but this time on an incongruent card where the 50 characters were now colour-
specific ‘words’ which did not correspond to the actual ink colour they were printed in. For 
example the word might be printed in red ink (so the correct response would be “red”) but 
the word itself might spell “blue”. In the presence of fatigue, accuracy of responses may not 
be significantly impacted if participants are able to take their time (Sagaspe et al., 2006) but 
the test tends to take significantly longer to complete (Leonard et al., 1998). Therefore for this 
study the Stroop test was timed, and scored as the difference between the time (measured in 
seconds) taken to read the two cards (congruent and incongruent). 
(Note: During the enrolment process participants were administered brief practice tests for 
the Stroop and PVT, because while practice effects are considered negligible for both tests 
(Belenky et al., 2003, Van der Elst et al., 2006) pilot testing of the methodology suggested it 
was important to familiarise participants with the tests prior to actual data collection.) 
5.4.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 24 (IBM Corp. Released 2016. IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows, Version 24.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). The level of statistical 
significance for all tests was set at 0.05. 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND BASELINE FATIGUE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
Descriptive analysis was undertaken for the baseline characteristics of study participants. 
Means with standard deviation (SD) were calculated for numeric variables (age, number of 
previous patient transports, ESS score, PSQI score, and OFER-IR score). Frequency counts and 
proportions were calculated for categorical variables (gender and specialty training). Fatigue 
reporting and cognitive testing variables from the pre-simulation checklist (SP fatigue, KSS, 
PVT lapses, Stroop score, self-reported impact of fatigue on performance) were treated as 
ordinal, and compared using Wilcoxon tests. 
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MAIN OUTCOME: AEROMEDICAL NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
The four individual AeroNOTS category scores were summed to provide a possible overall non-
technical skills score of between 4 and 20. Scores for each category were also analysed 
individually, possible scores ranging between 1 and 5. Initially, ratings from the two individual 
assessors who rated each simulation were examined by calculating the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC). The model chosen was a one way random test because the same raters had 
not rated each scenario (Hallgren, 2012) (that is, the makeup of rater-pairings for each 
scenario were variable). Following this, assessor scores were averaged for the purposes of the 
main analysis. Difference variables for clinicians’ performance when rested versus fatigued 
were calculated by subtracting participants’ scores during the fatigued scenario from their 




 Participants’ usual sleep quality (measured by the PSQI. Scores can range between 0 
and 21 with scores ≤ 5 indicating good sleep quality and scores higher than this 
indicating poor sleep quality (Buysse et al., 1989)).  
 Participants’ usual levels of daytime sleepiness (measured by the ESS. Possible scores 
range between 0 and 24, with scores of more than 10 indicative of excessive daytime 
sleepiness (Johns, 2009)). 
 Participants’ usual recovery from fatigue between work shifts (measured by the OFER-
IR scale. The possible scores range between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels between-shift recovery (Winwood et al., 2005)). 
 Experience (measured by the count of the total number of previous aeromedical 
transfers). 
 Differences in participants’ pre-simulation fatigue levels (as measured by the SP 
fatigue scale and the KSS). 
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 Differences in time awake, sleep in the past 48 hours, and workhours in the past 48 
hours, before completing the simulation (measured in hours). 
 Differences in cognitive performance measures (Stroop test, measured in seconds; 
and PVT, measured as the total number of lapses > 500ms). 
ESTIMATING SAMPLE SIZE 
There was limited reference material from which to estimate the expected size of the effect of 
fatigue on non-technical performance, as this had not been reported for any clinical 
population at the time of undertaking the study. However the results from the previous 
AeroNOTS evaluation (the Study II clinical simulation study) provided some parameters for 
estimating the possible effect size and variability between different levels of non-technical 
skills performance due to fatigue. In the previous clinical simulation study it had been 
anticipated there would be relatively large differences related to exposure effects 
(experienced vs inexperienced clinicians). For the current simulation study (Study III), it was 
anticipated there may be smaller exposure effects (due to fatigue), but perhaps larger 
variability within exposure groups. Therefore, based on using a paired t-test to detect a 
difference of 2.5 rating points (12.5%) on the 20 point AeroNOTS scale, a SD of the differences 
of 3 rating points, with a power of 80% and an alpha error level of 0.05, the required sample 
size was estimated to be 15 paired measurements. Presuming some dropout (some clinicians 
failing to complete both their fatigued and non-fatigued simulation), the aim was to enrol 20 
participants. This also approximately matched the availability of clinicians in the institution 
who could be eligible for the study over a timeframe covering two consecutive 6-month ICU 
duty rotations.  
STUDY HYPOTHESES 
The null hypotheses tested by the analyses were as follows: 
Null hypothesis 3a. There is no difference in the nontechnical skills performance of 
aeromedical clinicians in fatigued versus non-fatigued states. 
Null hypothesis 3b.  There is no difference in clinician’ self-rated performance when they 
are in fatigued versus non-fatigued states. 
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Null hypothesis 3c. There is no order effect associated with differences in overall non-
technical skills performance for clinicians in fatigued versus non-fatigued 
states. 
Null hypothesis 3d. There is no order effect associated with differences in performance in 
individual non-technical skills categories for clinicians in fatigued versus non-
fatigued states. 
Null hypothesis 3e.  There is no order effect associated with differences in self-rated 
performance for clinicians in fatigued versus non-fatigued states. 
Null hypothesis 3f. If an order effect is present, the difference in overall non-technical 
skills performance of clinicians between non-fatigued versus fatigued states is 
not associated with individual characteristics of the clinicians once the order 
effect is controlled for.  
General hypothesis 3g.  A final hypothesis is referred to for consistency as hypothesis 3g; it 
was a general hypothesis (rather than a statistical null hypothesis) that the 
level of performance in each of the individual non-technical skills domains is 
similar, when clinicians are in either non-fatigued or fatigued states. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Data for the main outcome, difference in non-technical skills performance (a participant’s 
non-fatigued summed AeroNOTS score minus his/her fatigued AeroNOTS summed-score), was 
plotted and tested for normality using the Shapiro Wilks test. This test is appropriate for small 
datasets and the null hypothesis is that data are normally distributed. This means if the 
Shapiro Wilks test returns a p-value greater than 0.05 one fails to reject the null hypothesis, 
concluding the data comes from a normal distribution. Quantile-quantile (Normal Q-Q) plots 
of the AeroNOTS scores were examined for their proximity to a straight diagonal line (data 
from a normal distribution closely follows the diagonal line in a Normal Q-Q plot). As a further 
exploration of the data properties, the fatigued and non-fatigued AeroNOTS summed-scores 
were also transformed (log transformation) and compared using paired tests (as outlined in 
the following paragraph), to explore whether transforming the data would change the findings 
of the analysis. Following these examinations, the decision was made to use parametric 
methods of analysis on the original non-transformed data, to test the study hypotheses.  
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For hypothesis 3a within-subject differences between AeroNOTS scores in the fatigued and 
non-fatigued states were tested using paired t-tests. For hypothesis 3b within-subject 
differences between participants’ self-rated performance scores in the fatigued and non-
fatigued states were tested using paired t-tests. Regarding hypotheses 3c, 3d, and 3e, the 
order in which participants completed their scenarios (fatigued first or non-fatigued first) had 
been randomised to limit bias, but also considered was the possibility that while all 
participants were familiar with simulation training they had not trained specifically in the new 
aeromedical simulator; therefore they may perform better with repetition and time (a 
learning effect) (Gordon et al., 2010). So to test whether or not the size of any difference in 
performance outcomes between rested and fatigued states differed by the order in which 
they were observed (whether the participant completed their fatigued or rested scenario 
first), two sample t-tests were used to examine whether mean differences were different 
between the two orders. After testing for the order effect, Analysis of Covariance was used to 
test hypothesis 3f examining the relationship between potential covariates and the difference 
in the AeroNOTS score, but controlling for the order in which the scenarios were observed 
(that is, using order as a factor). This was testing whether mean difference in non-technical 
skills performance differed by scenario order, by possible covariates, or by the interaction 
between the two. 
Regarding the final stage of the analysis referred to as hypothesis 3g, the intent was to 
examine whether scores within each of the individual non-technical skills domains varied 
about the mean to the same extent; also whether this was different according to whether 
clinicians were fatigued or not. The nature of the linear relationship between scores in the 
four non-technical skills categories was visually examined using scatterplots with fitted 
regression lines. The strength of the relationship was assessed by examining the correlation 
coefficient for each category-pair. Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated for the AeroNOTS summed 
scale of the four domains (for both fatigued and non-fatigued states), then for each 
combination of three domains (that is, with each of task management, teamwork, situation 
awareness, and decision making alternately omitted). When used in this way Alpha 
(theoretically a value between 0 and 1) reflects the extent to which individual domains (scale 
items) produce similar measurement outcomes (Taber, 2017).The AeroNOTS instrument is 
specifically designed to capture different groups of clinical behaviours so the question behind 
this hypothesis was not about whether the summed AeroNOTS scale showed a high level of 
internal consistency, which is the usual reason why Cronbach’s Alpha is used. Rather, it was 
aiming to examine whether performance across individual non-technical skills domains is 
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strongly related. For example if clinicians score a 3 for task management would they also be 
likely to score a 3 for decision making; and is this different if they are fatigued? One way 
repeated-measures (within-subjects) ANOVA with four levels was used to test whether 
participants’ scores across the four individual non-technical skills categories differed 
significantly. This paired test relies on an assumption that the relationship between the 
different ‘domain pairs’ is similar (this is known as ‘sphericity’). This assumption can 
automatically be tested and accounted for during analysis, with a ‘Greenhouse-Geisser’ 
correction applied to a test result if the sphericity assumption is not met. 
5.5 SUMMARY OF METHODS 
This chapter has described the methods used in the thesis research, which was undertaken 
over three phases referred to here as Studies I, II, and III.   
The objectives for Study I were to determine how often clinicians working in an out of hospital 
critical care setting were highly fatigued while on duty; also whether the level of fatigue they 
reported was associated with expected characteristics like pre-mission fatigue, mission 
duration, or time of day. Doctors and flight nurses from two intensive care inter-hospital 
transport teams routinely completed fatigue report forms before and after patient transport 
missions over a 4 month period. Data collected included subjective ratings of fatigue, mission 
difficulty and performance, as well as mission duration, pre-mission sleep, and mission time of 
day. Multivariate hierarchical linear and logistic models were used to evaluate the influence of 
various mission characteristics on post-mission fatigue. 
The overarching objective for Study II was to determine whether an existing tool for assessing 
the critical care non-technical skills of anaesthetists could be effectively customised to a 
critical care aeromedical setting. More specifically whether terminology and expected 
behaviours could be determined by triangulating data from clinical experts, review of 
literature, and Delphi-like analysis of clinician focus group interactions and survey responses; 
whether the newly customised non-technical skills framework could be internally and 
externally validated; and whether it would be able to discriminate between relatively more 
and relatively less experienced aeromedical clinicians. In the adaptation phase the 
anaesthetists’ non-technical skills (ANTS) framework was customised for the aeromedical 
setting, using data collected directly from clinician groups and published literature. For the 
initial phase of the evaluation a range of experienced clinicians were surveyed, field-testing 
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was undertaken, and a small convenience sample trialled the measurement framework using 
scripted (acted) videos. The second phase of the evaluation utilised clinical simulation. A 
group of experienced and inexperienced inter-hospital transport clinicians completed a 
simulated critical care air transport scenario and their non-technical skills performance was 
independently rated by two assessors blinded to their level of experience. Observed and self-
rated general clinical performance ratings were also collected. Rank-based statistical tests 
were used to examine differences in the performance of experienced and inexperienced 
clinicians, and relationships between different assessment approaches and assessors.  
The overarching objective for Study III was to determine whether performance decrements 
associated with fatigue state could be detected using a customised aeromedical non-technical 
skills measurement framework. More specifically the objectives were to determine whether 
fatigue state in a critical care setting was associated with poorer non-technical skills 
performance; whether clinician self-rating for performance was predictive of actual 
performance level as measured in terms of non-technical performance; and whether there 
was an association between individual categories of non-technical skills performance (in both 
rested and fatigued states), compared to overall scores. Clinical simulation was again utilised, 
with doctors from an ICU flight service undertaking two different simulated air ambulance 
missions, once when fatigued and once when more rested (randomised crossover design). 
Trained assessors blinded to participants’ fatigue status performed detailed structured 
assessments based on expected behaviours in the four non-technical skills domains: 
teamwork, situation awareness, task management, and decision-making. Participants also 
provided self-ratings of their performance. The main outcome was the summed-score of 
overall non-technical performance, and within-subject differences in performance were 
analysed using paired t-tests. Analysis of covariance was used to examine the relationship 
between possible covariates and within-subject performance differences, while controlling for 
the effect of scenario order (fatigued or non-fatigued first). Relationships between 
performance scores within individual non-technical skills domains were examined using 
bivariate correlations and Cronbach’s Alpha; and repeated measures ANOVA was used to 





6  RESULTS 
The results chapter is divided according to the three phases of research carried out as follows:  
1. Results relating to the research questions for Study I, a prospective observational 
study measuring fatigue experienced by aeromedical transfer clinicians 
Q1a. The prevalence of fatigue for critical care aeromedical clinicians 
undertaking their routine role of transferring critical care patients in 
air ambulances 
Q1b. The characteristics associated with the levels of fatigue aeromedical 
clinicians experience while on duty 
2. Results relating to the research questions for Study II, describing the adaptation and 
evaluation of a non-technical skills measurement framework for evaluating 
performance in a critical care clinical setting 
Q2a. & Q2b. Description of a prototype non-technical skills measurement 
framework customised for the aeromedical setting (based on 
workshop activity of clinical experts, review of literature, and focus 
groups of experienced clinicians)  
Q2c. Survey and field-based evaluation of the prototype non-technical skills 
measurement framework customised for the aeromedical setting  
Q2d.  A simulation-based evaluation of the ability of the customised 
aeromedical non-technical skills framework to distinguish between 
different levels of performance  
3. Results relating to Study III, (Q3a – d), a simulation-based evaluation of fatigue impact 
on the non-technical skills performance of critical care aeromedical clinicians 
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6.1 FATIGUE IN AEROMEDICAL CLINICIANS UNDERTAKING CRITICAL CARE 
INTERHOSPITAL PATIENT TRANSPORTS (STUDY I) 
Study I was a prospective observational field-based study, in which aeromedical clinicians 
from two hospital-based intensive care flight teams routinely completed fatigue reports 
before and after their patient transfer missions. 
6.1.1 BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS 
A total of 62 participants, 29 flight nurses and 33 doctors, were enrolled to participate in Study 
I. Their demographic and baseline fatigue-related characteristics are presented in Table 6-1. 
The flight nurses were older than the doctors (mean, SD of 41 ± 7 vs 34 ± 5, n = 29 and 33 
respectively, independent groups t-test, p < 0.001); they were also more experienced in terms 
of aeromedical interhospital transport (median, IQR, of 54 months [12 – 125] vs 4 months [1 – 
11] respectively, Mann Whitney U, p < 0.001). Flight nurses were more likely than doctors to 
report routinely disturbed sleep outside of the workplace (chi-squared test, p = 0.011), and to 
report high levels of daytime sleepiness (ESS scores > 10, chi-squared test, p = 0.025). 
Additional information gathered from pre-study enrolment questionnaires showed that in the 
6 months leading up to the study, three participants (all flight nurses) had specifically declined 
going out on a patient transport mission because they felt they were too fatigued to fly. Both 
doctors and nurses reported undertaking a total of 22 different transport missions which they 
felt in retrospect they have declined due to their level of fatigue.  
6.1.2 FATIGUE REPORTS 
There were 403 fully complete fatigue report forms returned from 277 different transport 
missions. With 331 missions in total tasked to these services during the study period, this 
represented 84% of missions for which fatigue reports were returned (Table 6-1). However 
the overall estimated return rate for fatigue reports was considered to be 73%. This was based 
on the total number of critical care patient transport missions undertaken over the period of 
the study, the number of clinicians required for each mission, and an assumption that all 
transport clinicians who worked on those missions would also be enrolled in the study (and 
therefore completed a fatigue report for that mission). Flight nurses returned 258 fatigue 
reports (64%) and doctors 145 fatigue reports (36%), with 61% of the reports from missions 
undertaken by fixed-wing aircraft, 19% by helicopter and the remaining 20% by road. The 
average, SD, duration of missions was 5.7 hours, ±2.8; the average amount of sleep clinicians 
reported having in the 24 hours preceding their mission was 7 hours, ±1.6; and the reported 
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average in-mission sleep time was 4 minutes, ±19. Thirty-two percent of the reports were 
from night missions; and for 28% of the fatigue reports returned clinicians were working on 
call. For a further 50% the clinicians had left a PICU or ICU clinical shift to undertake the 
mission. On 85% of reports returned there was more than one clinician on the mission and for 
almost half (46%), the patients being transported were ‘Category A’ requiring ventilation or 
advanced life support.  












Age  -  years,  mean  (SD) 41 ( 7)  33 ( 5)  
Female participants - number (%) 26 (90) 209 (87) 15 (45) 53 (44) 
Experience -  months, median (IQR) 54 (12 - 125)  4 (1 - 11)  
Regular sleep disturbance - number 
(%) 12 (41) 
 
94 (39) 5 (15) 
 
19 (16) 
Epworth score >10 - number (%) 5 (17) 63 (26) 2 (6) 4 (3) 
Declined a mission in past  6 months 
due to fatigue, n (%) 3 
 
37 (14) 0 
 
0 
Should have declined a mission in 
past 6 months due to fatigue 
- number of occasions, n (%) 17 
 
 




* Approximately 3% of  fatigue reports returned did not include an ID number from which baseline 
characteristics could be reported 
 
The median (IQR) number of missions undertaken by each clinician was 4 (2 – 7), Table 6-2. On 
one in every 12 of the fatigue reports returned (8.2%) clinicians reported severe post-mission 
fatigue (that is, levels of 6 or 7 on the SP scale). As a proportion of missions for which data was 
returned there was at least one clinician reporting severe fatigue on 11.2% of missions. 
Fatigue increased significantly from the start to the end of transports, as rated on a VAS scale 




Table 6-2. Summary of mission fatigue and associated characteristics 
Part 1. Total number of missions reported on, n = 277  
 
 
Characteristic Number Range 
 
Missions undertaken per clinician, median, IQR 
 
4, 2 – 7 
 
1 - 28 
Missions where clinicians reported severe fatigue, n (%) 31 (11.2)  
Night missions (inclusive of a period between midnight and 
6am), n (%) 86(31%)  
Two or more clinicians on the mission, n (%) 217 (78)  
 
Part 2. Summary of data from fatigue report forms, n = 403 
Retrieval Service, n (%)  247 (61) General 
156 (39) Pediatric 
 
 
Transport mode, n (%)  244 (61)  Fixed-wing 
78   (19)  Helicopter 
81   (20)  Road 
 
Night mission (inclusive of period between midnight and 
6am), n (%) 
130 (32) 
 
Mission duration, mean hours, SD  5.7 ±2.8 1.25 - 20 
Sleep during mission, mean minutes, SD 4  ± 19 0 - 240 
Two or more clinicians on the mission, n (%)  343 (85)  
Sleep in the 24 hours previous to the mission, mean hours, SD 7 ±1.6 2 - 14 
On-call from home, n (%)  112 (28)    
Transport mission undertaken “off the floor, n (%)” 204 (50)  
Rostered for flight duty only, n (%) 87(22)  
Patient acuity category A, n (%) 186 (46)   
Consecutive previous shifts worked,  mean, SD 2 ± 1.3 0 – 9 
VAS fatigue pre-mission, mean, SD 21 ±18 0 - 78 
VAS fatigue post mission, mean, SD 37 ±24 0 - 100 
Increase between pre and post-mission VAS fatigue, mean, 
95%   confidence interval 
15.8, 13.8 – 17.9*  
 
SP fatigue score ≥6 pre-mission, n (%)  1 (0.2)  
SP fatigue score ≥6 post-mission, n (%) 33 (8.2)  
VAS self-rated performance, mean, SD  78 ±16 16 - 100 
VAS self-rated  mission difficulty, mean, SD  28 ±27   0 - 100 
 
*paired t-test, p <0.001 
Total number of transport missions tasked to the services during the study period, n  = 331 




6.1.3 FACTORS PREDICTIVE OF CLINICIAN FATIGUE LEVELS  
The results of the hierarchical linear model showed four factors were associated with the 
overall level of post-mission (VAS) fatigue (Table 6-3). These were pre-mission fatigue level, 
duration of the mission, overnight missions, and mission difficulty. One other factor which 
approached significance was transporting via helicopter (p=0.09). Factors which were not 
associated included the amount of sleep clinicians reporting having had in the 24 hours prior 
to their mission, the number of previous shifts they had worked in a row, whether clinicians 
were working on-call or rostered, whether they were doctors or flight nurses, and whether 
they were working in the general ICU flight team or the pediatric transport team. The 
clinicians’ previous sleep hours and the consecutive shifts they had worked were both 
correlated with the level of their pre-mission VAS fatigue (r = -.15, p = 0.002, and r = .21, p < 
0.001 respectively). The sensitivity analysis disregarding the data from the three clinicians who 
had previously refused missions due to fatigue showed that the results were still well within 
the original confidence limits. 
Table 6-3. Mission factors and post-mission fatigue 
 
Post mission VAS and SP fatigue ratings (Figure 2) were strongly positively correlated (r = 0.86, 
95% CI 0.84 – 0.89, p < 0.001), and while pre-mission SP fatigue ratings influenced post-
mission ratings (SP), clinicians with low pre-mission fatigue could still finish at 6 or 7 on the SP 
scale, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 *Estimated change in VAS (0 – 100) 
outcome per 1 unit change in the co-








0.46 - 0.68 
 
<0.001 
Mission duration 2.11, 1.24 - 2.98 <0.001 
Night mission 10.49, 6.55 - 14.42 <0.001 
Mission difficulty (0 – 1) 11.7, 4.8 - 18.6   0.001 
 
* The estimated amount, according to a multiple hierarchical regression model, of expected 
change in VAS post-mission fatigue if there was a one unit change in the mission factor, if all other 




Figure 2. Post-mission fatigue as measured by two different scales:  The Samn-Perelli (SP) 
fatigue scale and the VAS (0 – 100). 
 
 
Figure 3. Pre-mission and post-mission fatigue, as measured on the Samn-Perelli (SP) fatigue 
scale 
The results of the hierarchical logistic model (Table 6-4) showed the odds of being severely 
fatigued by the end of the mission rose by 2.19 for every step higher on the SP fatigue scale at 
which clinicians started out (95% CI 1.43 - 3.34). For each hour extra the mission lasted, the 
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odds of severe fatigue increased by 1.32 (95% CI 1.12 - 1.56). The odds for night missions 
(spanning midnight to 6am) were increased 4.05 times and the odds of severe fatigue for the 
most difficult mission were 4.71 that of the easiest mission but this was not statistically 
significant (p=0.06) 
Table 6-4. Mission factors and severe post-mission fatigue 
 
There was a negative correlation between fatigue and clinician performance, with poorer self-
rated performance during the mission associated with higher levels of post-mission fatigue 
(VAS fatigue rating, r = -0.4, 95% CI -0.5 to -0.3, p < 0.001; and SP fatigue rating r = -0.34, 95% 
CI –0.42 to -0.25, p < 0.001). 
 
6.2 STUDY II: A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE IN THE CRITICAL CARE SETTING OF 
AEROMEDICAL PATIENT TRANSPORT. 
The prototype AeroNOTS measurement framework was approved by the expert working 
group, having been initially adapted from the ANTS framework by the working group and 
further informed by data gathered from literature, clinician focus groups, clinician survey, and 
field testing. The skill definitions for the framework are illustrated in Table 6-5, and examples 
of illustrative behaviours for each skill element are illustrated in Table 6-6. A full description of 
the AeroNOTS framework is available in the appendix (Appendix 8 Skill definitions and 
behavioural descriptors). The rating scale to be applied to the AeroNOTS skill categories and 
elements is illustrated in Table 6-7 (for a complete sample recording form see Appendix 9 
AeroNOTS assessment form and rating scale) 
  
*Odds Ratio, with 95% CI P value 
 




1.43 - 3.34 
 
<0.001 
Mission duration (hours) 1.32, 1.12 - 1.56 <0.001 
Night mission  4.05, 1.52 - 10.77   0.001 
Mission difficulty (0 to 1) 4.72, 0.91 - 24.5   0.06 
 
* The estimated odds, according to a multiple hierarchical logistic model, of being severely fatigued (that is, a 
level of 6 or 7 on the SP fatigue scale) by the end of the mission for every step higher on the SP fatigue scale at 
which clinicians started their mission (pre-mission SP fatigue) 
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Table 6-5. Aeromedical non-technical skills framework: skills definitions 
 
  
Category Element Skill definition 
Task Management 
The skills of management of 
resources and organisation of 
tasks to achieve goals, be they 
individual case plans or longer 




Developing in advance primary and contingency strategies for managing tasks, 
reviewing these and updating them if required to ensure goals will be met, making 




Scheduling tasks, activities, issues, information channels, etc – according to 
importance (eg due to time, seriousness, plans); being able to identify key issues and 
allocate attention to them accordingly, and avoiding being distracted by less 





Supporting safety and quality by adhering to accepted principles of patient 
transport; following where possible, codes of good practice, treatment protocols or 




Establishing the necessary, and available, requirements for task completion (eg. 
People, expertise, equipment, time) and using them to accomplish goals with 
minimum disruption, stress, work overload or underload (mental and physical) on 
individuals and the whole team. 
 
Team Working 
The skills of working with 
others in a team context, in 
any role, to ensure effective 
joint task completion and 
team satisfaction; the focus is 
particularly on the team 




activities with the 
team 
 
Working together with others to carry out tasks, for both physical and cognitive 
activities; understanding the roles and responsibilities of different team members; 






Giving and receiving the knowledge and data necessary for team coordination and 
task completion 
 
Using authority & 
assertiveness 
 
Leading the team and/or the task (as required), accepting a non-leading role when 
appropriate; adopting a suitably forceful manner to make a point, and adapting this 




Judging different team members’ skills, and their ability to deal with a situation; 
being alert to factors that may limit these and their capacity of perform effectively 





Providing physical, cognitive or emotional help to other members of the team 
Situation awareness 
The skills to develop and 
maintain an overall dynamic 
awareness of the situation 
based on perceiving the 
elements of both the clinical 
and the aviation environment: 
patient, team, time, displays, 
equipment, aircraft operation, 
understanding what they 
mean and thinking ahead 







Actively and specifically collecting data about the situation by continuously 
observing the whole environment  and monitoring all available data sources and 






Considers and interprets information in light of the environment, identifies the 
match or mis-match between the situation and the expected state, updates one’s 




Asking ‘what if’ questions and thinking about potential outcomes and consequences 
of actions, intervention, non-intervention, etc; running projections of current 
situation to predict what might happen in the near future 
Decision making 
The skills of making decisions 
to reach a judgement or 
diagnosis about a situation, or 
to select a course of action, 
based on experience or new 
information under both 








Generating alternative possibilities or courses of action to be considered in making a 
decision or solving a problem 
 




Assessing hazards to weigh up the threats or benefits of a situation, considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action; choosing a solution or 




Continually reviewing the suitability of the options identified, assessed and selected ; 
and re-assessing the situation following implementation of a given action 
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Table 6-6. Aeromedical non-technical skills framework: Behavioural illustrations 














 Negotiates for an appropriate plan 
for transport with relevant parties  
 Demonstrates the ability to elicit 
relevant information from the 
referring hospital 
 Sources and organises all appropriate 
medication and equipment before 
setting out on the transport 
 
 Does not adapt the transport plan 
in light of new information 
 Does not organise appropriate 
drugs or equipment in advance 
 Fails to make appropriate 






 Discusses priority issues in the case
  
 Manages potential distractors with 
appropriate delegation  
  
 Becomes distracted by the aviation 
environment or logistical issues 







 Follows established protocols and 
guidelines when appropriate  
 Cross checks drug labels 
 Checks equipment before transport 
commences 
 Does not check medication with 
patient and notes 
 Breaches guidelines such as 
minimum monitoring standards 
 Fails to confirm or check what 






 Identifies resources that are available 
 Carries out routine tasks in 
anticipation of busy or critical periods 
 
 Fails to utilise available resources 
 Overloads other team members 
with tasks 
 Does not request necessary 












 Confirms roles and responsibilities of 
team members including themselves 
 Cooperates with others to achieve 
goals  
 Does not coordinate with 
colleagues 






 Gives situation reports/updates key 
events 
 Confirms shared understanding 
 Expresses concerns constructively 
 Maintains clear case documentation 
 Does not information team of plan 
or subsequent alteration 
 Gives inadequate handover briefing 
 Fails to express concerns in a clear 







 Takes over task leadership as 
required 
 States their case and provides 
justification 
 Questions other team members 
regardless of seniority when unsure 
right decision has been made 
 Does not allow others to put 
forward their case 
 Fails to attempt to resolve conflicts 
in an appropriate manner 






 Communicates own limitations and 
calls for assistance when it is needed 
 Clarifies the experience of team 
members they have not worked with 
before 
 
 Joins an established team without 
ascertaining their capabilities 
 Fails to respond to obvious cues of 
fatigue or other incapacity such as 
motion sickness – person yawning, 






 Acknowledges concerns of others 
 Provides reassurance/encouragement 
 Debriefs and thanks staff after a 
difficult transport 
 
 Asks for information at a 
difficult/high workload time for 
someone else 
 Does not offer assistance to team 
member 
 Fails to recognise needs of others 
requiring task re-allocation 
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 Obtains and documents patient 
information prior to transport 
 Conducts a frequent scan of the 
aviation and clinical environment 
 Cross checks information to increase 
reliability 
 Reduces level of monitoring 
because of distractions or 
tediousness 
 Does not alter physical layout of 
workspace to improve data 
visibility or audibility 
 Does not ask questions to orient 






 Demonstrates ability to change 
clinical treatment plan in light of new 
information 
 Verbalises observed trends and their 
meaning to other team members 
 
 Perseveres with ineffective 
strategies in response to critical 
events 
 Dismisses alarms without 
investigation  




 Keeps ahead of the situation with 
appropriate intervention 
 Sets and communicates intervention 
thresholds 
 interventions during mission (eg. 
Draws up drugs for use in advance to 
use on the airframe or anticipates 
additional medical supply 
requirements such as oxygen) 
 Fails to increase level of monitoring 
in keeping with patient condition or 
circumstances 
 Is caught unaware by transport 
related issues 
 Does not forsee undesirable 















 Recognises alternative options for 
decisions 
 Seeks input on various transport 
related issues with all relevant parties 
 Objectively evaluates and discusses 
clinical or other relevant 
considerations with colleagues 
 Even though time is available 
jumps straight to one option 
without considering alternatives  
 Fails to ask other team members 
for options, when appropriate or is 








 Considers risks of different treatment 
and/or transport options 
 Assesses time criticality associated 
with possible options 
 
 Does not preview courses of action 
with relevant people to assess their 
suitability 
 Fails to review and discuss possible 




 Re-assesses patient after key stages 
of the transport or on a regular basis 
 Reviews situation , if decision was to 
wait and see to list options as 
patient’s condition evolves 
 Reviews transport options as aircraft 
or environmental changes occur 
 Fails to re-assesses patient after 
key stages of the transport or on a 
regular basis 
 Fails to allow adequate time for 
intervention to take effect 
 Is unwilling to revise course of 




Table 6-7. Rating scale descriptors for aeromedical non-technical skills 
Rating Options Descriptor 
5 – Excellent 
(exceptional) 
Extremely good performance which could serve as a model example for others; patient 
safety enhanced 
4 – Good (strong) A consistently high standard of performance, patient safety assured 
3 – Acceptable 
(adequate) 
Satisfactory  performance but could be improved; patient safety not affected 
2 – Marginal 
(borderline) 
Performance gives rise to concern; patient safety potentially compromised 
1 – Poor (obviously 
unacceptable) 
Absence of behaviour required by the situation; performance endangered or potentially 
endangered patient safety 
* Round down to the next lower integer rating if you feel performance was best described in between two scale 
points 
 
GLOBAL RATING: (Mark with a circle):     Poor   1  –  2  –  3  –  4  –  5  – 6  –  7  Excellent 
 
 
The results of the individual pieces of work (literature search, focus groups, field testing, 
content evaluation survey) which informed the final AeroNOTS prototype are presented in 
greater detail next.  
6.2.1 DATA FROM LITERATURE AND CLINICIAN GROUPS 
LITERATURE SEARCH 
As described in the methods chapter for Study II (section 5.3.4) the search to identify 
literature for the scoping review was undertaken in two stages. There were 19 articles 
identified during stage one of the search, but none of them met the initial inclusion criteria 
which required studies to be empiric, focused on clinical performance and safety, and not on 
pilots. The inclusion criteria were then expanded to include published expert opinion or 
review articles, and empiric data collected from general ICU interhospital transport settings. 
This identified seven publications suitable for review (Blanchet, 2010, Droogh et al., 2012, 
Erler et al., 2013, Gordon et al., 2012, Gryniuk and National Flight Paramedics, 2003, Hearns 
and Shirley, 2006, Springer, 2005). The second stage of the search, utilising specific non-
technical skills categories as search terms and the original inclusion criteria, yielded a further 
10 studies (Dalto et al., 2013, Fisher et al., 2000, Flabouris et al., 2006, Gabram et al., 1994, 
Jaynes et al., 2013a, MacDonald et al., 2008, Pugh, 2002, Stohler, 1998, Topley et al., 2003, 
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Vilensky and MacDonald, 2011). When the widened inclusion criteria were applied a further 
six new publications were identified (Frakes, 2011, Jaynes et al., 2013b, Maynard et al., 2012, 
Reimer and Moore, 2010, Williams et al., 1999)(As a breakdown: “situation awareness” = 11 of 
which 0 were retained; teamwork = 204 of which 3 were retained (Flabouris et al., 2006, 
Jaynes et al., 2013b  , Frakes, 2011); communication = 1125 of which 2 were retained (Dalto et 
al., 2013, Vilensky and MacDonald, 2011); decision making = 925 of which 3 were 
retained(Topley et al., 2003, Stohler, 1998)). Overall, this resulted in 23 individual publications 
available for review (a summary of these search results is available in Appendix 10 Literature 
search results). 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE AERONOTS PROTOYPE RESULTING FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
DATA 
Review of the low range of evidence and literature available did result in some modification or 
additions to behavioural descriptors and skill definitions in the draft prototype AeroNOTS 
framework. My review notes, on which these modifications are based, are available in 
Appendix 7 Notes literature review and data synthesis AeroNOTS development’, but as 
examples: 
Additions for teamwork behaviours 
 an addition for the ‘using authority or assertiveness’ element of teamwork was 
questions others regardless of seniority when they are unsure the right decision has 
been made 
 an addition to the ‘supporting others’ element of teamwork was helps out when a 
colleague is busy  
Additions for situation awareness behaviours 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘gathering information’ element of situational 
awareness was conducts a frequent scan of the aviation and clinical environment 
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘gathering information’ element of situational 
awareness was does not alter layout of the workplace to improve data visibility or 
audibility (the ability to hear in aircraft is limited so it is important clinicians can see 
monitors to mitigate this).  
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MODIFICATIONS TO THE AERONOTS PROTOTYPE RESULTING FROM FOCUS GROUP DATA 
During generation of the white-board lists within the focus groups, a common point raised for 
discussion was that experienced clinicians develop many strategies to cope with the challenge 
and the geographical isolation of the critical care transport environment such as “try to plan 
for things to go wrong” and “plan for every eventuality”. Flight nurses in particular also listed 
items related to the importance of developing specific communication strategies, particularly 
for working with unknown team members; for example the skill of being very assertive in 
acquiring information, ensuring they are being listened to, making non-confrontational 
suggestions when they think something needs doing that does not appear to be happening 
such as “do you want me to…?”.  
With regard to managing their own fatigue focus group participants listed strategies such as 
“repeating things out loud” and “making a point of telling other team members they are 
tired”. The focus group data did not support the addition of any skills (non-technical skills 
categories or elements) not already in the prototype framework, but did support the content 
of the existing framework with all listed whiteboard points able to be coded to a pre-existing 
category and element from the AeroNOTS framework. The data did provide useful additions of 
illustrative behaviours for the skills however, for example: 
Additions to task management behaviours 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘providing and maintaining standards’ element of 
task management was follows established protocols and guidelines when appropriate, 
for example reviews checklists before key time-points in the transfer  
Additions to teamwork behaviours  
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘exchanging information’ element of teamwork 
was does not include relevant people in communications or communicates at 
inappropriate times 
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘using authority and assertiveness’ element of 
teamwork was does not challenge colleagues when appropriate 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘using authority and assertiveness’ element of 
teamwork was makes requirements known with necessary level of assertiveness 
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 a positive behaviour added to the ‘assessing capabilities’ element of teamwork was 
notices when other team members are fatigued and offers assistance or increases 
level of monitoring 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘supporting others’ element of teamwork was 
provides appropriate information to relatives 
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘supporting others’ element of teamwork was 
provides inappropriate assurances to family 
Additions to situation awareness behaviours 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘gathering information’ element of situation 
awareness was cross checks information to increase reliability (for example on a noisy 
helipad or in the noisy aircraft) 
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘gathering information’ element of situation 
awareness was reduces level of monitoring because of distractions or tediousness 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘recognising and understanding’ element of 
situation awareness was mounts defences against fatigue-related errors 
  a negative behaviour added to the ‘recognising and understanding’ element of 
situation awareness  was perseveres with ineffective strategies in response to critical 
events 
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘anticipating’ element of situation awareness was 
continually prepares for upcoming clinical interventions during mission 
Additions to decision making behaviours  
 a positive behaviour added to the ‘identifying options’ element of decision making 
was seeks input on various transport related issues with all relevant parties 
 a negative behaviour added to the ‘identifying options’ element of decision making 
was fails to ask other team members for options when appropriate, or is 
inappropriately influenced by non-medical considerations 
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6.2.2 CONTENT VALIDITY SURVEY 
As part of the evaluation of the AeroNOTS framework in development, a convenience sample 
of aeromedical clinicians were consulted on how relevant and representative the prototype 
skills definitions and behavioural descriptors were. The methodology for this survey is 
described in section 5.3.6 of the methods chapter. A total of 36 fully complete surveys were 
returned from 20 flight nurses, 10 transport consultants and six paramedics; they had a 
median (IQR) aeromedical transport experience of eight (4 – 13) years. Of the 64 positive 
behaviours included in the survey five failed to achieve a content validity index (CVI) greater 
than or equal to 0.75 and were revised. The original and revised versions are shown in Table 
6-8. For example in the domain of Task Management, there is a skill element of ‘maintaining 
standards’; and one of the suggested behavioural descriptors for maintaining standards was 
follows established protocols and guidelines, which returned a CVI of 0.72. Accompanying their 
ratings, the surveyed clinicians offered comments such as: “sometimes a situation doesn’t fit 
guideline or protocol so you must be flexible enough to adapt to the new situation”; and 
“sometimes events occurring at the time may necessitate some deviation from outlines 
guidelines and protocols”. The general theme of comments for this behaviour was that while 
protocols or guidelines are important the changeable and unknown nature of the 
environment means an element of flexibility is important. This behaviour description was 
changed to follows established protocols and guidelines when appropriate 
From the Team Work domain a behavioural descriptor for the skill element of ‘exchanging 
information’ was given as avoids criticising, which returned a CVI of 0.61. The themes from the 
comments on this behavioural descriptor included the notion that it was important to be able 
to give criticism, and that it was acceptable if it was constructive. For example: “criticism can 
be okay and necessary if it is constructive”; and “information sharing is important, but the 
mission is more important than worrying about criticising”; and “I think we need to be able to 
give appropriate feedback. If that feedback is negative, it needs to be communicated in a non-
judgemental and appropriate way. This does not mean we should criticise but I think if we 
don’t address things, that is where cracks form and it can compromise care”. This behaviour 
description was changed to expresses concerns constructively. 
Many of the free-text comments provided by the surveyed clinicians focused on the 
importance of the individual elements or general non-technical skills categories for safe 
aeromedical patient transport (for example “communication and confirmation are the keys to 
completing a safe and expedient transport”), but respondents did not provide any suggestions 
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for specific skills not already covered by the prototype AeroNOTS framework. For example 
‘teamwork and communication’ were mentioned five separate times but this was 
incorporated into the teamwork category already. The AeroNOTS working group concluded 
that all comments regarding behaviours could be categorised into the existing 15 skills and 
associated behaviours; also that there were no major omissions other than the modifications 
made for items that scored low (<0.75) CVI ratings. Participant suggestions were used to 
improve or replace low scoring behavioural statements but other than this all additional 
comments related to activities were already listed in the exemplar behaviours.  
Table 6-8. Behavioural descriptor modifications following content validity survey 
NTS main category and skill element Original behavioural descriptor Revised behavioural descriptor 
Task Management: Providing and 
maintaining standards 
Follows established protocols and 
guidelines eg. Reviews checklists before 
key time-points in the transfer CVI = 0.72 
Follows established protocols and 
guidelines when appropriate 
Team working: Exchanging 
information 
Avoids criticising CVI = 0.61 Expresses concerns constructively 
Team working: Assessing capabilities Asks new team member about their 
experience CVI = 0.72 
Clarifies the experience of team 
members they have not worked with 
before 
Situational awareness: Gathering 
information 
Conducts frequent scan of the 
environment, CVI = 0.72 
Conducts a frequent scan of the clinical 
and aviation environment 
Decision making: Identifying options Seeks input on various transport related 
issues with patient or family, CVI = 0.64 
Seeks input on various transport 
related issues with all relevant parties 
Content validity index (CVI) is calculated as number of respondents who rated the importance of a behaviour as ‘very 
important’ or ‘essential’, divided by total number of respondents. A CVI < 0.75 is considered to potentially indicate low content 
validity (Polit et al., 2007) 
 
6.2.3 FIELD TESTING 
Testers who trialled four and five-point scales for rating performance expressed a preference 
for being able to distinguish between good and exemplary performance, so they preferred the 
five point scale (Table 6-7) as has been applied in a similar modification of the ANTS scale to 
the nurse anaesthetists’ setting (LYK‐JENSEN et al., 2014), rather than the 4-level rating scale 
used in the ANTS system(Fletcher et al., 2003). Field testers also confirmed that it was only 
possible to observe the non-technical performance of one clinician at a time; that particular 
non-technical skills seemed to be prominent for different clinical roles at different stages of 
the mission; and suggested a “not applicable” category would be useful because some 
transports do not require all elements, or they just cannot always be observed.  
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6.2.4 CLINICAL SIMULATION STUDY: NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE OF 
EXPERIENCED VERSUS INEXPERIENCED AEROMEDICAL CLINICIANS 
Demographic details and baseline characteristics 
A total of 16 physicians from speciality training programmes in intensive care, emergency 
medicine, and anaesthesia, took part in the clinical simulation study examining the difference 
between non-technical skills performance of clinicians ‘with’ and ‘without’ experience in 
interhospital patient transport. Eight of the participants were categorised as ‘experienced’, 
having undertaken a median (IQR) of 45 (25 – 51.5) previous inter-hospital patient transfers. 
The other eight participants had undertaken a median of 0.5 (0 – 4.5) transfers, and were 
categorised as ‘inexperienced’ (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Previous transport experience 
 
The baseline characteristic results (Table 6-9) show that the experienced group was older than 
the inexperienced group, with a mean age, with SD, of 36.1, ±5.6 years versus 29.8, ±2.1 years 
(independent t-test, p = 0.009). In the experienced group (n = 8) 50% were male; in the 
inexperienced group (n = 8) all were male. There was no difference in other baseline 
characteristics including previous experience of simulator training, the number of hours they 
had worked or slept in the 24 hours prior to their simulation-based evaluation, and their 




Table 6-9 Baseline characteristics of participants 
Characteristic Experienced 
Group, n = 8 
Inexperienced 
Group, n = 8 
P value 
    
Age, mean (SD) 36.1 (± 5.6) 29.8 (± 2.1) ^0.009 
Male gender, n (%) 4 (50) 8 (100) §0.08 





Specialty training programme, n (%) 
ICU and Anaesthetics 
Anaesthetics 



























Number of previous patient transports, median 
(IQR) 
45 (25 – 51.5) 0.5 (0 – 4.5) 0.001 
Number of previous simulations, median (IQR) 15 (2.25 – 20) 5 (5 – 16) 0.57 
Usual weekly hours worked, mean (SD)     44 (4) 46 (5) ^0.29 
PSQI* sleep quality score, mean, (SD) 5.5 (1.4) 4.6 (2.3) ^0.38 
ESS∞ daytime sleepiness score, mean (SD) 3.8 (3.1) 5.4 (4.1) ^0.39 
OFER (IR) sub-scale~, mean (SD) 
 
48 (27) 56 (18) ^0.54 
Samn-Perelli Fatigue Scoreǂ, median (IQR) 3 (1.25 – 4.75) 2.5 (1.25 – 3.75) 0.57 
Sleep in 24 hrs pre-scenario, median  hours (IQR) 7.0 (6.6 – 7.9) 7.0 (7 - 8) 0.80 
Work in 24 hrs pre-scenario, median hours (IQR) 8 (1 – 13.5) 6 (1.75 – 7.75) 0.51 
 
*Pittsburgh Sleep Quality index (Buysse 1989): Scores  < 5 associated with good sleep quality, scores > 5 associated with poor 
sleep quality 
∞  Epworth Sleepiness Scale: Scores > 10 are  indicative of excessive daytime sleepiness (Johns 1991) 
~ Occupational Fatigue Exhaustion Recovery (Intershift recovery) subscale (Winwood 2005): Scored between 0 and 100, higher 
scores represent greater recovery from occupational fatigue between shifts. 
ǂ Samn-Perelli Fatigue scale (Samn-Perelli 1982), possible scores between 1 and 7 where 1 is “fully alert wide awake” through 
to 7  which is “completely exhausted, unable to function effectively” 
^Independent t-test 
§Fishers exact test 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 
    
    
 
Comparison of non-technical skills rating scores from two independent assessors 
There was variation between the AeroNOTS performance ratings (overall non-technical skills 
score) provided by the two assessors (see Figure 5), but overall there was no statistical 
difference between their scores (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p = 0.21). This remained consistent 
across three of the four individual AeroNOTS categories (team work, situational awareness, 
and decision making) while for the fourth non-technical skills category of ‘task management’ 
one assessor (the clinical expert) tended to rate more highly than the other (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = 0.02). In terms of the AeroNOTS summed score the performance ratings from 
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the two assessors displayed a monotonic association with each other, meaning as the value of 
the summed score from one assessor increased so did the other (rs = 0.65, p = 0.006). This also 
held true across the four individual skill categories (correlation coefficients ranging between rs 
= 0.54 and 0.76, all significantly greater than 0 at p = 0.05).  
 
Figure 5. Non-technical skills ratings from individual assessors 
 
The differences in how the two assessors were rating appeared to arise within the 
inexperienced clinician group; that is, paired tests demonstrated there was no difference in 
the AeroNOTS scores assigned by the two assessors when they were rating the experienced 
clinician group (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p = 0.83) whereas there was a difference for the 




Figure 6. Non-technical skills ratings from individual assessors for the clinicians with and 
without experience in aeromedical transport. 
 
The performance of experienced versus inexperienced aeromedical clinicians 
For the main analyses, the AeroNOTS scores provided by the two assessors (summed total and 
individual categories) were averaged. The non-technical skills performance, general clinical 
performance (observed), and self-rated clinical performance scores for all participants are 
shown in Table 6-10. Clinicians with experience in patient transfer had significantly higher 
non-technical skills (AeroNOTS) scores than the clinicians without transfer experience (Mann-
Whitney U, p = 0.001), the difference in median scores for the two groups being 4.25 points 
on the 20 point scale. For the secondary observed performance measure (general clinical 
performance as rated by a third assessor), experienced clinicians were also rated more highly 
(Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.003, Figure 7). For all clinicians, the ratings they received for their 
non-technical skills performance were strongly positively correlated with the ratings they 




Table 6-10 Assessment scores: Non-technical skills and general clinical performance 
Performance measure, median (IQR) Experienced 
clinicians, n = 8 
Inexperienced 
clinicians, n = 8 
P value~  
    
Non-technical skills (AeroNOTS)* 16 (15.125 – 17.125) 11.75 (8.75 – 
14.25) 
0.001 
Task Managementǂ 3.75 (3.5 – 4.375) 2.5 (2.125 – 3) 0.001 
Teamworkǂ, 4 (3.625 – 4.5) 3 (2.5 – 3.5) 0.002 
Situational Awarenessǂ 3.75 (3.5 – 4.375) 3 (2.5 – 3.375) 0.03 
Decision Makingǂ 4 (3.625 – 4.375) 2.75 (2.125 – 3) 0.02 
 
General clinical performance∞ 
 
 
4 (4 – 4) 
 
2.75 (2 – 3) 
 
0.003 
Self-rated clinical performance∞ 
 
4 (3 – 4) 3.5 (2.125 – 4) 0.32 
    
* Median Aeromedical Non-technical Skills rating (summed score, possible range between 4 and 20, higher scores represent a 
higher level of performance) 
ǂ Median non-technical skills category rating (possible range between 1 and 5, higher scores represent a higher level of 
performance) 
∞ Overall clinical performance rating (self-rated or observed -  possible range between 1 and 5, higher scores represent a higher 
level of performance) 




Figure 7. Observed non-technical skills and general clinical performance scores for clinicians 





Self-ratings of general clinical performance did not discriminate in the same way as the 
‘observed’ performance measures, with the self-rated performance of the experienced group 
no different from that of the inexperienced group (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.32, Figure 8). In 
addition, self-rated performance was not correlated with either observed general 
performance (rs = 0.4, p = 0.11) or observed non-technical skills performance (rs = 0.4, p = 
0.1).  
 
Figure 8. Self-rated general clinical performance scores for clinicians with and without 




ADDITIONAL VALIDITY STUDY 
Six aeromedical clinicians took part in the exercise at a professional postgraduate 
development programme in which they rated scripted videos of the study scenario. For the 
scenario demonstrating a higher level of performance all ratings except one were within two 
points of each other (total summed AeroNOTS score). For the scenario demonstrating a lower 
level of performance, rating scores were up to four points different. For the global rating score 
(global rating between 1 and 7) ratings were within 1 point for the higher level of performance 
and two points when it was the lower level of performance being demonstrated (Table 6-11). 
Table 6-11. Ratings from trial raters for scenarios scripted at higher and lower levels of 
aeromedical non-technical skills performance 
Summed non-technical 
skills score scripted for a 
higher level of 
performance (possible 
score between 4 and 20)  
Summed non-technical 
skills score scripted for a 
lower level of 
performance (possible 
score between 4 and 20) 
Global non-technical 
skills rating scripted for a 
higher level of 
performance 
(possible score between 
1 and 7) 
Global non-technical 
skills rating scripted for a 
lower level of 
performance (possible 
score between 1 and 7) 
15 7 5 2 
18 5 5 1 
16 8 6 3 
16 6 5 2 
16 4 6 2 
18 4 6 1 
 
A comment common to all the trial raters was that despite the earlier non-technical skills 
presentation session, it was hard to decide on different ratings for different categories when 
not very familiar with the measurement framework. Some raters also noted in written 
comments that “it depended on their experience and thus their perspective”, or that they felt 
“underqualified to be rating and didn’t feel able to give scores of either ‘1’ or ‘5’ but that was 
because they personally steer clear of two extreme ends on a scale”. Another suggestion 
mentioned by more than one person was that depending on the purpose of the rating it 
would be ideal to “make a note of the specific behaviours that should be expected for a given 




6.3 STUDY III: THE IMPACT OF FATIGUE ON THE NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL CARE AEROMEDICAL TRANSPORT 
CLINICIANS. 
As described in the methodology chapter (section 5.4), Study III was a crossover study in 
which clinicians acted as their own controls and performed two aeromedical simulations, one 
when expected to be highly fatigued at the end of a night shift (classified as the ‘fatigued 
scenario’) and one when it was expected they would be more rested after at least one usual 
night’s sleep (classified as the ‘non-fatigued scenario’). Their non-technical skills performance 
was rated by assessors blinded to participants’ fatigue status, using a pre-determined checklist 
of non-technical behaviours specific to the two scenarios. 
6.3.1 BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS 
Nineteen registrars from a range of clinical specialty training programmes participated in the 
study. Their baseline characteristics are presented in Table 6-12. The average PSQI score was 
5.2, with six of the clinicians reporting scores of over 5 which indicates poor sleep quality. The 
reported recovery from fatigue between shifts (OFER-IR) was fair at 39.3., and ESS scores 
indicated daytime sleepiness was relatively low at an average of 4.6, with none of the 
participants reporting a score higher than 10 (which is associated with excessive daytime 
sleepiness). 
Table 6-12. Participant characteristics 
Age 32 (2.9) years 
Gender (% male) 58% 
Speciality training, n (%) 
Intensive Care Medicine 








Experience (number of previous patient air transports) 33.7 (29.5)  
~ Epworth Sleepiness Score (ESS) 4.6 (2.2) 
∞ Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) 5.2 (2.3) 
ǂ Occupational Fatigue Recovery Scale (OFER – IR) 39.3 (18.4) 
*n = 19, values are expressed as means with SD unless otherwise stated 
~ ESS Scoring range  0 – 24,  scores > 10 indicative of excessive daytime sleepiness 
 ∞ PSQI Scoring range 0 – 21, scores of ≤ 5 associated with good sleep quality, > 5 associated with poor sleep quality 





6.3.2 FATIGUE AND SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS 
When participants completed their first of two scenarios, 10 did so when fatigued and nine 
when non-fatigued. For nine participants it was scenario B (intracerebral haemorrhage) they 
completed when fatigued while for the other 10 it was scenario A (cardiac arrhythmia). 
Participants reported a median of 12 hours of sleep in the 48 hours prior to undertaking their 
fatigued scenarios, versus 14 hours in the 48 hours prior to their non-fatigued scenarios. In the 
fatigued state they had been awake (overnight) for a median of 16 hours prior to completing 
the scenario. In the non-fatigued state they had been awake on average for 4.5 hours prior to 
completing their scenario. Median scores of 7 on the KSS and 6 on the SP-fatigue scale 
confirmed that the participants were subjectively feeling highly fatigued when they undertook 
fatigued scenarios. In comparison, they reported median scores of 3 on both the KSS and the 
SP-fatigue scale for non-fatigued scenarios. For the Stroop test participants were 5 seconds 
slower on average to complete the distraction task when fatigued versus non-fatigued, while 
for psychomotor vigilance the median number of lapses was 2 when clinicians were fatigued, 
and 1 when non-fatigued. After completing a scenario non-fatigued, participants rated their 
performance as not impaired to any extent by fatigue (that is, a median score of 1 on a four 
point scale ranging from “1 = fatigue did not impair my performance at all during the 
scenario” to “4 =fatigue greatly impaired my performance during the scenario”). After 
completing their fatigued scenario, participants rated fatigue as having “moderately” impaired 
their performance (a median score of 3 on the four point scale referred to immediately 





Table 6-13. Fatigue characteristics: Within-clinician differences when non-fatigued versus 
fatigued 
Clinical performance and fatigue characteristics Difference* p-value 
 
Consecutive hours awake  
 
11.86 (10 – 13.5) 
 
p < 0.001 ǂ 
Number of hours on shift previous 48hrs  13 (12 – 24) p < 0.001ǂ 
Hours of sleep previous 48hrs  2 (0 – 3) p = 0.008ǂ 
Karolinska Sleepiness Scale ∞ 3 (2 - 4) p < 0.001 ǂ 
Samn-Perelli Fatigue Score ¶ 2 (2 – 3)  p < 0.001ǂ 
Stroop interference score (seconds) ~ 4.8 (3.8 – 10.5) p = 0.049ǂ 
Five minute PVT (number of lapses > 500ms) § 1 (1 - 3) p = 0.084 ǂ 
Impact of fatigue on performance (self-rated) 1 (1 – 2) p < 0.001 ǂ 
 
*Differences expressed as median with interquartile range. Differences were calculated by subtracting individual participant 
scores when they were fatigued from their scores when non-fatigued.   
 ǂ Wilcoxon signed-ranks test,  
∞ Subjective sleepiness, score range from 1 ( = very alert)  to 9 ( = very sleepy, great effort to stay awake); ¶Subjective fatigue, 
score range from 1 ( = fully alert, wide awake) to 7  ( = completely exhausted, unable to function effectively); ~ Stroop effect:  
Time taken to read a 50 item colour chart minus the time taken to read a 50 item non-matching word/colour chart; § 
Psychomotor vigilance task, median number of reaction time lapses greater than 500 milliseconds 
 
6.3.3 INTER-RATER AGREEMENT 
The inter-rater agreement (ICC and 95% CI) for the rater-pairs who assessed each scenario was 
0.93 (0.82 – 0.97) for the neurological scenario and 0.93 (0.83 – 0.97) for the cardiac scenario. 
The scores of the rater-pairs were averaged for the main analysis. 
6.3.4 DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
For the main outcome, ‘difference between fatigued and non-fatigued non-technical skills 
performance’, the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality returned p-values greater than 0.05 
(supporting a conclusion the data were normally distributed) as follows:  p = 0.07 for the 
difference in overall AeroNOTS summed-score; p = 0.92 for the difference in Task 
Management; p = 0.83 for Team Working; p = 0.66 for Situation Awareness; and p = 0.45 for 
Decision Making. Histograms and Normal Q-Q plots of non-transformed scores are presented 
in Figure 9 and Figure 10 respectively. They illustrate that the Q-Q plot for AeroNOTS 
summed-scores did not closely follow a diagonal line, so the results of paired t-tests on log-
transformed scores (for the difference between fatigued and non-fatigued performance) were 
also examined. This analysis did not lead to any different findings. My decision was therefore 
to present the results for Study III based on a presumption that there was a normal 

















Figure 10. Normal Q-Q plots for the AeroNOTS ‘difference’ scores between non-fatigued 






6.3.5 CLINICAL PERFORMANCE 
For the main outcome, the overall non-technical skills performance of the clinicians, the mean 
difference in performance, with 95% CI, was 2.8 points, 2.2 - 3.4. The differences in clinicians’ 
performance scores in non-fatigued versus fatigued states are presented inTable 6-14.  
Table 6-14. Clinical performance measures: within-clinician differences when fatigued versus 
non-fatigued. 







Overall non-technical skills performance  
 
2.8 (2.2 - 3.4) 
 
p < 0.001 ƚ 
 
Individual non-technical skills categories 





     Task Management 0.78 (0.40 - 1.16) 
 
p = 0.001 ƚ 
 
     Team Work  
 
0.75 (0.53 - 0.97) 
 
p < 0.001 ƚ 
 
     Situational Awareness 
 
0.72 (0.50 - 0.94) 
 
p < 0.001 ƚ 
 
     Decision Making 0.54 (0.23 - 0.85) p = 0.003 ƚ 
 
 
Self-rated clinical performance, median (IQR) 
 
 
0 (0 – 1) 
 
p = 0.153ǂ 
*Differences expressed as mean with 95% confidence interval unless otherwise indicated. Differences were 
calculated by subtracting individual participant scores when they were fatigued from their scores when non-
fatigued. For overall non-technical skills performance the size of the possible score difference was 16 points 
(scores could range between 4 and 20). For individual categories, and for self-rated performance the size of the 
possible score difference was 4 points (scores could range between 1 and 5). 






Figure 11. Non-technical skills performance of individual clinicians when fatigued versus non-
fatigued 
 
Clinicians’ performance was better in non-fatigued than fatigued states (16.95 [16.17 - 17.73] 
and 14.13 [13.41 - 14.86], respectively, mean [95% CI], Figure 11). Scores were also higher in 
each of the four individual non-technical skills domains (task management, teamwork, 
situational awareness, and decision making) when clinicians were non-fatigued (Table 6-14). In 
contrast to the observed ratings for performance (AeroNOTS scores), participants’ self-rated 













There was an order effect for the main outcome of interest, overall non-technical skills, and 
for the individual category of task management. When the participants undertook their first 
scenario fatigued the mean difference in performance was higher. There was also a difference 
in self-rated performance, depending on the order. Clinicians who undertook their first 
scenario when non-fatigued tended to self-rate their performance in their second scenario 
(when fatigued) more highly (Table 6-15).  
Table 6-15 Order effect for difference between fatigued and rested non-technical skills 
performance 
Outcome Difference 
(rested – fatigued) 
Mean(SD) difference 
when first scenario was in 
rested state 
Mean(SD) difference when 
first scenario was in fatigued 
state 
p value 
Difference in overall non-technical 
skills 
2.16 (1.16) 3.42 (1.21) 0.033 
Difference in Task Management 
 
0.30 (0.73) 1.21 (0.74) 0.015 
Difference in Team Work 
 
0.61 (0.53) 0.87 (0.42) 0.257 
Difference in Situational Awareness 
 
0.54 (0.36) 0.89 (0.55) 0.123 
Difference in Decision Making 
 
0.65 (0.70) 0.45 (0.70) 0.545 
Difference in Self-Rated 
performance 
-0.22 (0.67) 0.80 (0.92) 0.014 
 
 
* two-sample t-test of the mean differences between the two orders 
 
Due to this possible learning effect (in relative terms clinicians tended to perform ‘better’ in 
their second scenario) the order in which the situations were observed was controlled for, to 
examine differences in performance by other covariates.   
Examining the effect of measured covariates  
An analysis of covariance was performed to examine whether the mean difference in non-
technical skills performance differed by order, by possible covariates, or by the interaction 
between the two. There was no interaction between any of the covariates and order. Once 
the order effect was controlled for, none of the covariates affected the difference in overall 
performance (Table 6-16). 
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Table 6-16 Covariate effect on performance once order was controlled for 
 
Covariate F test p-value for covariate 
Gender p = 0.553 
Age p = 0.876 
Epworth Sleepiness Score p = 0.402 
Usual Sleep Quality (PSQI) p = 0.544 
Inter-shift fatigue recovery (OFER) p = 0.731 
Experience (previous number of air transfer missions) p = 0.695 
Difference in KSS p = 0.500 
Difference in SP p = 0.559 
Difference in PVT Lapses p = 0.341 
Difference in Stroop p = 0.125 
Difference in time awake p = 0.752 
Difference in sleep past 48 hrs p = 0.907 
Difference in work hrs past 48 hrs p = 0.894 
Abbreviations: OFER= Occupational Fatigue Exhaustion Recovery Scale ; KSS = Karolinska Sleepiness Scale;  
SP = Samn-Perelli Fatigue Score; PVT = Psychomotor vigilance test   
 
Relationship between performance scores in the four non-technical skills categories 
Scatterplots with fitted regression lines and correlation coefficients, illustrating the nature and 
strength of the relationship between a clinician’s performance scores in the individual non-
technical skills categories, are presented in Figure 13 and Figure 14. When clinicians were non-
fatigued their performance in the non-technical skills domain of teamwork was positively 
correlated with their performance in both situation awareness (r = .72, p < 0.01) and decision 
making (r = .613, p < 0.01); and their situation awareness performance was positively 
correlated with their decision making performance (r = .544, p < 0.05). Performance in the 
domain of task management was not associated with performance in any of the other non-
technical skills domains of team work (r = .173), situation awareness (r = .317), or decision 

















These scatterplots illustrate the linear relationship between individual non-technical skills domain scores when 
clinicians were ‘non-fatigued’. Via this simple analysis these panels show that task management has the least 
apparent covariation with the other domains.  
  




For ‘non-fatigued’ performance, Cronbach’s Alpha for a summed AeroNOTS scale increased 
from .69 to .80 if the task management domain was omitted from the scale. The size of the 
coefficient for the correlation between task management and the summed total of the other 
three domains (corrected domain-total correlation) was .09 (Table 6-17).  
Table 6-17 Similarity in measurement outcomes for domains in the AeroNOTS summed scale: 
non-fatigued performance 
 Scale mean if 
domain 
omitted 











12.51 2.31 .09 .80 
Teamwork 12.8 1.38 .74 .45 
Situation 
awareness 
12.87 1.54 .76 .47 
Decision making 12.67 1.32 .46 .67 
*Cronbach’s Alpha  for the AeroNOTS scale overall when clinicians were non-fatigued = .69; 
N of items -= 4 
 
When clinicians were fatigued their situation awareness performance was positively 
correlated with both teamwork (r = .662, p < 0.01) and decision making (r = .510, p < 0.05) 
performance. Their performance in teamwork and decision making tended towards being 
positively correlated but this was not statistically significant (r = .448, p = 0.054). Performance 
in the domain of task management was not associated with performance in any of the other 
non-technical skills domains of team work (r = -.002), situation awareness (r = .026), or 















These scatterplots illustrate the linear relationship between individual non-technical skills domain scores when 
clinicians were ‘fatigued’. Via this simple analysis these panels show that task management has the least 
apparent covariation with the other domains. 
  
  






For ‘fatigued’ performance, Cronbach’s Alpha for a summed AeroNOTS scale increased from 
.58 to .76 if the task management domain was omitted; the coefficient for the correlation 
between the task management domain and the summed-total of the other three domains 
(corrected domain-total correlation) was -.01 (Table 6-18). These results support the finding 
that the way people performed in task management continued to show less covariation with 
the way they performed in the other domains. 
Table 6-18 Similarity in measurement outcomes for domains in the AeroNOTS summed scale: 
fatigued performance 
 Scale mean if 
item deleted 





if item deleted* 
Task Management 10.49 2.91 -.01 .76 
Teamwork 10.75 2.10 .56 .38 
Situation awareness 10.80 1.744 .60 .30 
Decision making 10.42 1.75 .43 .46 
 
*Cronbach’s Alpha  for the AeroNOTS scale overall when clinicians were fatigued = .58; N of items -= 4 
 
Comparing clinicians’ performance scores across the four individual non-technical skills 
domains, visual assessment suggested there may be a tendency for clinicians to score more 
highly in task management and decision making than in teamwork and situation awareness, 
particularly when fatigued (Figure 15). However the results of one way repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed that clinicians scores across domains were not consistently different when 
clinicians were either non-fatigued (F [3, 54] = 2.41, p = 0.08) or fatigued (with Greenhouse-









6.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The research for the thesis was undertaken over three phases, referred to as Studies I, II, and 
III. Study I was a prospective assessment of the levels and patterns of fatigue for critical care 
clinicians, specifically focusing on the fatigue they experienced while on duty transferring 
critically ill patients between hospitals in air ambulances. Clinicians returned 403 fully 
complete fatigue report forms at an estimated overall return rate of 73%. Fatigue increased 
over the course of missions, and on one of every 12 fatigue reports returned, clinicians 
reported severe post-mission fatigue (that is, levels of 6 or 7 on the Samn-Perelli scale). 
Factors which impacted on clinician fatigue were the pre-mission fatigue level of the clinician, 
night work, mission duration, and mission difficulty. Poorer self-rated performance was 
significantly associated with higher levels of fatigue (r = -0.4, 95% CI -0.5 to -0.3). For the six 
month period leading up to the study three participants reported they had declined a mission 
due to fatigue; over the entire sample 22 missions had been completed that in retrospect 
participants felt they should have declined due to fatigue. 
The phase of research referred to as Study II comprised a number of related pieces of 
research. The objective of this phase was to adapt and evaluate a non-technical skills rating 
framework for the critical care interhospital air ambulance (aeromedical) environment. The 
final prototype of an AeroNOTS framework (Table 6-5 and Table 6-6) was produced from 
expert working group, literature review, focus group, clinician survey, and focus group data. 
During the evaluation phase the content evaluation survey was completed by 38 clinicians 
with a median aeromedical transport experience of 8 (IQR 4 – 13) years. Based on responses 
there were no skills or behaviours added though some of the behaviour illustration 
descriptors were revised. Field testers expressed a preference for a five point rating scale. In 
the second phase of the evaluation 16 physicians from speciality training programmes in 
intensive care, emergency medicine and anaesthesia took part in the clinical simulation study. 
Clinicians with inter-hospital transport experience performed more highly than those without 
experience, according to both AeroNOTS non-technical skills ratings (Mann-Whitney U, p = 
0.001) and general performance ratings (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.003). Self-ratings did not 
distinguish experienced from inexperienced transport clinicians (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.32) 
and were not strongly associated with either observed general performance (rs = 0.4, p = 0.11) 
or observed non-technical skills performance (rs = 0.4, p = 0.1).  
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Study III was a clinical simulation study in which a randomised crossover design was used to 
compare the non-technical skills performance of clinicians when they were in a fatigued 
versus a non-fatigued state. The overall non-technical skills performance of clinicians was 
better in non-fatigued than fatigued states (mean difference with 95%CI, 2.8 [2.2 - 3.4]).The 
findings remained consistent across individual non-technical skills domains; also when 
controlling for an order effect and examining the impact of a number of possible co-variates. 
There was no difference in self-ratings of clinical performance between non-fatigued and 
fatigued states. For the four individual non-technical skills domains, clinicians’ performance in 
task management did not co-vary with their performance in the other domains (teamwork, 
situation awareness and decision making), whether clinicians were fatigued or non-fatigued. 
Paired analysis showed that clinicians’ scores within each of the four non-technical skills 
domains were not consistently different, whether they were in a fatigued or non-fatigued 




7 DISCUSSION  
As a start to the discussion a summary of the main aims and main findings is presented. The 
central aim of this thesis was to identify and assess possible effects of acute fatigue related to 
sleep deprivation. The emphasis was on clinician performance in high risk critical care settings, 
since degraded clinician performance is a risk to patient safety, particularly in acute medical 
settings when clinicians are working in isolation. The focus was therefore particularly on 
whether degrading effects of fatigue are detected when assessed using a measure directly 
linked to safe and effective clinical performance. The specific research objectives for the thesis 
were to: assess the degree of fatigue critical care clinicians experience in the course of their 
routine duties; develop and test a meaningful method of measuring critical care clinical 
performance; and assess the effect of routinely-experienced levels of fatigue on critical-care 
clinical performance.  
The clinicians chosen as the study population for this research were those who undertake 
critical care interhospital air transfers as part of their clinical role in the ICU. Using a field-
based prospective design, I found they routinely experience high levels of fatigue. Subsequent 
examination using a clinical simulation design illustrated that at these fatigue levels, clinicians’ 
performance becomes significantly degraded. In this chapter I discuss these findings and their 
implications, acknowledge the limitations of the research programme, make 
recommendations for further research and clinical practice, and summarise the contribution 
of the thesis in a conclusion. 
7.1 CLINICIANS ARE ROUTINELY FATIGUED WHEN ON DUTY 
The aeromedical environment is one where advanced levels of clinical care are provided in 
isolated and challenging conditions. For one of every 12 fatigue reports returned at the 
culmination of a critical care patient transfer, clinicians were severely fatigued. In light of the 
nature of the clinical work I had estimated the burden of fatigue may be substantial, but it had 
not been possible to determine from existing published evidence the levels or characteristics 
of fatigue these clinicians experience in the course of their routine duties. In the pre-hospital 
care setting between 10% and 55% of clinicians are estimated to be severely fatigued when on 
duty (Patterson et al., 2012b), while in the critical care nursing setting one study found 65% of 
nurses struggled to stay awake or actually fell asleep during at least one shift per month and 
this was often during daytime hours (Scott et al., 2006). A study of orthopaedic surgical 
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trainees (residents) found they were fatigued for 48% of the time they were awake, and 
‘impaired’ during 27% of their time awake, sleeping on average only 5 hours per day 
(McCormick et al., 2012). By comparison, my findings regarding the potential burden of on-
duty fatigue may appear comparatively low with 11.2% of missions where there was at least 
one clinician working who was severely fatigued. To examine this further, in pre-hospital 
settings it is possible clinicians simply are more fatigued because they extend their workload 
by working for multiple agencies (Frakes and Kelly, 2007, Patterson et al., 2012a). This is not 
common practice for the hospital-based critical care services examined in my research. It is 
also possible there is an overestimation of effect sizes, which often occurs in case control 
studies; for example if a high preponderance of night-call clinicians had been enrolled in the 
previous studies (McCormick et al., 2012). There may also have been reporting bias in former 
studies. That is, unlike the clinicians in this thesis research who were reporting their fatigue 
levels in ‘real time’ (during their actual clinical shifts), evidence from most previous reports 
(Braude et al., 2011, Guyette et al., 2013, Patterson et al., 2010b, Patterson et al., 2012a, West 
et al., 2009) has tended to rely on clinicians being asked to recall their ‘usual levels of fatigue 
while at work’ at a later time, and is thus susceptible to recall bias.  
While it is not completely clear how the prevalence of severe fatigue reported here compares 
to the findings of others, it does confirm that in the course of routine aeromedical retrieval 
duties critical care clinicians can experience fatigue so severe it may be affecting their 
performance. 
7.2 CLINICIAN FATIGUE IS INFLUENCED BY TIME OF DAY, BASELINE FATIGUE 
LEVELS AND WORKLOAD 
Another finding from this research was that the degree of fatigue clinicians experience while 
on duty in the field is influenced by many factors: their baseline levels of fatigue; what time of 
day they are working; and aspects of their workload, which in this case was the duration of a 
patient transfer mission and also any unexpected events or logistical challenges which 
accompanied that mission. I discuss these results in greater detail next. 
Night work influences clinician fatigue 
It is the nature of most critical care settings that clinicians are routinely called on to work 
during the night. A third of the aeromedical transfers reported on in this research involved 
overnight work between midnight and 6am, and this was independently predictive of 
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clinicians experiencing severe fatigue. This finding is expected, given the known effects of 
circadian rhythm on night-time sleepiness and function (Van Dongen and Dinges, 2000). A 
homeostatic drive to sleep was also likely to be promoting the feeling of fatigue if the 
reporting clinicians had already been awake for an extended period of time when they 
undertook their patient transfer mission. Clinicians working in a critical care role are 
commonly awake for extended periods, somewhat sleep deprived for two or more days in a 
row, and have their sleep disrupted in some way. These are all factors known to increase sleep 
drive and fatigue (Belenky et al., 2003, Dinges et al., 1997, Van Dongen et al., 2003). While not 
surprising, my findings provide support for a conclusion that whenever patient transfer 
missions overlap with some part of the night, the odds of clinicians becoming fatigued to the 
point where they cannot concentrate or function effectively are substantially increased. 
Pre-mission fatigue levels influence clinician fatigue 
The results here also showed that the influence of pre-mission fatigue has a significant impact 
on the estimated degree of fatigue clinicians report, and many of the clinicians started critical 
care patient transfer missions already feeling relatively fatigued. The amount of sleep 
clinicians had prior to the missions was self-reported, because there were not resources to use 
an objective measurement tool like an actiwatch. The prospective design did at least ensure 
the clinicians were recalling sleep in the time immediately preceding their current shift, and 
there is some evidence that subjective estimation of sleep duration can be, on average, 
comparable to actigraph estimates (Signal et al., 2005). The average duration of sleep 
clinicians reported in the field-based study was just under seven hours which, while perhaps 
not uncommon in medical trainees and other health care workers (Smyth et al., 2017), is at 
the lowest end of the recommended daily allowance for healthy adults (National Center for 
Chronic Disease Prevention (CDC), n.d). It is likely this contributed to the pre-mission fatigue 
experienced by the clinicians and statistical analysis did reveal an association. For the field 
study the quality of clinicians’ sleep was not measured in terms of using an extensive or well-
validated sleep quality measure. However a single question answered at enrolment did 
indicate that many of the clinicians were experiencing regularly disturbed sleep due to factors 
outside their workplace such as having young children, or living with other housemates who 
may have a different schedule to them. I did use the validated Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) 
at enrolment, to capture the clinicians’ usual daytime sleepiness, finding that some of the 
flight nurses (17%) reported high levels of susceptibility to daytime sleepiness (ESS scores 
greater than 10). Still, this rate of daytime sleepiness was actually only comparable to that of 
the New Zealand general population where 15% of people report ESS scores greater than 10 
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(Harris, 2003) and significantly less that the rate of 30% which has previously been reported in 
NZ junior doctors (Gander et al., 2007), and a rate of 38% which has been reported in US 
prehospital personnel (Fernandez, 2011) and emergency medicine doctors (residents) (Handel 
et al., 2006).  
The number of previous shifts clinicians had worked, and the amount of sleep they reported in 
the 24 hours prior to their missions, was not strongly associated with their reported degree of 
fatigue at the end of their mission. This may seem a surprising finding, but both sleep and 
previous shifts were associated with the pre-mission fatigue levels of the participants; so in 
effect pre-mission fatigue simply came after sleep and workload on a causal pathway between 
sleep and post-mission fatigue.  
Workload 
For the field-based study I made a specific attempt to capture workload by taking account of 
mission-specific factors such as the duration and the difficulty of the transfer, finding they 
influenced clinician fatigue significantly. In pre-hospital and critical care settings workload is 
often conceptualised only in terms of the overall duration of clinicians’ shifts, and this has 
been shown to have little effect on fatigue-related performance (Allen et al., 2001, Guyette et 
al., 2013, Thomas et al., 2006) or error (Anderson et al., 2017). However those were studies 
where ‘workload actually undertaken’ or ‘time awake’ was not necessarily taken into account, 
in that there was likely to have been opportunity for significant rest or even sleep for the 
participants due to the way their clinical services were organised. Other critical care medical 
and nursing settings in which ‘extended time on duty’ could be argued to equate with ‘higher 
workload’ have clearly illustrated the impact of workload-related fatigue on clinicians’ ability 
to remain vigilant and avoid medical errors (Lockley et al., 2007, Rogers et al., 2004, Scott et 
al., 2006).  
It is true that the aspect of workload described here as ‘mission difficulty’ was subjectively 
rated by the clinician, and potentially influenced by a variety of operational and individual 
factors. The association between post-mission fatigue and mission difficulty could for example 
even have been reverse causation to some extent (that is, higher fatigue made the mission 
feel more difficult). Still, the wording of the rating question for mission difficulty asked 
clinicians to take ‘everything into account such as weather, logistical issues, patient condition, 
or unexpected events’, and as such ‘mission difficulty’ variable did represent a relevant aspect 
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of workload in terms of what the clinician had actually coped with or experienced during the 
course of the transfer mission. 
With respect to the ‘mission duration’ aspect of the workload, the missions the clinicians were 
undertaking in this study were not particularly long at an average of 5.7 hours (including total 
travel time and handover back in the ICU). This duration is likely to be longer than would be 
experienced in pre-hospital settings, and much shorter than long-haul military or international 
repatriation critical care settings (Lamb, 2010), but it is similar to that previously reported in a 
NZ interhospital transfer setting (Myers et al., 2012). The finding that both mission duration 
and mission difficulty influenced fatigue provide support for a conclusion that workload can 
have a significant impact on clinician fatigue in critical care settings, independent of time of 
day or a clinician’s baseline fatigue. 
7.3 THERE ARE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS WHEN THE CLINICIANS ON DUTY 
TRANSFERRING CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS ARE FATIGUED 
Clinical implications  
The fatigue levels reported by clinicians during the field-study suggest their clinical 
performance would often have been substantially degraded at the time they were on duty 
transferring a critically ill patient. This is supported by evidence from a range of health care 
settings which has demonstrated the adverse impacts of fatigue on clinically relevant tasks; 
for example reducing attention and vigilance, impairing decision making, and reducing the 
quality of communication (Gander et al., 2008, Howard et al., 2003, Lockley et al., 2006). The 
findings of one meta-analytic examination have even suggested fatigue has higher negative 
effect on clinical performance than it does on simple vigilance (Philibert, 2005). Findings from 
my own subsequent simulation study also confirmed that clinical performance in the form of 
non-technical skills was noticeably degraded in clinicians who were reporting feeling severely 
fatigued. A broad interpretation of this is that their ‘organisation and management of tasks 
and resources’; their ability to ‘maintain a dynamic awareness of patient or environment 
changes’; their ability to ‘work effectively in a team’; and their ‘decision making’; were all 
degraded in the face of fatigue. When clinicians were on real-world patient transfer missions 
they were particularly likely to report very high levels of fatigue if even a small portion of the 
mission encompassed time between midnight and 6am. If they had been awake for an 
extended period of time in addition to working during the period of the overnight circadian 
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trough, the effect on their performance was likely to be even more pronounced than that 
anticipated due to circadian effect alone (Williamson and Friswell, 2013).  
In the introductory chapters the known association between fatigue and medical error was 
discussed (Landrigan et al., 2007, Lockley et al., 2007, West et al., 2009). While error was not 
measured in the field study, the wording of the descriptors on the SP fatigue scale certainly 
suggested that for 11.2% of the missions for which fatigue reports were returned, at least one 
of the clinicians was so fatigued they were finding it ‘very difficult to concentrate’ or were 
‘completely exhausted and unable to function effectively’ by mission end. A previous report 
from NZ-based anaesthetists found 32% recalled a fatigue-related error in the previous six 
months (Gander et al., 2000). In pre-hospital transport settings the reported odds of an 
adverse event or an error are 2.2 times greater in fatigued than non-fatigued clinicians, while 
the odds of safety-compromising behaviour are 3.6 times greater (Patterson et al., 2012a). It 
therefore seems likely that when clinicians were reporting severe fatigue during a real-time 
critical care patient transfer, they were at risk of making an error. This is an important factor 
to be aware of in any critical care setting, but especially one such as interhospital transfer 
where clinicians are generally working in small teams and in isolation, so errors may go 
unnoticed and additional support or resources are not readily available.  
Operational implications  
Organising critical care services in a manner that best manages the potential hazard of 
clinicians working when they are highly fatigued is likely to be challenging. If a service is one 
where clinicians are likely to have outside employment it is important to consider the 
possibility they may start their shift (or a patient transfer mission) with a high baseline level of 
fatigue. Reports from some pre-hospital and air ambulance settings suggest between 34% and 
81% of clinicians are employed in more than one organisation (Frakes and Kelly, 2005, Frakes 
and Kelly, 2007, Patterson et al., 2010a), though in hospital-based critical care services it may 
not be common (McCormick et al., 2012). While clinicians who start out feeling alert and lively 
may still experience extreme tiredness or exhaustion by the end of an interhospital transfer 
mission (as demonstrated in the field-study, Figure 3), being aware of the predictive role of 
pre-mission fatigue is essential. It is certainly important for retrieval services where clinicians 
will routinely be leaving their other clinical duties to transfer critical care patients. Baseline 
fatigue is also important to consider in critical care settings where clinicians work on-call in 
addition to their rostered shift-load, and therefore have reduced opportunities for rest and 
sleep, or have disrupted sleep. Others have noted the impact of clinicians having a ‘less than 
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ideal’ amount of sleep prior to their duty period (Garden et al., 2012, Smyth et al., 2017). It 
has been reported to reduce the accuracy aspect of doctors’ attentional testing but not the 
reaction time, executive control, or attentional orienting aspects of their attention (Smyth et 
al., 2017). There is also evidence that even if not actually called out, simply being on call can 
disrupt clinicians’ sleep and affect the quality and restorative value of their sleep (Ziebertz et 
al., 2017). 
The influence of pre-mission fatigue, night work and workload collectively highlight the 
potential applicability of having a formal system for managing fatigue in a critical care setting, 
and I will discuss this further in a later section addressing recommendations. Fatigue risk 
management systems in many workplaces are based on a policy of self-identification for those 
who feel too fatigued to carry out their duties safely (Lerman et al., 2012). In terms of whether 
critical care clinicians are likely to do so or not, three flight nurses indicated they had declined 
to undertake a mission in the six month period prior to the field study on the grounds of 
fatigue. Many more missions had been undertaken during the same time period which 
clinicians (both doctors and nurses) retrospectively recognised they should have declined in 
light of the impact of fatigue. Because those data were based on participant recollection of 
the six month period leading up to when they were enrolled into the study, it was not possible 
to determine what the characteristics or final outcomes of the particular transfers were. 
Serious breaches in patient safety are rare and therefore not a routine outcome to study in 
prospective studies, which is why I needed to generate and assess measurable surrogates (in 
study II and III). A future qualitative examination of this issue would also be useful, and is 
intended. The nature of the study design here meant the culture of the two flight services was 
not readily discernible, in terms of how acceptable it was to openly discuss their level of 
fatigue or refuse missions in their daily practice. However a previous report based on data 
from one of the services showed that even if registrars are provided with a dedicated sleep 
room they do not routinely nap during night shifts (Poynter et al., 2012). The proposed plan 
discussed in that report was instituting a change in service culture by moving to a ‘stated 
expectation’ that registrars should ideally take turns to nap during night shifts (Poynter et al., 
2012). This would suggest that for at least one of the ICU flight services participating in my 
research there was an acknowledgement at management level of the hazard clinician fatigue 
may pose. However it is not clear whether this would generally be the case across critical care 
services. For example a study of first year residents (registrars) from the US reported that 
while they had access to an on-call room where they could take naps if highly fatigued, only 
20% felt their work environment actually supported a culture of napping while at work 
168 
 
(Shnayder et al., 2017). Another study reported that critical care nurses worked longer than 
scheduled for 85% of their shifts and 10% of the time this was “coerced” voluntary overtime 
(Scott et al., 2006).  
To my knowledge the findings from the field-based study reported here represent the first 
time clinician fatigue has been prospectively mapped in a critical care interhospital transport 
setting. For logistical reasons only subjective ratings of fatigue were collected and it may be 
that fatigue and its impacts are underestimated in these findings. It is particularly likely if the 
clinicians doing the reporting had high baseline fatigue levels or were chronically lacking in 
sleep (Van Dongen et al., 2003). While there was value in understanding the level and 
characteristics of the clinician fatigue under routine circumstances, an important part of the 
thesis research programme was to consider in more detail what actual impact the clinicians’ 
fatigue was having on their clinical performance and safety. This is discussed next. 
7.4  AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK WITH DIRECT RELEVANCE FOR CLINICAL 
PERFORMANCE CAN BE APPLIED IN A SAFETY SENSITIVE SETTING 
A safety sensitive setting in the context of this thesis refers to a real-world setting where the 
outcome is critical and human performance is critical to that outcome. In fatigue research, 
performance has traditionally been measured in terms of discrete aspects of cognition, or 
discrete clinical tasks. Generic measures scored in terms of response times, or physiological 
measures such as blink detection, have the advantage of being widely applicable and largely 
independent of the situation or context for the participant. The disadvantage is that they may 
not directly translate to clinical performance levels, or that they may potentially interfere with 
clinical duties. Because the degree to which proxy measures represent actual clinical 
performance or patient safety is not clear (Rubulotta et al., 2016), accessible assessment tools 
which can capture clinical performance in a more global fashion are needed. A context-specific 
observational tool has the advantage of being adjusted for the context, and is non-
interventional in that the reporting or analysis of the observed or recorded performance can 
be achieved in a delayed fashion. There are still disadvantages though in that observers need a 
high degree of training for the task, and the measure of performance can still potentially be 
influenced by observer subjectivity. Against this background I identified a non-technical skills 
framework as being suitable for the purpose of assessing context-specific clinical 
performance. The premise was that such a measurement framework could be used to 
169 
 
examine the impact of fatigue in a way that was highly relevant in terms of clinical 
performance and patient safety, and had not previously been reported.  
In light of limited aeromedical-specific literature, and the cost and lengthy timeframes 
required to develop a completely novel measurement framework for non-technical skills, I 
chose to adapt an existing anaesthesia-focused framework (ANTS, (Fletcher et al., 2003)) for 
use in the aeromedical environment. The rationale for this is discussed in section 5.3.3 of the 
Methods chapter, but to repeat this in brief, the ANTS system is well-established, with 
anaesthesia being a medical speciality to take a leading role in addressing patient safety; also 
in taking a human factors approach to training and safety (Gaba, 2000). While a behavioural 
rating system cannot simply be applied to another specialty area (Flin et al., 2010) there is 
significant overlap in the non-technical skills requirements of intensive care and anaesthesia 
(Reader et al., 2006). Based on these factors my rationale was that similarity between the 
skills required of intensive care air ambulance clinicians and anaesthesia specialists would be 
expected. Findings from work undertaken to adapt and evaluate the aeromedical non-
technical skills instrument are discussed next. 
7.4.1 A NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK FROM ONE CRITICAL 
CARE SETTING CAN BE ADAPTED FOR ANOTHER SIMILAR SETTING 
The ANTS system is already known to be a valid and reliable measure of the critical care non-
technical skills anaesthetists use (Flin and Patey, 2011), and non-technical skills are broadly 
generic (Flin et al., 2008). In light of the previous two points, and taking into account 
limitations of time and funding, my initial evaluation of the AeroNOTS system focused on the 
adequacy of the customisation process from anaesthetics to aeromedical settings. The 
recommended processes for adapting such tools was followed, in collecting data directly from 
clinician experts and literature specific to the aeromedical transport domain (Kodate et al., 
2012). A number of changes were made on the basis of that consultation both while the tool 
was in development, and when it was tested by surveying experienced aeromedical clinicians 
based in both NZ and internationally. As a result, I am satisfied the face and content validity of 
skill definitions and behavioural descriptors in the customised AeroNOTS tool developed for 
the research are adequate. 
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7.4.2 AN ADAPTED AEROMEDICAL NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS FRAMEWORK CAN 
DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE 
 Another requirement for the customised AeroNOTS tool was that it could discriminate 
between different levels of performance. This was important because a key motivation for 
developing such a tool was being able to measure clinical performance in a meaningful way. I 
chose to test this in simulated research conditions so as to be able to standardise the process 
as far as possible. In accordance with a priori expectations, clinicians who had aeromedical 
transfer experience received higher AeroNOTS scores from blinded assessors than clinicians 
without transfer experience. While the sample size was small, the results provide preliminary 
support for a conclusion that the AeroNOTS framework adequately captures the construct of 
aeromedical non-technical skills performance. Firstly, the AeroNOTS scores differentiated 
between more and less experienced clinicians, based on their non-technical skill performance 
during simulated transfer of a critical patient. Secondly, the AeroNOTS scores from two 
blinded assessors strongly correlated with an independently observed general performance 
score from a third assessor. Some limitations associated with this conclusion are discussed 
further in section 7.7.3. 
7.5 THE NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL CARE 
CLINICIANS IS DEGRADED AT ROUTINE LEVELS OF FATIGUE IN 
SIMULATED SETTINGS 
An important finding from this research is that the non-technical skills performance of critical 
care clinicians is degraded when they are fatigued. In measuring non-technical skills the aim is 
to capture the range of cognitive and personal resource skills clinicians should display as they 
work as safely and effectively as possible (Flin et al., 2008). As I discussed in Chapter 2 (section 
2.3.1), the detrimental effects of fatigue on many individual aspects of cognition are well 
recognised. These include many of the same aspects of cognition clinicians would require to 
ensure good non-technical performance, for example short term memory; processing speed; 
maintaining attention; and the aspects of executive function an individual uses to reason, 
make decisions and interact effectively with team members. All of these have been 
individually examined in research settings. However in using a global measure of the clinicians’ 
non-technical skills I was pragmatically assessing the effect of a number of interacting 
cognitive functions on clinical performance, in the presence of fatigue. 
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The novelty of the finding that non-technical performance is degraded by fatigue lies in the 
fact that fatigue impact is rarely measured using an approach so directly linked to actual 
performance in a critical care clinical setting. I can identify only one previous report of the 
impact of fatigue on critical care non-technical skills performance, where two independent 
groups of 10 anaesthetic residents managing a simulated crisis situation were compared 
(Neuschwander et al., 2017). In the Neuschwander study (2017) fatigued clinicians were on 
call overnight (obtaining less than 5 hours sleep) and had a median (IQR) performance score of 
12.2 (10.5 – 13) on the 16 point summed ANTS scale; the rested clinicians were assessed after 
a usual night’s sleep and had a median (IQR) score of 14.5 (14 – 15); and ratings were made by 
two blinded observers (Neuschwander et al., 2017). The levels of fatigue for their two groups 
with respect to the average KSS scores (6.5 when fatigued vs 3.7 when non-fatigued) were 
comparable to the fatigue levels of the clinicians in my research (7 when fatigued vs 3 when 
non-fatigued). The findings of Neuschwander et al (2017), so similar to my own, appear to 
provide further support for my conclusion that key aspects of safe and effective clinical 
performance are likely to be degraded if clinicians are highly fatigued.  
In the thesis research high-fidelity but simulated conditions were utilised to examine fatigue 
impact on non-technical skills, and it is not clear how strongly my findings represent clinical 
performance in a real-world setting (Baker et al., 2016). Still, there is evidence to suggest 
simulation-based assessment agrees strongly with real-world clinical behaviour (Gordon et al., 
2010). In addition, simulation is widely used to teach or study clinical performance (Griswold 
et al., 2012). For consistency, every attempt was made to ensure each clinician’s test in both 
‘fatigued’ and ‘non-fatigued’ state occurred at a similar time of day. It also had to be organised 
around participants’ usual clinical duties in the ICU, so for pragmatic reasons all simulation 
sessions were taking place at approximately 9am which is the time clinicians generally 
complete their night shift duties. In terms of circadian rhythm this time could potentially have 
represented the start of a period of ‘performance upswing’, regardless of how fatigued or 
sleep-deprived the clinicians were (Czeisler et al., 1980, Howard et al., 2003). If the ‘fatigued’ 
simulations had taken place earlier during actual shift-time, more extensive non-technical 
skills decrements would most likely have been evident (Howard et al., 2003).  
While there were four trained assessors available in total for the fatigue study, each individual 
simulation session was rated by only two assessors, a possible drawback when observing 
complex phenomena such as non-technical performance (Gaba et al., 1998). However it was 
important that blinding be maintained by ensuring each assessor rated a participant only once 
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so they would not, even subconsciously, be comparing a clinician’s performance when 
fatigued versus non-fatigued, which could introduce a rating bias into the second scoring. The 
rating process was very demanding and time consuming, and needed to be done by people 
who were content experts, but finding objective assessors and getting the ratings done was a 
challenge. An attempt was made to mitigate the issue of few raters by following 
recommendations to use a pre-defined checklist of the key expected behaviours specific to 
the scenarios the clinicians completed (Boulet et al., 2003), and ICC analysis of the ratings did 
suggest excellent levels of reliability (Hallgren, 2012). While it is not likely using multiple raters 
would have improved the reliability of the ratings process (Noveanu et al., 2017), the 
assessors should be recognised as a crucial part of the planning for any future similar study. 
7.5.1 THERE ARE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DEGRADED NON-TECHNICAL 
SKILLS PERFORMANCE IN CLINICIANS 
One of the key characteristics of the research here is that clinicians’ performance in typical 
circumstances, and in the conditions they routinely experience, was examined. In a clinical 
simulation study this was achieved by testing clinicians when they had been working between 
2 and 4 night shifts in succession on the floor in the ICU; but also at an alternative time when 
they had been able to have at least one or two usual night’s sleep, and recent time off duty. 
The clinical scenarios were designed to approximate relatively routine critical care air 
transfers, as opposed to requiring a period of crisis-management. In addition, because the 
participants were being assessed during a period of their regular ICU shifts as opposed to in 
artificially induced lab-based conditions, I am confident their fatigue levels were those they 
routinely experience. The clinicians’ non-technical performance was degraded when they 
were in a fatigued state compared to when they were in a more rested state. This finding 
remained consistent when controlling for an order effect and examining the impact of some 
possible co-variates including gender, their usual sleep quality, their usual recovery from 
fatigue between shifts, and the total number of previous aeromedical transfers they had 
undertaken.  
In absolute terms it is not possible to know how fatigued the clinicians were when they were 
assessed since fatigue cannot be measured directly. Fatigue was assumed when tested in the 
‘fatigued’ state because the clinicians were known to be acutely sleep deprived, and their 
subjective ratings did confirm they were feeling severely fatigued. On average they had been 
awake for 12 hours longer for the fatigued versus non-fatigued scenario; and PVT lapses and 
Stroop scores also indicated some impact from fatigue. As was discussed in the methods 
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(section 5.4.5), in essence the key differentiation between the two fatigue states was the 
extent of acute sleep deprivation, although recent workload could also be taken into account 
as they had worked 13 more hours in the last 48 when undertaking their fatigued scenarios. 
Although clinicians were acutely sleep deprived when tested in the fatigued state, the total 
amount of sleep they reported obtaining in the 48 hours previous to each simulation session 
was similar. Still, it is likely that sleep was of lower quality and less restorative because it was 
obtained during daytime hours (Akerstedt and Wright, 2009). These data also suggest 
clinicians were routinely working on the floor in the ICU when their ‘current total hours 
awake’, had exceeded their ‘total hours of sleep in the past 48 hours’, and this is considered 
particularly high risk in terms of fatigue impacting on safety (Dawson and McCulloch, 2005). 
These findings are directly relevant to the work critical care clinicians do every day. By 
definition non-technical skills or behaviours complement technical skills, and contribute to 
safe and efficient performance of tasks (Flin et al., 2008). Yet while their importance to safe 
and effective health care is widely acknowledged, they are not necessarily formally taught or 
assessed in health professional training (Gordon et al., 2015, Yule et al., 2018). There is 
evidence that incorporating non-technical skills training into medical curricula improves 
patient safety (Gordon et al., 2012, Johnson and Kimsey, 2012, Mazzocco et al., 2009, Cosby et 
al., 2008). So while it is true that technical knowledge is vital, and safety problems in a clinical 
setting may well arise for reasons beyond the performance of an individual clinician, clinicians’ 
non-technical skills can undoubtedly be a contributory factor in terms of ultimate patient 
safety and outcomes. This is confirmed in findings from a prospective ICU-based study, where 
instituting a CRM training programme aimed at non-technical performance of all staff 
members was associated with a reduced rate of serious complications, and lower patient 
mortality (Haerkens et al., 2015) 
The degree to which clinical performance or safety is compromised by fatigue continues to be 
challenging to quantify (Parshuram et al., 2015, Smyth et al., 2017, Sturm et al., 2011), and it is 
not clear whether the degree of degradation observed here represents a meaningful effect-
size for non-technical skills performance. Still, quite small improvements in operating theatre 
non-technical skills have been associated with large decreases in technical error (McCulloch et 
al., 2009). Similarly, a recent report of surgeon and anaesthetist non-technical skills 
performance found that a one point change on a 16 point non-technical skills scale was 
associated with a difference of almost one minute in the time it took to resolve a crisis in the 
operating theatre (Doumouras et al., 2017). Another recent report found that for every 1-
174 
 
point increase in the mean non-technical skills category score of a lead surgeon, as measured 
by the Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) behaviour assessment tool (Yule et al., 2006), 
the odds of having a higher versus lower patient safety score were 2.29 times (Yule et al., 
2018). And a three year review of fatal medical accidents in Japan found that 50% were due to 
failure in non-technical skills (Uramatsu et al., 2017). The findings from those studies provide 
support for a conclusion that my own findings of an average change of almost 3 points, on the 
20 point AeroNOTS scale, represent a clinically meaningful fatigue-related degradation in 
performance. 
Evaluating non-technical performance in this way may have identified key elements of 
professional behaviours which are important, but could be difficult for individuals to 
conceptualise or assess themselves (Wieck et al., 2018). In addition to capturing important 
fatigued-related degradations in performance, a tool like AeroNOTS could add value to the 
training of critical care clinicians who transfer patients. It is a framework of skills and 
illustrative behaviours which can be used to both assess and debrief clinicians in training, 
demonstrating how so many key aspects of their clinical practice are not reliant simply on 
their core technical knowledge (Nicolaides et al., 2018). 
7.5.2 CLINICIANS’ PERFORMANCE IN INDIVIDUAL NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
DOMAINS IS SIMILAR 
The summed score for the AeroNOTS tool is composed of scores from the four skills categories 
of Task Management, Teamwork, Situation Awareness and Decision Making. Examining the 
domain scores of clinicians individually, in each of the individual non-technical skills domains 
clinicians performed more poorly when fatigued than when non-fatigued. Task Management 
had the least covariance with the other domains whether clinicians were fatigued or non-
fatigued, whereas the other three domains co-varied more closely. It is therefore possible 
clinicians’ ability to manage tasks and organise resources may not be affected in the same way 
as working with team members, maintaining a dynamic awareness, or making decisions. An 
initial descriptive examination suggested the size of the difference between a clinician’s non-
fatigued and fatigued performance tended towards being largest in the domain of Task 
Management (mean difference of 0.78 on the 5 point scale) and smallest in the domain of 
Decision Making (mean difference of 0.58 on the 5 point scale), however further analysis 
showed that this was not consistent. Although clinicians’ scores for the four individual non-
technical skills domains did not differ significantly, the results here may indicate each domain 
captures slightly different aspects of clinicians’ clinical performance. The relationship between 
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performance across different non-technical skills domains does not appear to have been 
extensively examined so it is difficult to comment on this in the context of other research. I 
was able to identify one study from a simulated anaesthetic setting, which reported clinician 
performance in all four ANTS non-technical skills domains, including Task Management, was 
correlated (Riem et al., 2012). 
7.6 CLINICIANS HAVE LIMITED SELF-AWARENESS OF DEGRADATIONS IN 
THEIR PERFORMANCE 
7.6.1 EXPERIENCED VERSUS INEXPERIENCED CLINICIANS 
In research focused on evaluating the AeroNOTS tool, self-ratings were not useful in 
distinguishing the different levels of performance displayed by clinicians experienced and 
inexperienced in patient transfer. The inexperienced clinicians over-estimated their 
performance level, perhaps because they did not have the contextual experience against 
which to gauge their performance. Or, as has previously been suggested, it may be that self-
ratings are more accurate at the extremes such as when performance is significantly degraded 
(Davis et al., 2006). While my initial results suggested the value of self-ratings may be limited I 
chose to re-examine them in the subsequent fatigue study. Critical care clinicians are highly 
likely to experience severe fatigue at some point. It therefore seemed pertinent to further 
assess the degree to which they were able to detect potential degradation in their own 
performance associated with fatigue. 
7.6.2 SELF-AWARENESS OF CLINICIANS WHEN FATIGUED 
In the fatigue simulation study I found that even when clinicians were relatively experienced 
in terms of patient transfer, they seemed to have limited awareness of their own degraded 
performance; this, even though they were reporting feeling severely fatigued and ‘finding it 
difficult to concentrate’. Self-ratings of their general clinical performance were not different in 
fatigued versus non-fatigued states, which was in direct contrast to the non-technical skills 
ratings provided by the blinded observers. An order effect was demonstrated for both 
observed and self-rated assessments of performance, but for self-ratings clinicians completing 
their initial scenario ‘non-fatigued’ tended to rate their own performance as being worse than 
when ‘fatigued’. One explanation for these results could be that the five-point general 
performance scale did not have adequate discriminative sensitivity to demonstrate different 
levels of fatigued versus non-fatigued performance. However I do not believe that is likely, 
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because the same scale had shown discriminative ability when used by an ‘observer’ to rate 
experienced versus inexperienced clinicians. Previous reports have also noted clinicians’ 
limited ability to self-assess clinical performance (Davis et al., 2006, Noveanu et al., 2017). My 
new findings support the interpretation that this is true even when clinicians know they are 
highly fatigued, and are presumably aware they could be more prone to fatigue-related 
decrements.  
Critically ill patients are managed in high intensity units, generally requiring the same level of 
care day and night due to high acuity of their medical problems and treatments. In an 
aeromedical transfer setting in particular, this can result in long shifts, and patient cases and 
missions that are generally not planned, occurring at all hours. Fatigue will not always be 
avoidable and management of risk may depend on clinicians self-identifying when they are 
too fatigued to transfer a patient. My results support the idea that clinicians’ ability to make 
such judgements when fatigued may be inadequate. The risk of clinicians minimising or failing 
to recognise fatigue impacts in clinical settings was also noted in a recent study of intensive 
care physicians on night shift (Maltese et al., 2016). So it is interesting to consider whether 
with training, critical care clinicians could use signs of degraded non-technical skills in 
themselves or others to identify and manage the risk of unsafe performance while on duty.  
7.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
7.7.1 GENERAL STUDY DESIGN ISSUES 
The use of self-report to measure fatigue prevalence 
As discussed in the opening chapters of the thesis, the assessment of fatigue is challenging 
because it has complex effects on many functions, and there are no biochemical or 
physiological measurements which can directly quantify it (Rosekind, 2005). In the prospective 
field-based study the fatigue routinely experienced by clinicians working in ICU flight services 
was measured using self-report methods rather than a performance test like the PVT. The 
subjective nature of the fatigue reports may have been influenced by activities that masked 
their feelings of fatigue or sleepiness to some extent (Roehrs et al., 2005); for example the 
activity of transferring the patient off the aircraft and communicating with receiving clinicians. 
We also know from laboratory-based studies that when sleep loss is prolonged or chronic 
there can be a ceiling effect, resulting in self-ratings indicating lower fatigue than objective 
measures, in terms of a negative effect on performance (Van Dongen et al., 2003). This may 
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be less of an issue in individuals who are acutely sleep deprived (Roehrs et al., 2005), but still, 
it is possible the prevalence of clinician fatigue I report is underestimated. Asking clinicians to 
complete a 5-minute PVT pre- and post-mission as an objective measure of fatigue effect on 
performance was trialled during a pilot testing phase for the field study. However I found in 
the real-world setting of critical care patient transfers, where clinicians were fitting voluntary 
data collection requirements around their usual clinical roles, they did not reliably complete a 
PVT test. It appeared that sometimes they simply forgot in amongst the other requirements of 
preparing for or completing a transport; it also appeared that they found it particularly 
difficult to find an uninterrupted period of sufficient duration to reliably concentrate on and 
complete the task. This is an indirect indication, in these highly motivated research 
participants, that they were functioning at the limits of their capacity in task management. 
During the start and finish of aeromedical transfers, the clinicians are very busy and 
completely occupied, very conscious of working quickly and avoiding delays. This was a lesson 
that loading research-related tasks on clinicians at the start or end of aeromedical missions 
was not an optimal data collection plan. An independent observer would be needed for 
reliable data collection during these periods. If resources had allowed dedicated research or 
support staff to be available, it may have been feasible to measure fatigue impact using the 
PVT during the study proper. An ‘embedded’ measurement device such as glasses that 
measure eyelid movements and pupil size (Johns, 2009, Ftouni et al., 2013) may also have 
been a feasible tool for assessing onset of sleepiness or more severe fatigue, particularly 
during potentially monotonous stages of the transfer when in flight. 
Potential introduction of bias 
Another potential shortcoming of the field-based study methodology was that the response 
rate for returning fatigue report forms was only estimated, based on an assumption that all 
clinicians who were working on the patient transfer missions were enrolled in the study. This 
meant there may have been up to 17% of missing fatigue report forms. In terms of bias there 
may have been something fundamentally different about the clinician fatigue or mission 
characteristics in those cases, or non-responders not wanting to draw attention to specific 
issues associated with that mission. It is not possible to know unequivocally whether this was 
the case because enrolment in the study was voluntary and the number of eligible clinicians 
who chose not to enroll was not disclosed by the flight services, meaning so-called ‘missing’ 
forms may simply often have been non-enrolled clinicians undertaking that particular transfer. 
The participants were recruited on the understanding that the principal objective was to gain 
an overall picture of clinician (self-reported) fatigue in this clinical setting, without 
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individualised scrutiny. Therefore I believe that clinicians were neglecting to complete a 
fatigue report form because they forgot, ran out of time, or had not enrolled in the study, 
rather than because they were worried individual fatigue or mission related incidents would 
be highlighted. With respect to whether clinicians with a history of fatigue-related mission 
refusals represented a potentially different group to the other participants, the results of a 
sensitivity analysis disregarding their data supported a conclusion that this was not the case. 
A potential advantage of simulation versus real-world clinical research is that it can be easier 
to keep the testing conditions standardised, but a potential shortcoming is the possibility that 
confederate performance may be variable. In terms of study design for the simulation-based 
studies I did focus specifically on scripting, training, and using the same confederate actors in 
an effort to facilitate consistent confederate performance. Despite this effort, my reflection 
upon reviewing the videos was that there were some challenges with respect to the ability of 
confederates to maintain a standardised model of performance. Once scenarios started, 
complete blinding to participants’ fatigue or experience status could not reliably be 
maintained, and may potentially have influenced confederate interactions. While I didn’t 
specifically measure whether this was the case, it is possible this introduced bias. For future 
studies of this type, the aim would be to use a very experienced researcher, with insight into 
the outcomes of interest, to perform a highly (prospectively) structured interaction with the 
study participants. 
7.7.2 SAMPLE ISSUES 
In the absence of readily identifiable parameters from previous research, my sample size 
calculations for the clinical simulation studies were based on relatively conservative effect 
sizes. For reasons that were logistic and resource-based, I was only able to recruit numbers at 
the lowest end of the estimated requirements, as discussed in the data analysis sections of 
5.3.7 and 5.4.8 in the methods chapter. Even so, differences in performance based on these 
relatively low sample sizes were detected. Still, it will be useful to replicate these findings with 
further research; certainly in all clinical groups who work as aeromedical clinicians. While data 
from all air ambulance clinician groups informed the adaptation process for the AeroNOTS 
system, I was only able to recruit doctors to participate in the clinical simulation studies. There 
were a number of reasons for this. For the initial simulation study where experienced versus 
inexperienced clinicians were compared, it was not possible to recruit any flight nurses or air 
ambulance paramedics at a local level who were ‘inexperienced’ in patient transfer. For the 
second ‘fatigue’ simulation study, flight nurse specific scenarios were written and recruitment 
179 
 
of flight nurses did begin. Unfortunately there were unforeseen changes to the way flight 
nursing and ICU duties were coordinated soon after the study commenced. Resultant 
pressures on the flight nurse team meant it was not possible to complete the study, even with 
the flight nurse cohort already recruited. One alternative for more data collection would have 
been to expand to an additional data collection site and cohort, though this was both 
technically challenging (accessing another personnel group and aeromedical service that was 
willing to collaborate), and prohibited by cost. Another alternative would have been to collect 
data over a longer period of time, at the same site. Ultimately, I was able to gather enough 
data at one site and over three groups of rotating hospital (ICU) personnel, but I was not able 
to include a flight nurse cohort. 
A related issue in terms of external validity or generalisability, is that most data used to 
customise the framework came from clinicians and services based in New Zealand or 
Australia. It is possible that roles and responsibilities of aeromedical clinicians, and therefore 
the required non-technical skills, are not the same in all countries (Wisborg and Manser, 
2014). I did attempt to gain a wide-ranging perspective via the literature, and also by 
consulting a wide range of clinicians including some based in the UK and Sweden (in both the 
development and feedback process for the AeroNOTS system). While the findings provided 
sufficient support for using the AeroNOTS tool in my sample of NZ-based registrars, it requires 
further testing in the full range of aeromedical clinician groups routinely involved in critical 
care transfer. 
7.7.3 EVALUATION ISSUES 
As I referred to earlier in this discussion (section 7.4.2) there are some limitations associated 
with interpreting the meaning or the clinical significance of non-technical skills degradation. 
While it is known non-technical skills are required to perform safely, it is not clear in a 
quantifiable sense what the relationship is between non-technical skill degradation and error 
or adverse events. I posited in section 7.5.1 that the size of the degradation I observed was 
likely to be clinically significant. However I did not overtly measure error, or link clinicians’ 
fatigue to definitive error. The focus for the research here was on measuring the impact of 
fatigue on routine clinical performance, but future crisis-focused clinical simulation studies, or 
field-based studies, could be undertaken to examine the link between fatigue, degraded non-
technical performance, and error, in a more specific manner. At the skill category level, 
assessors in the clinical simulation fatigue study still rated fatigued clinicians’ performance as 
‘acceptable, patient safety not affected’ on average. However due to the way the scoring 
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system works, based on averaged values, it was possible for clinicians to achieve an average 
‘acceptable’ category level score (rating score of 3 out of 5) if some individual skills elements 
were excellent or good (rating score of 5 or 4), but others were ‘marginal’ or ‘poor’ indicating 
patient safety was significantly compromised (rating scores of 2 or 1). Future examination of 
fatigued performance could also ideally take this into account, examining a larger sample size 
and analysing clinicians’ scores right down to the individual skill element level. 
While preliminary testing indicated the AeroNOTS rating system would be suitable for my 
ongoing research purposes, it has not yet been extensively tested. A small convenience 
sample of experienced aeromedical clinicians provided score ratings that distinguished good 
and poor performance in scripted videos; but post-rating discussions suggested they found it 
quite challenging to know how low to score the ‘poor performance’ video as compared to the 
‘better standard of performance’ video. For the ‘experience-based’ clinical simulation study I 
observed some variability between ratings from two assessors, which was not unexpected 
based on reports from other critical care non-technical skills domains (Flowerdew et al., 2013, 
Weller et al., 2011, Yule et al., 2009). At this point in the research the assessors were trained 
in non-technical skills concepts and use of the rating system, but only a limited attempt was 
made to calibrate their ratings prior to the preliminary simulation study. While I did not 
formally test reliability before using the AeroNOTS tool to measure fatigue-related 
performance, I was able to apply information from the above preliminary testing to the design 
of the subsequent fatigue simulation study. Because the key focus for the subsequent 
simulation study was the question of whether fatigue had a demonstrable impact on 
performance, a specific effort was made to calibrate the rating expectations of four assessors. 
This was approached by developing a predefined checklist of expected clinical behaviours 
specific to the two scenarios in consultation with clinical experts. More extensive pre-study 
rater training was also undertaken using two ‘exemplar’ scenarios, as well as group discussion 
of ratings for the first few participants in the study proper.  
While the AeroNOTS system appeared to perform well in my research, ongoing evaluation will 
certainly be required. For example in the first clinical simulation study (experienced versus 
inexperienced aeromedical clinicians) it would have been ideal to also undertake some 
retrospective validation. That is, to reassess the non-technical skills of the ‘inexperienced’ 
clinician group after several months of experience, under the assumption that their skills 
would have improved with time and training, and this would be reflected in their rating 
scores. In services where formal training of non-technical skills is undertaken scores will be 
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expected to improve over time. If this is illustrated it will provide further support for the 
construct validity of the framework (Weller et al., 2011, Yee et al., 2005).  
7.8 RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.8.1 FUTURE RESEARCH  
A number of further questions arise from the work undertaken for this thesis. Fatigue was 
already well recognised as a potential hazard to the safety of both clinicians and patients, but 
the measures on which the evidence is based are difficult to translate in terms of a quantified 
impact on clinical performance. The findings from this thesis research indicate non-technical 
skills offer a useful avenue for further examining ways to clarify and manage fatigue impact in 
clinical settings. Firstly it will be important to repeat prospective studies to determine whether 
the findings reported here are reproduced in other clinician groups and services. In addition, 
because the thesis research focused on relatively routine performance requirements, fatigue 
impact on non-technical skills in higher stress and crisis-focused situations should also be 
examined in future studies. The consequence of performance degradation in a crisis may well 
be greater, so this type of study would provide the opportunity to examine in more depth the 
link between non-technical skills degradation and adverse events or error. 
Another useful research question is whether non-technical skills teaching can improve 
clinicians’ ability to recognise and manage fatigue-impaired performance in the clinical setting. 
This question may lend itself to incorporating a qualitative research methodology as part of 
the investigation. For example discussion with the clinical lead of the ICU flight service 
programme revealed that some participating clinicians had expressed surprise at the degree 
of their performance degradation when viewing their own fatigued- and non-fatigued-related 
performance videos in post-study debriefing sessions (A Psirides 2017, personal 
communication, August 16th). There were indications they found the debriefing teaching 
environment, focusing on their non-technical skills, an extremely valuable learning experience 
in terms of which clinical behaviours were degraded and how they might approach this in the 
future. A structured qualitative examination of the clinicians’ observations could provide a 
more robust indication of how to facilitate an effective learning experience for clinicians.  
The results here also indicated that for some clinicians (Figure 11), their performance in 
fatigued and non-fatigued states may be relatively consistent. It is known that some 
individuals seem to just ‘physiologically’ be more resilient to the impact of fatigue than others 
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(Van Dongen et al., 2011). Still, qualitative investigation of those who appear to be 
demonstrating this resilience in a clinical research setting could explore whether apparently 
‘fatigue-resilient’ clinicians also employ specific strategies to cope with or manage their 
fatigue. While the evidence indicates cognitive abilities are affected by fatigue regardless of 
experience level in ICU clinicians (Maltese et al., 2016), there may also be value in examining 
the strategies that very experienced clinicians use to cope with fatigue. Others have already 
started qualitative examination of this in ICU clinicians (Henrich et al., 2016) and while this can 
be repeated, it would also clearly be important to examine whether the self-identified 
strategies clinicians are actually effective (Amaral et al., 2016). Such information can then 
become part of critical care in-service teaching about avoiding or managing fatigue-related 
risk. Related to this is the finding that some clinicians ask to be stood down from patient 
transfer missions if they feel they are too highly fatigued, and some clinicians reflect that with 
the benefit of hindsight they should have. From both a clinical and a fatigue management 
perspective it would be beneficial to examine in depth what knowledge clinicians have 
regarding sleep and fatigue, how clinicians might arrive at a decision to stand down in the face 
of fatigue, and what the clinician and patient circumstances are for the missions where they 
believe in retrospect their fatigue had such a severe impact. 
There is also value in continuing a line of research which incorporates non-technical skills 
assessment frameworks to both guide and evaluate clinical training. Teaching of the essential 
knowledge and technical skills required to treat critically ill patients tends to be well 
established and is relatively straightforward to assess. In contrast, the importance and 
application of non-technical skills training is more recently recognised (Nicolaides et al., 2018), 
and still evolving from what has generally been a somewhat informal and unstructured 
approach (Flowerdew et al., 2012a, Tarkowski and Vetto, 2015). So in addition to fatigue-
focused research, future studies could also assess whether teaching of non-technical skills in 
critical care educational programmes, at the same level as technical skills, might improve 
clinician performance in the ICU and other critical care settings; and perhaps improve patient 
outcomes (Uramatsu et al., 2017). It is interesting to note the evidence that a CRM-type 
training approach does improve patient outcome in ICU settings (Haerkens et al., 2015), and 
this may provide a direction for further examination. For example video-based simulation 
sessions have only recently become a routine part of in-service teaching in the ICU flight 
service where much of my thesis research was based. The post-study informal interview with 
ICU flight service clinical leader (A Psirides 2017, personal communication, August 16th) also 
indicated perceived additional value (from an educational perspective) in using the structured 
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AeroNOTS framework as the basis for group and individual de-briefing of aeromedical 
teaching sessions, though this has not yet been formally examined. For any simulation-based 
teaching, receiving skilled and constructive feedback is considered a key part of the learning 
process (Rudolph et al., 2006). So it is certainly plausible that using a non-technical skills 
framework, where the focus for feedback can be on using a ‘common language’ to discuss the 
specific behaviours trained de-briefers are observing (Gordon, 2013), and on achieving specific 
positive behavioural ‘standards’ (including error avoidance strategies), would add significant 
value (Bracco et al., 2017).  
The AeroNOTS measurement system itself also requires more extensive evaluation if it is to be 
used in ongoing research. A planned approach for this is to produce a number of ‘exemplar’ 
videos demonstrating various levels of performance at referenced rating levels. This will 
provide the opportunity to more fully evaluate the utility and inter-rater reliability of the 
system using larger groups of assessors. Formalised evaluation of ICU in-service teaching 
programmes (specific to the clinicians’ flight service role within the ICU) at commencement 
and completion of training rotations will provide opportunity to further examine the validity 
of the measurement system itself. These types of assessments and tools are needed to try to 
evaluate effects of interventions in this clinical setting, and to try to reduce or mitigate the 
effects of fatigue on clinical performance. The findings reported here can provide benchmarks 
for this type of workplace, and can be used for comparisons to other workplaces, and 
programmes implemented to reduce fatigue effects on clinician performance. This thesis did 
not address fatigue-mitigating interventions. However throughout the planning of the 
different studies this has always been the long term goal, and can be addressed in future 
studies. 
7.8.2 CLINICAL PRACTICE 
Evidence including the work reported here shows that when clinicians are fatigued clinical 
performance is likely to be impaired, and likelihood of error is higher. In general clinicians are 
probably used to working when fatigued, and while it was not systematically examined here 
my impression, based on communicating with clinicians during the thesis research 
programme, is that there can be a relatively entrenched culture of accepting that this is part 
of medical practice. For example during focus groups the very experienced flight nurses 
actively expressed concern about making fatigue-related mistakes, yet paramedics and 
doctors either did not have, or did not acknowledge, the same concerns. In the critical care 
setting of aeromedical transfer it is anecdotally well-recognised that mission pilots may 
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actually be stood down or have an enforced rest period mid-mission because they have 
exceeded mandated duty hours; generally the extension is as a result of unforeseen logistic or 
patient-related complications. The result can be an incongruent situation where the duty 
period for the clinicians caring for the critically ill patient is subsequently significantly 
extended. While no-one would suggest the fatigued pilots should be flying regardless, it does 
give pause to consider the contrast between the perceived risks for clinicians versus pilots 
working when fatigued. One can imagine a situation arises regularly where ICU clinicians, 
paramedics, ED clinicians, surgeons, anaesthetists and other theatre staff nearing the end of a 
night-shift or busy on-call period, are faced with an emergency patient who will extend their 
duty hours, yet requires urgent treatment. The risk versus the benefit for either the patient or 
the clinician in such circumstances is difficult to judge in individual or absolute terms, but it is 
likely to be weighed up by both individual clinicians and service leaders (and perhaps even the 
patient themselves) as being far more favourable than for example a highly fatigued pilot 
continuing to fly.  
While it may be a reality of critical care medicine that clinicians routinely work when they are 
acutely sleep deprived, it is important to consider the potential of additional risk when the 
clinicians also routinely obtain inadequate amounts of sleep resulting in ‘acute-on-chronic 
fatigue’ (Lock et al., 2018). A key question to consider is whether steps can actively and 
systematically be taken within critical healthcare services to mitigate clinician fatigue and 
manage the potential hazards arising from clinicians working when fatigued; also what these 
active steps should include. One approach very recently reported from the US air medical 
setting has trialled an automated text message-based real-time intervention aimed at 
mitigating clinician fatigue, demonstrating the potential application of technology as part of a 
formalised fatigue risk management approach (Patterson et al., 2018a). The authors report 
that via an automated application self-reported fatigue of clinicians can be monitored during 
shifts and tailored suggestions for fatigue mitigation strategies like napping, or caffeine 
consumption, or exercises can be suggested. Weekly sleep promotion advice can also be 
provided. Using a randomised design this intervention was reported to reduce within-shift 
clinician fatigue during shifts of 12 hours in duration, though not for shifts longer than this; the 
intervention did not reportedly impact on the overall sleep quality of the clinicians (Patterson 
et al., 2018a). As the ease and prevalence of technology in general advances, this type of 
approach may start to offer a useful adjunct for managing clinicians working in a range of 
critical care services. 
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In high-risk settings outside health-care, successful approaches to safety and fatigue risk 
management are generally ‘system-based’. There tends to be a culture of acceptance and 
understanding regarding the vital nature of obtaining adequate sleep (Rosekind, 2008). Also 
active promotion and education of sleep hygiene principles (Lock et al., 2018). Technology is 
frequently employed where available to mitigate the possibility of human error (Amaral et al., 
2016) though with caution to ensure that the technology doesn’t simply add to cognitive 
workload or distract individuals at crucial times, which is also a relevant factor to consider in 
critical care medicine (Sinsky and Privitera, 2018). Applying systemic safety and fatigue risk 
management principles to health-care would seem logical and important. For example 
strategic napping as a fatigue mitigation strategy is well recognised by fatigue researchers, 
albeit along with awareness of the potential impact of sleep inertia (Burke et al., 2015). In 
some safety critical settings such as long-haul aviation, dedicated areas to sleep and extra 
crew numbers are provided, so that restorative sleep can be obtained. Comparatively, in 
health-care settings it is not clear there is a culture of either acceptance or understanding of 
the potential value of clinicians taking active steps to rest or sleep (Poynter et al., 2012, Scott 
et al., 2006, Shnayder et al., 2017), and there is sometimes significant concern about the 
potential impact of sleep inertia when clinicians wake from such naps (Burke et al., 2015). 
There may be a general assumption that if it is an emergency situation the alerting effect of 
adrenalin will counteract the effect of sleep inertia, but this is not necessarily so when it is 
complex cognitive tasks the clinician must undertake upon waking (Killgore, 2010).  
If a health-care setting relies on a fatigue risk management strategy of clinicians self-
identifying when they are too fatigued to care for a patient, it seems unlikely this successfully 
modifies risk for either clinician or patient. The results here suggest clinicians may not be well-
equipped to make such decisions. There are also likely to be resource and logistic pressures 
which the clinicians or their managers take into account, whether consciously or otherwise. It 
is certainly relevant to think about and examine whether there are useful changes in service 
culture, education, and training in detecting and managing fatigue-related performance that 
could be made. A very recent release of evidence-based guidelines for managing fatigue in 
emergency medicine settings recommends routine use of self-report fatigue or sleepiness 
measures (Patterson et al., 2018b). While acknowledging the potential limitations associated 
with such measures, the expert panel developing the guidelines strongly recommended 
including routine self-reporting as part of a fatigue risk management programme, so that the 
fatigue levels of personnel are assessed and monitored (Patterson et al., 2018b). As they point 
out it can be useful as a general means of monitoring the effect of scheduling and other 
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fatigue management strategies, or to raise awareness of individual clinicians who are highly 
fatigued. I have already noted the evidence that introducing a ‘human factors’ approach to 
training in critical care settings is effective (Haerkens et al., 2015). If service leaders and 
clinicians also understand the key interactions of the human sleep wake system, and how they 
increase fatigue-related risk, there is at least the chance to plan strategies which may mitigate 
that risk (Dawson et al., 2011).  
If clinicians are not adept at detecting fatigue-related performance decrements in themselves 
it may contribute to a general culture of accepting fatigue, minimising the risk it presents to 
both patient and clinician, and not really taking active steps to avoid or mitigate the impact of 
fatigue-related performance. While in team-based critical care settings degraded performance 
in clinicians does not necessarily result in patient harm (Rubulotta et al., 2016), it is logically 
more likely if the clinicians are working in isolated settings such as patient transfer or a 
prehospital setting; or even in a critical care unit at night when there may be less immediately 
available support or oversight. Highly fatigued clinicians make more errors, and pose risk to 
either themselves or their patients (Lockley et al., 2007). At the very least, my 
recommendation is for an active education approach for both service managers and clinicians. 
For example on-call sleep rooms are generally available in hospital settings, suggesting some 
understanding of the physiological need to sleep. However this does not necessarily mean 
either service managers or clinicians understand how best to gain optimal sleep. Similarly, 
duty hours may be limited or protected, but there are no guarantees that clinicians will use 
their off duty hours to gain adequate pre-duty rest (Dawson et al., 2011, Rosekind , 2008, 
Smyth et al., 2017). Education should include the importance of maximising and protecting 
sleep opportunities; strategies for doing so related to room ambience, bed comfort, darkness, 
noise and caffeine/alcohol/electronic device restriction; recognising likely times of 
vulnerability to fatigue during shift; advantageous shift-work scheduling; safe driving; the 
importance of physical activity; and strategies for recognising and mitigating fatigue-related 
performance degradation. The precise content of an education programme can be tailored 
depending on the specific characteristics of the clinical service, but it should be provided to 
both clinicians and managers coming into the service area; and also repeated on a regular 
basis to maintain knowledge (Patterson et al., 2018b).  
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7.9 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
In the research programme for this thesis I examined the fatigue routinely experienced by NZ-
based intensive care flight-service doctors and nurses, and the impact such fatigue may be 
having on their clinical performance and safety. While it is assumed clinician fatigue is 
common due to the nature of the work, the characteristics of on-duty clinician fatigue in this 
setting had not previously been reported. The fatigue reports were collected in the somewhat 
specialised context of flight retrieval teams, where intensive care clinicians were transferring 
critically ill patients between hospitals. Still, the shifts and duty rosters of the participating 
study clinicians are typical of those most critical care clinicians are likely to be working. The 
findings here support a conclusion that clinicians caring for critically ill patients will often be 
highly fatigued. The likelihood of severe fatigue is influenced by the factors we would expect 
based on previous work, including their baseline fatigue levels, working through at least part 
of the night, and their workload. When the impact of acute fatigue was explicitly examined in 
terms of its effect on non-technical skills, clinicians’ performance was observed to be 
significantly degraded. This is notable because in critical care settings the non-technical 
performance of clinicians is recognised as being directly linked to safe and effective treatment 
of patients. Moreover in terms of fatigue/sleep deprivation, the conditions under which the 
clinicians were tested are those they routinely experience. To my knowledge the impact of 
fatigue on non-technical skills has rarely been reported, and never in the context of ICU 
clinicians. 
Another finding of relevance from the thesis research programme was the clinicians’ failure to 
recognise degradations in their own performance, despite being in a situation where they 
might expect it such as when feeling severely fatigued. It supports a conclusion that clinicians 
may have limited ability to be able to self-identify when their performance levels are slipping 
below an acceptable or safe level, or when their capacity to transfer a critical care patient 
safely is compromised. That represents a potential risk to clinical care quality and patient 
safety, particularly in a dynamic and isolated environment like air ambulance transfer. It also 
suggests fatigue-focused education would be of use, both to highlight the potentially 
hazardous effects of fatigue and to educate clinicians on strategies for mitigating fatigue 
effects.  
Another novel aspect of the thesis research involved adapting and applying an aeromedical 
transfer non-technical skills assessment framework as a relevant and global measure of 
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clinicians’ actual performance in the clinical setting. There were existing tools focusing on 
individual clinician performance in emergency department settings (Flowerdew et al., 2012a) 
and on overall team performance in critical care settings (Weller et al., 2011). However a non-
technical skills framework focusing on assessing individual clinician performance in a critical 
care patient transfer context had not been reported. I found that a well-established non-
technical skills assessment tool from anaesthesia could successfully be adapted for this 
purpose. Non-technical skills frameworks provide an ideal foundation for describing and 
assessing the range of clinically-relevant behaviours associated with effective patient care. 
They can also illustrate performance decrements in clinical contexts. Consequently, non-
technical skills assessment tools could be incorporated into the training programmes of critical 
care clinicians on a routine basis. Evidence already exists that instituting a service-wide CRM 
training programme which includes specific human factors teaching can improve outcomes for 
critically ill patients (Haerkens et al., 2015). Adding a non-technical skills framework to assist in 
both debriefing and assessment would potentially add value to such in-service training. 
Further, this type of assessment tool could be used in conjunction with an active fatigue-
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 STUDY I ENROLMENT FORM 
 
Fatigue in clinicians who undertake  
regular aeromedical transport work 
 
1. Name_________________________________ Your unique study ID number is:  
 
2. How old are you currently? ____________ (years) 
 
3. Are you (please circle): Male   Female 
 
4. Which ethnic group do you belong to? (tick as many as apply to you) 
New Zealand European   
Māori    
Samoan    
Cook Island Māori   
Tongan    
Niuean    
Chinese    
Indian    
Other such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan.  Please 
state:_______________________ 
 
NB: We suggest you place the 
attached sticker on the rear of your 
hospital ID as you will need to provide 
your study number on each fatigue 
rating questionnaire you complete. 
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5. Are you a (please circle) :  Flight Nurse   Registrar 
 Consultant 
 
6. How much clinical experience in aeromedical retrieval do you have?  
Years______________ Months________________ 
 
7. Is your sleep at home regularly affected by living with children or other 
housemates  
(please circle)?  Yes   No   




8. How often, over the last 6 months, have you declined to go on a transport mission 
because you were too fatigued? 
________________________________________________________ 
(If you have less than 6 months experience just answer for whatever time frame you have 
been doing retrievals) 
 
9. How often, over the last 6 months, have you completed a transport mission but 
thought that you should have declined because you were too fatigued? 
___________________________ 
(If you have less than 6 months experience just answer for whatever time frame you have 
been doing retrievals) 
 
10. Your usual sleepiness: How likely are you to doze off or fall asleep in the following 
situations, in contrast to feeling just tired? This refers to your usual way of life in 
recent times.  Even if you have not done some of these things recently try to work 
out how they would have affected you. Please circle the most appropriate 
description for each situation 
 
Sitting and reading 
No chance of dozing slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing 





No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting inactive in a public place (eg in a theatre or a meeting) 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
As a passenger in a car for an hour without a break 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Lying down to rest in the afternoon when circumstances permit 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting and talking to someone 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting quietly after a lunch without alcohol 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
In a car, while stopped for a few minutes in traffic 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing






APPENDIX 2 STUDY I FATIGUE REPORT FORM 
 
Fatigue in aeromedical clinicians 
 
Pre-mission:         Date______________  Study ID number________________ 
1) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________ 
 
2) I have been preparing for this retrieval since (24hr clock) _______________ 
 
3) In the last 24 hours I have slept for a total of  approximately ________hrs_________mins 
 
4) Please circle:         This is a rostered shift    or    I was on call from home 
 
5) I started this work shift at (24hr clock)__________________________________ 
 
6) At present I feel (circle the response which best applies): 
 
1. Fully alert and wide awake    
2. Very lively, responsive but not at peak   
3. OK, somewhat fresh    
4. A little tired, less than fresh   
5. Moderately tired, let down    
6. Extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate   
7. Completely exhausted, unable to function effectively 
 
7) At present I feel (please mark the line below with an “x” at the point which best describes how you 
feel) 
 
             Alert         Drowsy 
 
8) I am a (please circle): 
 
Fight nurse  Doctor       Other (description) ___________________________ 
 
 
9) Please circle:  
 





10) This is my_____________ shift in a row without a day off 
 
 
11) The patient being transported is: (please circle - if more than one patient, choose the most 
serious)   
Category A  (ventilated and/or needing advanced life support)  
 
Category B  (high dependency)  
 
 
12) The transport for this mission is via (Please circle): 




After the mission is complete 
 
13) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________________ 
 
 
14) The mission was completed at (24hr clock) ___________________ 
 
 




16) At present I feel (circle the response which best applies) 
 
1. fully alert and wide awake      
2. very lively, responsive but not at peak    
3. OK, somewhat fresh    
4. a little tired, less than fresh    
5. moderately tired, let down     
6. extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate   









17) At present I feel (please mark the line below with an “x” at the point which best describes how you 
feel) 
 
              Alert                    Drowsy 
 
18)  Taking everything into account such as weather, logistical issues,  patient condition, or 
unexpected events, the difficulty of the mission was (please mark the line below with an “x” at the 
point which best describes it)      
Very straightforward                                        Very 
difficult 
 
19) My performance on this mission was: (please mark the line below with an “x” at the point which 
best describes it) 
 
            Poor                     Excellent 
 








APPENDIX 3 STUDY II AND III ENROLMENT FORM 
Fatigue and performance in 
Aeromedical Transport Clinicians 
 
1. Name_________________________________ Study ID number (office use only):  
 
2. How old are you currently? ____________ (years) 
 
3. Are you (please circle): Male   Female 
 
4. Which ethnic group do you belong to? (tick as many as apply to you) 
New Zealand European   
Māori    
Samoan    
Cook Island Māori   
Tongan    
Niuean    
Chinese    
Indian    
Other such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan.  Please state:____________________________ 
 
5. Are you a (please circle) :   Flight Nurse   Doctor 
 
6. What is your current clinical role and (if applicable) what specialist training programme 







7. How much clinical experience with inter-hospital flight transfers do you have?  
Years______________ Months________________ 
Approximate number of flight transfers to date__________________________ 
 
8. How many hours a week do you normally work (including over-time?) 
____________________ 
 
9. Are you on any medication that could affect your sleep (if yes please give details) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Are you suffering from any health condition which could affect your sleep or energy 




11. What is your usual daily caffeine 
intake?_________________________________________________ 
 





12. Your usual sleepiness:  How likely are you to doze off or fall asleep in the following 
situations, in contrast to feeling just tired? This refers to your usual way of life in recent 
times.  Even if you have not done some of these things recently try to work out how 
they would have affected you.   
 
Please circle the most appropriate description for each situation 
 
Sitting and reading 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Watching TV 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting inactive in a public place (eg in a theatre or a meeting) 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
As a passenger in a car for an hour without a break 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Lying down to rest in the afternoon when circumstances permit 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting and talking to someone 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing
 high chance of dozing 
 
Sitting quietly after a lunch without alcohol 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing




In a car, while stopped for a few minutes in traffic 
No chance of dozing  slight chance of dozing moderate chance of dozing









13. Your usual sleep quality: The following questions relate to your usual sleep habits 
during the past month only. Your answers should indicate the most accurate reply for 
the majority of days and nights in the past month. Please answer all questions. During 
the past month, 
1. When have you usually gone to bed? ___________________ 
2. How long (in minutes) has it taken you to fall asleep each night? ______________ 
3. When have you usually gotten up in the morning? ______________ 
4. How many hours of actual sleep do you get at night? (This may be different than the number 
of hours you spend in bed) ______________________________ 
 
During the past month how often have 













a. Cannot get to sleep within 30 
minutes 
    
b. Wake up in the middle of the 
night or early morning 
    
c. Have to get up to use the 
bathroom 
 
    
d. Cannot breathe comfortably 
 
    
e. Cough or snore loudly 
 
    
f. Feel too cold 
 
    
g. Feel too hot 
 
    
h. Have bad dreams 
 
    
i. Have pain 
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j. Other reason(s), please 
describe and note how often 
you have trouble sleeping 




    











6. During the past month, how often 
have you taken medicine to help you 
sleep (prescribed or “over the 
counter”)? 
    
7. During the past month, how often 
have you had trouble staying awake 
while driving, eating meals, or 
engaging in social activity? 
    
 No problem 
at all 





A very big 
problem 
8. During the past month, how much 
of a problem has it been for you to 
keep up enough enthusiasm to get 
things done? 
    
 Very good Fairly good Fairly bad Very bad 
9. During the past month, how would 
you rate your sleep quality overall? 
    













10. Do you have a bed partner or 
room-mate? 
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11. If you have a room-mate or bed 
partner, ask him/her how often in the 
past month you have had: 
    
a. Loud snoring     
b. Long pauses between breaths 
while asleep 
    
c. Legs twitching or jerking 
while you sleep 
    
d. Episodes of disorientation or 
confusion during sleep 
    
e. Other restlessness while you 








14. These statements are about your experience of Fatigue & Recovery at work and home 
OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. Circle a number from 0 – 6: “strongly disagree” to 












1) I  never have enough 
time between work shifts 
to recover my energy 
completely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 2) Even if I’m tired from 
one shift, I’m usually 
refreshed by the start of 
the next shift 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3) I rarely recover my 
strength fully between 
work shifts 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4) Recovering from work 
fatigue between work 
shifts isn’t a problem for 
me 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5) I’m often still feeling 
fatigued from one shift by 
the time I start the next 
one 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 







APPENDIX 4 STUDY II FATIGUE AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
 
Fatigue and clinical performance: Pre-
simulation checklist 
 
Name________________________  Study ID number___________ Date____________ 
20) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________ 
 
21) In the last 24 hours I have slept for a total of  approximately ________hrs_________mins 
 
22) In the last 24 hours I have worked for a total of approximately ________hrs_________mins 
 
23) Current shift details (Please tick and provide further details below if necessary): 
 
Currently on a day off     
Currently in the middle of a shift   
Starting a shift later today    






24) Here are some descriptors about how fatigued you feel at present. Please CIRCLE the 
response which best applies. At present I feel: 
 
1. Fully alert and wide awake    
2. Very lively, responsive but not at peak   
3. OK, somewhat fresh    
4. A little tired, less than fresh   
5. Moderately tired, let down    
6. Extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate   
7. Completely exhausted, unable to function effectively 
 
25) Here are some descriptors about how sleepy you feel at present. Please CIRCLE the response 
which best applies. At present I feel: 
 
1. Very alert    
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2.   
3. Alert   
4.    
5. Neither alert nor sleepy    
6.   
7. Sleepy (but not fighting sleep) 
8.  
9. Very sleepy (fighting sleep) 
Post-simulation checklist: 
 
26) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________________ 
 
27) Your performance during the simulation. During the aeromedical transport mission you just 
completed how would you rate your performance (please circle): 
 
5 = Excellent  Performed at my highest level; all issues well managed and patient safety enhanced. 
4 = Good Performed competently; issues managed adequately and patient safety consistently 
maintained. 
3 = Acceptable  Performed adequately; at approximately the level of skill and safety required. 
2 = Marginal Performed slightly below the expected standard; some lapses which could potentially 
have affected patient safety. 





28) Do you have any further comments (for example about your own performance, or about 





APPENDIX 5 STUDY III PRE AND POST SIMULATION FATIGUE AND PERFORMANCE 
RATINGS 
Fatigue and clinical performance: Pre-
simulation checklist 
 
Name________________________   Date____________ 
29) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________ I have been awake for ________ 
hours 
 
30) In the last 48 hours I have slept for a total of  approximately ________hrs_________mins 
 
31) The last time I had a caffeinated drink was approximately (24hr clock) 
_____________________ 
 
32) In the last 48 hours I have been on shift  for a total of approximately 
________hrs_________mins 
 
33) Current shift details (Please tick and provide further details below if necessary): 
 
Currently on a day off     
Currently in the middle of a shift   
Starting a shift later today    





34) Here are some descriptors about how fatigued you feel at present. Please CIRCLE the 
response which best applies.  
At present I feel: 
 
1. Fully alert and wide awake    
2. Very lively, responsive but not at peak   
3. OK, somewhat fresh    
4. A little tired, less than fresh   
5. Moderately tired, let down    
6. Extremely tired, very difficult to concentrate   




35) Here are some descriptors about how sleepy you feel at present. Please CIRCLE the response 
which best applies.  
At present I feel: 
 
1. Very alert    
2.   
3. Alert   
4.    
5. Neither alert nor sleepy    
6.   
7. Sleepy (but not fighting sleep) 
8.  





36) The time now is (24hr clock) _________________________ 
 
37) During the aeromedical transport mission you just completed how would you rate your 
performance (please circle one): 
 
5 = Excellent (Performed at my highest level; all issues well managed and patient safety enhanced) 
4 = Good (Performed competently; issues managed adequately and patient safety consistently 
maintained) 
3 = Acceptable (Performed adequately; at approximately the level of skill and safety required) 
2 = Marginal (Performed slightly below the expected standard; some lapses which could potentially 
have affected patient safety) 







38) To what extent did you feel that fatigue impaired your performance during the scenario you 
just completed (please tick one) 
 Fatigue did not impair my performance at all during the scenario  
 Fatigue slightly impaired my performance during the scenario  
 Fatigue moderately impaired my performance during the scenario   
 Fatigue greatly impaired my performance during the scenario   
 









APPENDIX 6 STUDY II AERONOTS FIELD TESTING TEMPLATE 
Measuring non-technical skills in aeromedical clinicians 
Field testing of the AeroNOTs tool 
 
 Mission planning 
and preparation 















(3 or 4) 
Poor 
practice 
(1 or 2) 
Good 
practice 
(3 or 4) 
Poor 
practice 
(1 or 2) 
Good 
practice 
(3 or 4) 
Poor 
practice 


















































































































Rating Options: 4 Good: Performance was of a consistently high standard, enhancing 
patient safety, could be used as a positive example for others 
3 Acceptable: Performance was of a satisfactory standard but could be 
improved 
2 Marginal: Performance indicated cause for concern, considerable 
improvement needed 
1 Poor: Performance endangered or potentially endangered patient 
safety, serious remediation is required 
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Field testing:  
 Were any essential tasks observed or required which not covered by the tool 
 
 Any elements missing from any of the four main categories? 
 
 Any elements superfluous to the four main categories? 
 
 Do any of the behavioural descriptions need modifying? 
 





APPENDIX 7 NOTES LITERATURE REVIEW AND DATA SYNTHESIS AERONOTS DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review Data: Summary and Synthesis 
1. Erler C, Edwards NE, Ritchey S, Pesut DJ, Sands L, Wu J. Perceived patient safety 
culture in a critical care transport program. Air Med J. 2013;32(4):208-15.  
 
Descriptive cross sectional survey looking at the association between a safety culture 
and safety outcomes in a CCT transport program (the safety outcomes model was 
based on a Reason Framework) 
 
Communication and teamwork and their relationship to error were the main focus ie 
that is the two NTS examined in this study… 
 
Results: teamwork was associated with safety outcomes and communication 
openness was associated with safety outcomes. 
Communication openness was denoted by: Staff speaking up freely when they see 
something is not right; staff question the actions or decisions of someone in 
authority even if they have more authority than them; the minus would be staff are 
afraid to ask questions 
Teamwork was denoted by: Staff support one another; work as a team to get things 
done when lots to do; treat each other with respect; when one of busy the other 
helps out – less of this for CCT teams perhaps because of unique environment just 
not possible sometimes 
 
2. Droogh JM, Kruger HL, Ligtenberg JJ, Zijlstra JG. Simulator-based crew resource management 
training for interhospital transfer of critically ill patients by a mobile ICU. Joint Comm J Qual 
Patient Safety. 2012;38(12):554-9. (descriptive and empiric other transport environment) 
 
Describe how they undertaken specific simulation based CRM training the two NTS 
they particularly concentrate on are planning/preparation and teamwork (the other 
things are new equipment, mobility, and safety). The main quality issues identified 
include failure to anticipate possible problems (such as failing to ask for intubation 
of a respiratory-compromised patient at intake); late responses to alarms of the 
ventilator, perfusor pump, or monitor; and not anticipating a possible shortage of 
medication. 
 
3.  Blanchet D. Crew resource management and EMS. How an aviation technique can 
help us achieve greater scene and transport safety. EMS World. 2010;39(11):24,6. 
(expert opinion descriptive) 
 
Main components of a good CRM environment with examples: Open communication 
and create environment of open communication early especially if you don’t know 
other team member, say to ask something if don’t understand or agree, provide 
clear information and updates be succinct, be calm in the way you communicate, 
prioritise if in charge, seek shared understanding eg ask to repeat or if questions, 
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provide important information to other team members not just eg” we have to 
hurry” eg there is an aortic dissection so time is of the essence so they know to be 
gentle as well as hurry….leadership and take charge when its appropriate, correct in 
a calm fashion when necessary as opposed to just criticize, frequent re-caps to 
provide a shared understanding of what you have done and what’s next (error 




4.  Springer B. Taking your crew resource management temperature. Air Med J. 
2005;24(3):120-2. (expert opinion descriptive) – somewhat focused on pilot and 
cockpit safety even though it was specifically discussing the role of medical crew – 
more how they might contribute to overall safety I think as opposed to “clinical” 
safety and performance. 
What makes good CRM is communication, accountability and teamwork with the 
overriding goal being safety. The link for accountability is to the decision making that 
will eventuate if people had accountability 
 
5.  Gryniuk J, National Flight Paramedics A. The role of the flight paramedic in air medical 
safety and crew resource management. Air Med J. 2003;22(4):12-14 (expert opinion 
descriptive - still quite a focus on safety of flight but more specific suggestions of what 
that means or looks like in terms of flight crew behaviours and emphasis) - position 
statement from the National Flight paramedics association 2003: 
 
Main emphasis is safety of flight not patient condition or clinician requirements (eg go 
or no go weather decisions) so no coercive behaviour 
Maintain situation awareness at all times with respect to safety eg especially at critical 
phases of the flight such as departure, landing or when requested by pilot regardless 
of patient condition or other medical related duties 
Practice sterile cockpit procedures (limiting communication) during critical phases of 
flights as above 
Paramedic should be able to contact pilot in emergency and should be able to have 
input into go or no go decision 
Paramedic should be able to decline flight without fear of reprisal 
Paramedic should speak up immediately if any concerns re flight practice or conditions 
that may be unsafe – should ask to abort if feels safety is jeopardised.  
Paramedic should report unsafe practices to supervisor 
Note hazards eg other aircraft or ground obstacles and also do own walk around of 
aircraft before leaving 
Participate in multidisciplinary pre and post briefings to discuss issues of safety 
Should wear appropriate PPE 
Should undertake self-evaluations and correct unsafe behaviours or attitudes 





6.  Hearns S, Shirley PJ. Retrieval medicine: a review and guide for UK practitioners. Part 
2: safety in patient retrieval systems. Emer Med J . 2006;23(12):943-7. (Expert opinion 
and not specifically air transport) 
 
Equipment checks as part of planning before you go out 
Use all team members to maximum potential eg point out if you notice lead off 
monitor even if you are a junior nurse, listen to ambo paramedic if he says journey is 
too long for oxygen supply, take note of all info from surroundings and take a 
structured approach to problem interpretation or solution eg if monitor says patient 
deteriorating check everything don’t just assume the monitory is faulty  
Structured debrief and discuss any adverse events so can learn from them 
Communication a key competency which must be trained 
 
7. Gordon M, Darbyshire D, Baker P. Non‐technical skills training to enhance patient 
safety: a systematic review. Med Educ. 2012;46(11):1042-54. (Expert opinion on the 
key content for NTS training for health care practitioners).  
 
Content based on a sound evidence base (including Reason framework and  Gordon 
2013 systematic review) and evaluation has lead to improved patient safety attitudes. 
They point out that there is little published work that can be used to guide curriculum 
design in the NTS for clinical teaching (ref 7 Gordon for a Systematic Review he was 
about to have published for 2013) even the WHO patient safety curriculum guide 
(Geneva 2009 see ref 9 in Gordon) does not offer clarity.  
 
Model of teaching NTS is based on: 
Communication – check back, call out loud if necessary; Teamworking – role clarify, 
team briefing, hierarchical communications, shared mental model; error awareness – 
critical incident analysis, error feedback and discussion; Systems and technology – 
checklists, mnemonics, man/machine interface; situational awareness, situational 
cognition;  
 
8. MacDonald RD, Banks BA, Morrison M. Epidemiology of adverse events in air medical 
transport. Acad Emerg Med: 2008;15(10):923-31. (empiric data for air ambulance 
transport once specific NTS categories were added to the search phase 2 – 
observational study) 
Retrospective causes of adverse events nearly 38% due to communication problems, 
nearly 13% due to medical equipment (mostly malfunction), 11% due to patient 
management and 10% due to clinical performance.  
Communication: inaccurate or incomplete information given, Questionable 
documentation, Questionable advice or interpretation, Questionable disclosure 
process 
Medical equipment: mostly malfunction 
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Patient management: questionable use of resources, questionable delegation, 
questionable referral or consultation, questionable tracking or follow-up 
Clinical performance: Correct procedure incorrectly performed, correct procedure 
with complications, omission of essential procedure, incomplete diagnosis, correct dx 
questionable intervention, procedure not indicated, incorrect prognosis, correct 
procedure but untimely, procedure contraindicated 
For potential harm still highest number due to communication inaccurate or 
incomplete information, and high number for patient management questionable use 
of resources.  
 
Overall issues in communication between stakeholders such as sending facility, comm 
centre, flight medical crew and medical crew physician and receiving facility 
associated with one third of all adverse events. Acknowledges the work for CRM 
training on improving cockpit safety but discusses that its impact on patient morbidity 
and mortality are not yet available. Another 21% of adverse events due to problems 
with either clinical performance or patient management decision making 
 
9. Dalto JD, Weir C, Thomas F. Analyzing communication errors in an air medical 
transport service. Air Med J. 2013;32(3):129-37.  
 
Empiric data looked at communication errors only in terms of how many adverse 
events were caused by them and what types they were. Found communication in 20% 
but only a third of these had actually been reported ie recognized by staff as being 
errors. The NTS from their data collection form were: not notifying ground transport, 
not activating team member, miscommunication or ambiguity, incomplete or 
inaccurate information, breach of standard, omission, inadequate transfer info, 
call/page not returned, communication not received, communication procedures not 
followed, failure to communicate change in status or plans, failure to communicate 
expectations, incomplete information, misunderstanding of plans or goals (eg lack of 
shared understanding), unplanned or inefficient steps (eg poor use of resources such 
as staffing when short), wrong info given eg location, failed to communicate when 
indicated, or due to equipment failure, Clark’s communication levels as used to 
classify in this paper: Level 1 communication not initiated when should have been eg 
pilot doesn’t provide in flight status update when should; level 2 Communication 
initiated but not received eg due to wearing masks which muffle voices etc; level 3 
Communication initiated and heard/received but not understood eg pilot wants sterile 
cockpit but crew member doesn’t know what that means; level 4 communication 
initiated, received and understood but the goals of joint activity of the communication 
are not accomplished in an efficient or effective manger eg flight nruses and MD have 
discussion about whether to launch aircraft and begin transport. After conversation 
FN directs crew to launch heli to referring facility however control MD wanted 
crew/aircraft to remain on standby pending certain info from referring facility. 
Virtually all errors in communication occurred at either the lowest level ie level 1 
establishing communication or at the highest level ie level 4 goals/purpose of 
communication(ie the authors described it as “being on the same sheet of music”  - 
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? lack of shared understanding eg they both understand the words spoken but 
maybe ambiguious or vagueness in phrasing or omission of key information 
stemming from a false assumption of shared knowledge. ) 
 
10. Fisher J, Phillips E, Mather J. Does crew resource management training work? Air Med 
J. 2000;19(4):137-9.  
 
Study to see whether CRM training works. Did a survey to determine individuals 
understanding of team awareness and effective communication. Survey compared 
responses from crew members who received CRM training that those who did not. 
Those who received initial CRM training, team-building and effective communication 
had increased understanding of team awareness and effective communication. 
Conclusion based on results that CRM training increases crew awareness and 
promotes team concepts on both everyday and emergent air ambulance situations. 
 
11. Flabouris A, Runciman WB, Levings B. Incidents during out-of-hospital patient 
transportation. Anaesth Intensive Care. 2006;34(2):228-36.  
 
Analysed out of hospital (retrieval) adverse events of critical care patients. 37% due to 
equipment, 26% due to patient care, 11% due to transport operations, 9% due to 
interpersonal communication, 9% due to planning or preparation, 7% due to retrieval 
staff, 2% due to tasking. Considered that overall contributing factors were system 
based for 54% and human-based for 42%. Most frequent contributing factors were 
haste (7.5%). Equipment malfunctioning (7.2%) or missing (5.5%), failure to check 
(5.5%) and pressure to proceed (5.2%). Minimising factors were good crew 
skills/teamwork (42%), checking equipment (17%) and patient (8%), patient monitors 
(15%), good luck (14%) and good interpersonal communication (4%).  
 
Examples: equipment – not available, damaged, inappropriate, supply used up eg 
oxygen, failed eg power; transport problems – difficulty loading,  delay in amb arrival, 
weather or landing site issues; patient care problems – patient more severe than 
expected, inadequate or inappropriate preparation at referral site, deterioration of 
pat condition, delay in decision to retrieve, medication error; interpersonal 
communication – receiving hosp not made aware of patients condition, problem with 
staff communication, inaccurate patient info from site, staff unhelpful or 
uncooperative, unprepared or incomplete referral documentation; retrieval staff 
problems – inexperience, lack appropriate skills, not available or delayed for mission 
response, physical injury eg during loading or being unsecured in moving vehicle, 
interpersonal conflicts, failure to provide or inadequate PPE. 
 
Good (minimizing factors) were documented on 79% of forms eg: good crew 
skills/teamwork (42%), re-evaluation of patient (8%) re-evaluation of equipment 
(17%), patient monitors (15%), good luck 14% and good interpersonal 




System based contributing factors 54% (that I think are also NTS) eg: team cognitive 
factors  communication, poor teamwork, inappropriate action, lack of supervision; 
management culture pressure to proceed; protocols failure to provide or enforce and 
lack of policy/protocol; staff insufficient training or unfamiliar or not enough staff;  
Human based contributing factors 42% eg: violation or rule based eg failure to check 
equipment, follow policy/protocol, act on basic information, took short cut; skill based 
eg haste, distraction, inattention, fatigue, stress; knowledge based eg unfamiliar with 
equipment or environment, inadequate knowledge or training, inexperience 
 
12. Gabram SG, Hodges J, Allen PT, Allen LW, Schwartz RJ, Jacobs LM. Personality types of 
flight crew members in a hospital-based helicopter program. Air Med J. 1994;13(1):13-
17.  
 
Personality types in hospital based helicopter programme. They were looking for data 
on how flight crews (as high performance teams) interact. Didn’t really give any useful 
info for specific NTS other than crews tended to be extrovert (gregarious, external and 
energy expending) and perceivers (flexible, adaptable, open-ended and pending). 
Participants reported that even just after doing this study and considering the 
different personality types and how they work or respond under pressure 
communication was enhanced eg by knowing possible different preferences they 
could anticipate or understanding why or why not a certain response in a given 
situation would tend to occur. 
 
13. Jaynes CL, Cook P, Farmer R, Werman HA, White L. Assessing satisfaction and quality 
in the EMS/HEMS working relationship. Air Med J. 2013;32(6):338-42.  
 
Piloting survey instruments designed to measure key elements of quality in the 
interaction between SMS and air medical crews. Focus group method used to define 
the activities involved in the working relationship between EMS and air medical 
transport. These were then refined into statements and placed into a 16 item (with 
likert scales) questionnaire which was distributed to EMS agencies throughout Ohio. 
From these items the key activities which relate to NTS would be treating staff with 
courtesy, two organisations functioning as a team, receiving accurate information, 
receiving helpful or constructive feedback on either outcome or own performance, 
having all info required to make decisions. 
 
14. Vilensky D, MacDonald RD. Communication errors in dispatch of air medical transport. 
Prehosp Emerg Care. 2011;15(1) 
 
Rates and types of communication errors in air medical transport (dispatch though). 
42% of calls contained errors and nearly half of these were attributed to procedures 
and software. 81% or errors were minor ie not likely to lead to harm or an adverse 
outcome. No errors resulted in patient harm or an adverse outcome and conclusion 
was that communication based errorss are common in the initial phases of call 




15. Pugh D. A phenomenologic study of flight nurses' clinical decision-making in 
emergency situations. Air Med J. 2002;21(2):28-36.  
 
Phenomenologic study of FN clinical decision making in emergency situations. 
Purposive sample of six experienced flight nurses. Illustrative issues that came up as 
affecting decision making were the implications of the environment ie isolated, 
restricted and noisy so for example no access to extra equipment and need to plan 
carefully or get poor info from original triaging medical office especially if no 
opportunity to check these yourself eg to ask the nurse on staff “what do you actually 
think about this patient” or how/is their condition changing; Also being familiar with 
staff and knowing their experience etc might influence decision making; have 
strategies for determining the value of what they are being told or managing a 
situation in which they were unsure of the details provided to them; follow practice 
guidelines closely to aid decision making especially as in an isolated environment; use 
reflective practice and self critique eg move away when you realize your constant 
monitoring is making the patient agitated and not helping the situation, change 
decision making to ‘is this patient stable enough to be moved onto an aircraft’ based 
on direct actions making sure I know as much as possible for myself eg speak to 
patient directly on the ground, make sure I telephone hospital myself. 
 
16.  Stohler S. High Performance Team Interaction in an Air Medical Program. Air Med J. 
1998;17(3).  
 
Qualitative study to identify and describe the elements of a high performance team 
interaction on an air medical transport mission. Main themes were collaboration, 
mutual respect and trust, fitness standards and synergy. Asked for an experience of 
high performance team interaction and one of low performance.  
 
Collaboration – Good -  collective assessment and development of back-up plan, 
showing respect for others, decided ahead of time who was team leader; Poor – no 
discussion of plan for patient care, all trying to do same things, performance 
redundant acts that lacked team coordination, lacked agreement, independent 
actions not involving team process consistently and lack of coordinated effort. Maybe 
already frustrated as things have gone wrong with transport etc then lacking a shared 
understanding eg of who should do what Mutual respect and trust – Good – 
confidence in partner and their expertise, knowing ones practice limitations, high 
experience helps this; Poor – eg if expectations are not fulfilled and have to keep 
reminding them what to do, or not giving crew credit for what they know or not 
valuing other as a crew member eg shows by interrupting or asking questions I have 
already asked, not trusting eg re-doing what I have done or do the opposite 
Fitness standards – eg for rescue if all cannot help as not fit enough 
Synergy – communication eg not always lots of words but efficient and succinct 
especially if you have worked with them before, all team members providing support 




17. Topley D, Schmelz J, Henkenius-Kirschbaum J, Horvath K. Critical Care Nursing 
Expertise during Air Transport. Mil Med. 2003;168.  
 
Describe the practical knowledge possessed by CCAT nurses – the Four major themes 
were – Preflight preparation, in flight assessment and environment, characteristic os 
CCAT nurse, and hospital versus inflight nursing practice.  
Preflight preparation – often have little information so start running checklist or 
inventory of possible items needed what do I need what don’t I need, what can I 
afford to leave behind, use previous experience and your training to plan and prepare 
– compare your list with other team members and pool your collective experiences, 
“try and anticipate and negative outcome while still on the ground rather than try and 
correct it in the air” 
In-Flight care and environment – due to environment must be watched all the time 
(eg cant hear monitor, breath sounds etc) so stay physically close to patient; 
sometimes hard to stick to established safety rules eg ventilator problems when about 
to land 
Characterisitcs of a CCATT nurse – cc experience and knowledge of theory such as 
flight physiology impact of high altitude, and FN experience 
Hospital vs in flight nursing practice – use more visual cues when in aircraft eg cant 
hear so have to look at monitor and patient ; limited resources so planning and set up 
is vital 
Need accurate information before the mission departs, relevant clinical experience 
and relevant theoretical knowledge and principles. 
 
18. Jaynes CL, Werman HA, White LJ. A blueprint for critical care transport research. Air 
Med J. 2013;32(1):30-5.  
 
Blueprint for critical care transport research using concept map and Delphi technique 
– experts and key stake holders; Only questions related to NTS – Human factors  - 
elements of crew fatigue and rest; identify extent to which human performance being 
addressed in the industry. Education/training - what are the basic and advanced 
clinical skills needed in order to perform safe patient transport; and what is impact of 
crew training on outcome? 
 
19. Frakes MA. Forum: Teamwork the sum and the parts. Air Med J. 2011;30(4):187-91.  
 
Opinion piece on teamwork. Main elements of a good team: shared vision, mutual 
support, situational awareness, communication. Share information and help one 
another to trap errors, but teams’ internal components are not interchangeable some 
roles and acuity of patients just require more knowledge or expertise. Good team eg 
experienced nurse can cross-check the physician performance and help keep things on 
track (very quietly and invisibly though), people speak up when things don’t look the 
same even if someone is more senior than them and thus interrupts an adverse event.  
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Optimise teams -  by share a vision, keep our situational awareness by knowing where 
we have been, where we are now, and where we are headed; communicate clearly 
and without hesitation, cross-check on another and ensure environment is mutually 
supportive; Also recognize other team members skills and training and experience; 
create safe communication environment, also need good individual knowledge/skills 
and willingness to work as a team, “each member brings a unique skills set that 
cannot be replaced, synergy comes from the sum of individual excellent parts” 
 
20. Maynard MT, Marshall D, Dean MD. Crew resource management and teamwork 
training in health care: a review of the literature and recommendations for how to 
leverage such interventions to enhance patient safety. Adv Healthcare Manage. 
2012;13:59-91.  
 
CRM in health care systematic review: General findings – CRM and teamwork training 
programs beneficial. There is no agreed on list of topics or curriculum However - 
Critical components of CRM training include:   
 
1. Patient safety overview within health care 
2. Role of CRM in other industries and within health care to address safety 
3. Communication 
a. Effective communication models 
b. Standardize communication techniques (e.g., SBAR) 
c. Role of distractions 
d. Use of critical language 
4. Normalization of deviance 
5. Ingredients for effective teamwork 
6. Conflict 
7. Team briefings 
8. Team debriefings 
9. Assertiveness 
10. Situational awareness 
11. Shared mental models 
12. Red flags 
13. Decision making 
21. Bigham B, Morrison L, Maher J, Brooks S, Bull E, Morrison M et al. Patient safety in 
Emergency Medical Services advancing and aligning the culture of patient safety in EMS: The 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute Contract No.: ISBN 978-1-926541-23-5 
Patient safety in EMS – Report based on qualitative interviews, a systematic review of the 
literature, and roundtable expert discussion: Findings – patient safety poorly studied with little 
evidence. Experts believe greatest harm is from flawed decision making. 
22. Reimer AP, Moore SM. Flight nursing expertise: towards a middle-range theory. J Adv 
Nurs. 2010;66(5):1183-92.  
Discussion paper on flight nursing expertise plus literature review – reviewed the 3 studies 
above by Pugh, Stohler and Topley so doesn’t add anything new. However also discusses 
specifics like decision making is based specifically on environmental conditions often eg space, 
access to patient, noise and vibration of aircraft; may withhold medication in anticipation of  
negative side effects hard to manage in flight; other decision making related to situation 
awareness eg awareness of hazards, poor support -  but has to often be rapid and accurate; 
cue recognition especially visual cues; pattern recognition eg decreased oxygen or increased 
resp effort; flight nursing specific knowledge and experience eg through repeated exposure to 
258 
 
specific situations or problems helps facilitate awareness and decision making; or additional 
training 
23. Williams KA, Rose WD, Simon R. Teamwork in emergency medical services. Air Med J. 
1999;18(4):149 - 53.  
Teamwork in EMS (based on literature evidence) - effective teamwork is: 
Supportive climate  - understanding of various roles for all, and supported by management 
Teamwork planning – involve all members as appropriate assists resource management also 
Effective communication – to share a mental model – clear, timely, complete and verified. Use 
standard terminology. Where ever possible make it positive and specific eg not “don’t turn 
left” but “wires at your 10 oclock” . Affirm communication you receive and ? repeat 
Problem solving  - multistep define problem assess resources, develop possible solutions, 
crate feedback loop. Not always possible in emergency so then maybe practice critical events 
in training  - also try to use skills to avoid potential crises (pattern recognition etc) 
Good Teamwork at work – communicate shared mental model and problem solve to make a 
plan, share tasks and workload as necessary, manage resources effectively. Avoid 
complacency and overload through balanced workload, team has enough cross training to 
help monitor overall   performance and trap individual mistakes. Finally debriefs and improves 
performance through feedback eg”pre planned team follows procedures to accept the 
mission, respond to the aircraft and take off to scene. Communication is crisp, clear and 
timely. Cross monitoring ensures that all required equipment is aboard and ready and that the 
takeoff follows the prescribed checklist. En route the entire team plans for the landing and 
subsequent care. Patient information is requested and discussed as is landing zone 
information etc etc page 5. 
 However possible errors might be – free riding where individuals don’t contribute; social 
loafing – hold back even though have valuable skills but see no benefit in helping and reduce 
team performance; Renglemann effect – too many cooks spoil the broth; Risk shift – as a team 
the decisions made are more risky because it is perceived as spread across the team so feels 
less than if just one individual was making the decision; Group think – in striving for unanimity 
the appraisal is not realistic and actually end up making illogical and unreasonable decisions; 
Abliene paradox – a bad decision os offered and the team agrees to it even though individual 





APPENDIX 8 SKILL DEFINITIONS AND BEHAVIOURAL DESCRIPTORS 
Task management: ‘the skills of management of resources and organisation of tasks to 
achieve goals, be they individual case plans or longer term scheduling issues’ 
1. Planning and preparing – developing in advance primary and contingency strategies for 
managing tasks, reviewing these and updating them if required to ensure goals will be 
met, making necessary arrangements to ensure plans can be achieved.  
Good Practice Bad Practice 
Negotiates for an appropriate plan for 
transport with relevant parties (such as 
receiving and referring hospital staff, bed 
manager/finance holder) at all relevant 
points in the mission including a go or 
no/go decision, an overall mission plan, 
stabilisation at referring hospital and 
ongoing transport plan. 
Does not adapt the transport plan in light 
of new information 
Demonstrates the ability to elicit relevant 
information from the referring hospital 
Does not organise appropriate drugs or 
equipment in advance 
Communicates the plan for transporting 
the patient to all relevant parties (such as 
family, patient, receiving and referring 
hospital staff, air and ground crew) 
Fails to make appropriate arrangements 
for patient arrival at destination 
Reviews the transport plan in light of 
changes 
Fails to communicate with other team 
members regarding the physical 
arrangements 
Makes appropriate arrangements for 
patient arrival at destination 
Withholds information 
Sources and organises all appropriate 
medication and equipment before setting 
out on the transport 
 
 
2. Prioritising – scheduling tasks, activities, issues, information channels, etc – according to 
importance (eg due to time, seriousness, plans); being able to identify key issues and 




Discusses priority issues in the case Becomes distracted by the aviation 
environment or logistical issues 
Manages potential distractors with 
appropriate delegation 
Fails to allocate attention to critical areas 
Conveys order of actions in critical 
situations 




3. Providing and maintaining standards – supporting safety and quality by adhering to 
accepted principles of patient transport; following where possible, codes of good practice, 
treatment protocols of guidelines, and mental checklists.  
Follows established protocols and 
guidelines when appropriate eg. Reviews 
checklists before key time-points in the 
transfer  
Does not check medication with patient 
and notes 
Cross checks drug labels Breaches guidelines such as minimum 
monitoring standards 
Checks equipment before transport 
commences 
Fails to confirm or check what equipment  
is available 
Maintains accurate patient transport 
records 
Does not adhere to emergency protocols 
or guidelines 
 
4. Identifying and utilising resources – Establishing the necessary, and available, 
requirements for task completion (eg. People, expertise, equipment, time) and using them 
to accomplish goals with minimum disruption, stress, work overload or underload (mental 
and physical) on individuals and the whole team. 
Identifies resources that are available Fails to utilise available resources 
Allocates tasks to appropriate members 
of the team 
Overloads other team members with 
tasks 
Carries out routine tasks in anticipation of 
busy or critical periods 
Does not recognise when task load is 
unworkable 






Team Working: ‘the skills of working with others in a team context, in any role, to ensure 
effective joint task completion and team satisfaction; the focus is particularly on the team 
rather than the task’ 
1. Coordinating activities with team members – working together with others to carry out 
tasks, for both physical and cognitive activities; understanding the roles and 
responsibilities of different team members; and ensuring that a collaborative approach is 
employed.  
Confirms roles and responsibilities of 
team members including themselves 
Does not coordinate with colleagues and 
other groups 
Discusses case with consultants or 
colleagues 
Relies too much on familiarity of team for 
getting things done, makes assumptions, 
takes things for granted 
Considers requirements of others before 
acting 
Intervenes without informing others 
Cooperates with others to achieve goals  Does not involve team in tasks 
 Assumes team leader status without 
confirmation 
 
2. Exchanging information – giving and receiving the knowledge and data necessary for 
team coordination and task completion. 
Gives situation reports/updates key 
events 
Does not inform team of plan or 
subsequent alteration 
Confirms shared understanding Gives inadequate handover briefing 
Communicates care plans and other 
relevant information to appropriate 
people 
Does not include relevant people in 
communications or communicates at 
inappropriate times eg reports back to 
base in front of family members  
Expresses concerns constructively Fails to express concerns in a clear and 
precise manner 





3. Using authority and assertiveness – leading the team and/or the task (as required), 
accepting a non-leading role when appropriate; adopting a suitably forceful manner to 
make a point, and adapting this for the team and/or situation. 
Ensures an adequate handover occurs   
Makes requirements known with 
necessary level of assertiveness eg. Uses 
phrases like “would you like me to”  or 
“give me a few minutes while I tell you”  
Does not challenge colleagues when 
appropriate eg. When not listening at 
handover 
Takes over task leadership as required Does not allow others to put forward 
their case 
Uses clear instructions with team 
members  
Fails to attempt to resolve conflicts in an 
appropriate manner 
States case and provides justification  Does not advocate position when 
required 
Questions other team members 
regardless of seniority when unsure right 
decision has been made 
 
 
4. Assessing capabilities – judging different team members’ skills, and their ability to deal 
with a situation; being alert to factors that may limit these and their capacity of perform 
effectively (eg. Level of expertise, experience, stress, fatigue)  
Communicates own limitations and calls 
for assistance when it is needed 
Does not intervene if team member is 
unable to complete a task 
Clarifies the experience of team members 
they have not worked with before 
Allow team to accept case beyond its 
level of expertise 
Considers composition of the team prior 
to the  mission 
Does not pay attention to the 
performance of other members of the 
team (eg other flight crew, medical crew) 
Adapts level of monitoring to expertise 
and performance of other team members 
Joins established team without 
ascertaining their capabilities 
Notices when other team members are 
fatigued and offers assistance or increases 
level of monitoring 
Fails to respond to obvious cues of 
fatigue or other incapacity such as 
motion sickness – person yawning, not 




5. Supporting others – providing physical, cognitive or emotional help to other members of 
the team or family. 
Acknowledges concerns of others Asks for information at difficult/high 
workload time for someone else 
Provides reassurance/encouragement Does not offer assistance to team 
member 
Debriefs and thanks staff after a difficult 
transport 
Fails to recognise needs of others 
requiring task re-allocation 
Anticipates when colleagues will need 
information/equipment or helps out when 
colleague is busy 
Uses a dismissive tone in response to 
requests from others 
Provides appropriate information to 
relatives 
Gives inappropriate information to 
family eg inappropriate assurances 
regarding future care or prognosis 
 
 
Situation Awareness: ‘the skills to develop and maintain an overall dynamic awareness of the 
situation based on perceiving the elements of both the clinical and the aviation environment: 
patient, team, time, displays, equipment, aircraft operation, understanding what they mean 
and thinking ahead about possible implications’  
1. Gathering information – actively and specifically collecting data about the situation by 
continuously observing the whole environment  and monitoring all available data sources 
and cues and verifying data to confirm their reliability (ie that they are not artifactual) 
Obtains and documents patient 
information prior to transport 
Reduces level of monitoring because of 
distractions or tediousness 
Conducts a frequent scan of the aviation 
and clinical environment 
Responds to individual cues without 
confirmation 
Collects information from team to 
identify problem 
Does not alter physical layout of 
workspace to improve data visibility or 
audibility 
Cross checks information to increase 
reliability 
Does not ask questions to orient self to 




2. Recognising and understanding – considers and interprets information in light of the 
environment, identifies the match or mis-match between the situation and the expected 
state, updates one’s current mental picture.  
Increases frequency of monitoring in response to 
patient condition 
Perseveres with ineffective strategies in response to 
critical events 
Demonstrates understanding of aviation hazards Does not respond to changes in patient state 
Informs others of seriousness of situation Carries out inappropriate course of action 
Verbalises observed trends and their meaning to 
other team members 
Dismisses alarms without investigation  
Demonstrates ability to change the plan in light of 
new information 
Distracts others during critical tasks (eg talks on 
takeoff) 
Mounts defences against fatigue-related errors Fails to consider aviation hazards 
 
3. Anticipating – asking ‘what if’ questions and thinking about potential outcomes and 
consequences of actions, intervention, non-intervention, etc; running projections of 
current situation to predict what might happen in the near future 
Keeps ahead of the situation with 
appropriate intervention 
Does not consider potential problems 
associated with the transport 
 Fails to increase level of monitoring in 
keeping with patient condition or 
circumstances 
Sets and communicates intervention 
thresholds 
Is caught unaware by transport related 
issues 
Takes action to avoid or mitigate 
potential problems eg alters layout of 
workspace to improve visibility of data or 
prepares for noisy helipad tasks 
Does not forsee undesirable medical or 
transport related issues 
Continually prepares for upcoming clinical 
interventions during mission eg. Draws up 
drugs for use in advance to use on the 
airframe or anticipates additional medical 






Decision Making: ‘The skills of making decisions to reach a judgement or diagnosis about a 
situation, or to select a course of action, based on experience or new information under 
both normal conditions and in time-pressured crisis situations’ 
1. Identifying options – generating alternative possibilities or courses of action to be 
considered in making a decision or solving a problem 
Recognises alternative options for 
decisions 
Even though time is available jumps 
straight to one option without 
considering alternatives  
Seeks input on various transport related 
issues with all relevant parties 
Fails to ask other team members for 
options, when appropriate or is 
inappropriately influenced by non-
medical considerations 
Objectively evaluates and discusses 
clinical or other relevant considerations 
with colleagues 
 Ignores suggestions from other team 
members 
 
2. Balancing risks and selecting options – assessing hazards to weigh up the threats or 
benefits of a situation, considering the advantages and disadvantages of different courses 
of action; choosing a solution or course of action based on these processes. 
Considers risks of different treatment 
and/or transport options 
Does not find out about the risks 
associate with unfamiliar conditions or 
environment 
Weighs up factors with respect to 
patients condition  
Does not preview courses of action with 
relevant people to assess their suitability 
Assesses time criticality associated with 
possible options 
Fails to review and discuss possible 
options with the team 
Implements chosen option  
 
3. Re-evaluating – continually reviewing the suitability of the options identified, assessed 
and selected; and re-assessing the situation following implementation of a given action. 
Re-assess patient after key stages of the 
transport or on a regular basis 
Fails to allow adequate time for 
intervention to take effect 
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Reviews situation , if decision was to wait 
and see 
Fails to include other team members in 
re-evaluation 
Continues to list options as patient’s 
condition evolves 
Is unwilling to revise course of action in 
light of new information 
Reviews transport options as aircraft or 
environmental changes occur 
Fails to re-assesses patient after key 







APPENDIX 9 AERONOTS ASSESSMENT FORM AND RATING SCALE 
 Aeromedical non-technical skills: Assessment form and rating scale 
Categories *Category 
rating 
(1 – 5) 
Elements *Element rating 
(1 – 5) 
Debriefing notes 
Task Management   





























































* 1 = Poor; 2 = Marginal; 3 = Acceptable; 4 = Good; 5 = Excellent; N = skill was not required in this scenario 
The clinician is rated based on what is expected for a trained and competent aeromedical clinician. Round 












5 - Excellent Extremely good performance which could serve as a model 
example for others; patient safety enhanced 
4 – Good A consistently high standard of performance; patient safety 
assured 
3 – Acceptable Satisfactory performance but could be improved; patient safety 
not affected 
2 – Marginal Performance gives rise to concern; patient safety potentially 
compromised 
1 – Poor Absence of behaviour required by the situation; performance 
endangered or potentially endangered patient safety 
NR – Not 
relevant 
Skill was not required in this scenario 
* Round down to the next lower integer rating if you feel performance was best described in 
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The retrieval team consists of two team members, a doctor (D) & a 
flight nurse (N). Unknown to D, N is aware of the scenario & may be 
asked to provide clinical prompts to elicit information from D. The 
scenario is set across two consecutive phases designed to allow 
assessment of the different components of the challenges faced 
during aeromedical retrieval. The two phases of the simulation are: 
 
Phase 1: set in the resuscitation bay of an emergency department of a 
small hospital with an intubated mannequin on a hospital trolley 
attached to a ventilator & monitor. This phase is designed to assess 
the ability of the retrieval team to obtain relevant medical history in a 
timely fashion, review blood results & radiology, & examine the 
mannequin. If not volunteered by D, N will prompt to elicit a plan for 
retrieval. Phase 1 will end when the plan has been discussed to the 
SIMULATION 
SCENARIO 
Scenario: Rapid Atrial Fibrillation During Aeromedical Retrieval 
Location: Aeromedical Simulator 
Patient Name: Lily Blythe Gender: 
Female 
Learning Objectives: 
Assimilation of history, vital signs & equipment settings in a timely fashion 
Recognise deterioration in a critically unwell patient 
Respond appropriately with an escalated intervention 
Efficient team work with appropriate delegation of workload 
Clear communication with other team members 
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satisfaction of both parties. The scenario should then progress 
immediately to phase 2. 
 
Phase 2: set in the fuselage of an aeromedical retrieval plane at 
cruise altitude with an intubated mannequin strapped to an 
aeromedical transfer stretcher & connected to a portable 
monitor & ventilator. D & N are seated & must communicate 




Phase 1 (set in the resuscitation bay of the Emergency Department of a small hospital): 
 
• intubated female mannequin with #8.0 Portex endotracheal 
tube in-situ dressed in hospital gown & lying on a hospital 
bed. Auscultation of mannequin chest will reveal loud harsh 
breath sounds throughout both lung fields 
• ventilator set to 70% inspired oxygen, PEEP 0, ASV mode 
with MV 100% (or equivalent mode of ventilation) 
• pulse oximeter connected to monitor with probe on mannequin 
• urinary catheter draining into catheter bag 
• 18G & 20G cannulae inserted into left & right anterior cubital fossae 
• arterial line inserted into right radial artery 
• propofol in 50ml syringe connected to syringe driver 
infusing at 22ml/hr through left cannula 
• 12-lead ECG showing a sinus rhythm (see appendix) 
• chest X-ray showing a correctly-positioned endotracheal 
tube and bilateral pulmonary opacities consistent with 
severe community-acquired pneumonia (see appendix) 
• arterial blood gas (taken on 70% inspired oxygen 
concentration) showing hypoxaemia, hypercapnia, 
hypokalaemia & hypomagnesaemia (see appendix) 
 
Phase 2 (set in the fuselage of an aeromedical retrieval plane): 
• intubated female mannequin with #8.0 Portex endotracheal 
tube in-situ dressed in hospital gown & strapped on to an 
aeromedical transport stretcher covered by a blanket. The 
mannequin must be defibrillator safe 
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• transport ventilator set to 70% inspired oxygen, PEEP 0 (or 
as set by D in phase 1), ASV mode with MV 100% (or 
equivalent mode of ventilation) 
• transport monitor displaying ECG, arterial & end-tidal 
carbon dioxide waveforms with audio alarms muted (as 
would be inaudible in aviation environment) 
• pulse oximeter connected to monitor but no trace 
visible as probe not placed on mannequin (& is 
hidden from view under the blanket) 
• defibrillator (may be part of transport monitor or separate) 
• urinary catheter draining into catheter bag 
• 18G & 20G cannulae inserted into left & right anterior cubital fossae 
• arterial line inserted into right radial artery 
• propofol in 50ml syringe connected to syringe driver 
infusing at 22ml/hr through left cannula 
 
A ‘flight bag’, the contents of which are: 
• Crystalloid fluid (3 x 1000ml bags) 
• Intravenous giving set 
• Amiodarone 150mg vials 
• Digoxin 500mcg vials 
• Verapamil 5mg vials 
• Magnesium Sulphate 10mmol vials 
• Potassium Chloride 10mmol vials 
• Adrenaline 1mg vials 
• Metaraminol 10mg in 10ml pre-mixed syringes 
• Noradrenaline 10mg in 100ml pre-mixed bag 
• Defibrillator pads (adhesive) with connecting cable 
 
For practical reasons, it would be possible to use the same 
mannequin for both phases of the scenario provided it can be 
transferred onto the aeromedical transport stretcher & placed 
inside the aeroplane fuselage in a timely fashion. 
 
Pre-Scenario Clinical Information: 
“You are the medical & nursing members of the Intensive Care 
aeromedical retrieval team. You have been sent to a small hospital to 
retrieve a patient who is ventilated in their Emergency Department 
with a severe pneumonia. You need to bring her back to your ICU as 
the referring hospital don’t have any ICU beds available.” 
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Initial Vital Signs: 
Set 1 
Parameter Value Shown On 
Monitor 
ECG trace Sinus 
rhythm 
Yes 
Heart rate 81 Yes 






















The retrieval team are met in the Emergency Department 
by a junior doctor who, in response to direct questioning, is 
able to provide the following history: 
• Lily Blythe is a 76 year old lady who was brought to the 
Emergency Department earlier today 
• she had seen her GP several times in the last week with 
cough, lethargy & muscle aches & had been treated with 
antibiotics. Despite this she had continued to get worse & 
her husband called an ambulance yesterday because she 
was looking ‘a bit blue’ 
• on arrival to ED she was markedly cyanotic with an 
increased work of breathing so was rapidly intubated. ICU 
is full so we have requested transfer to the tertiary hospital 





• she takes cilazapril & various inhalers 
• she has no allergies but beta-blockers make her ‘wheezy’ 
• she had seen her GP for her seasonal influenza vaccination 
a few months ago & had a ‘heart check’ which was ‘fine’ 
• she is intubated & ventilated on 70% oxygen. She has 
an arterial line which is being transduced, 2 peripheral 
venous cannulae & continuous end-tidal carbon dioxide 
& ECG monitoring 
• she has a heart rate of 81 and a good blood pressure without any 
vasoactive support 
• she was an ‘easy intubation’. Other than the 
suxamethonium given for intubation, she has not had 
any other paralysing drugs 
• if asked any questions about the ventilator, the junior 
doctor should reply “I don’t know anything about 
ventilators. The anaesthetist set it up before they went 
home” 
 
On request, D can be shown any of the following (see appendix): 
• a post-intubation chest X-ray showing bilateral 
changes consistent with a severe pneumonia 
• an arterial blood gas taken on 70% oxygen showing 
hypoxaemia,hypercapnia, serum potassium 3.4 mmol/l & 
serum magnesium 0.6 mmol/l 
• a 12-lead ECG showing a sinus rhythm 
 
D is expected to: 
• examine the mannequin to ascertain what intravenous & 
intra-arterial lines are in-situ, check the endotracheal 
tube position & that the cuff is inflated 
• auscultate the chest 
• determine the vital signs displayed on the monitor & the current 
ventilator settings 
• check the post-intubation chest X-ray 
• notice the PEEP of 0 
• notice the hypoxaemia from the saturation probe and either 
increase the inspired oxygen concentration or increase the 
PEEP to a higher setting (anywhere between 5 to 15) a few 
minutes after which the oxygen saturation reading will 
increase to 94% 
• formulate a transfer plan including specific drugs made 
available (i.e. drawn up) & discuss this with the ICU 
consultant by telephone. The number of the ‘ICU consultant 
on- call’ will be provided which will be the mobile number for 
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one of the simulation team. A transfer plan will only be 
prompted with ‘what’s your plan?’ if it is not forthcoming 
from D. 
 
If D fails to perform any of these tasks, N should prompt them to do so. 
D may request the administration of a non-depolarising 
muscle relaxant (such as rocuronium, vecuronium, 
atracurium or pancuronium). All these are available for 
administration by N but only if a specific dose is 
requested. 
 
Phase 1 ends when D has successfully communicated a 
transfer plan to the ICU consultant on-call & N. The 
scenario then progresses to Phase 2. 
Phase 2 
Initial Vital Signs: 
 
Set 2 
Parameter Value Shown On 
Monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm Yes 




















16 (this must match the rate set 
on the ventilator as the patient is 













No trace or value until 
probe placed on 
mannequin 
 
• Begins in-flight at cruise altitude with the flight 
doctor (D) & flight nurse (N) seated adjacent to the 
mannequin 
• Wait for D to notice absence of saturation trace & reading. 
Once probe place on finger, show reading of 91%. N can 
prompt if D fails to notice after some time 
• Once the probe is placed, slow desaturation over 3-4 
minutes with oximeter value falling to 85% 
• D should make an attempt to either increase the inspired 
oxygen concentration or further increase the PEEP on the 
ventilator (to an acceptable maximum of 18), or both. 
Oxygen saturation will rise to a maximum of 89% with 
these changes 
• Occasional ventricular ectopics visible on ECG trace 
 
Set 3 
Parameter Value Shown On Monitor 
ECG trace Atrial fibrillation Yes 
Heart rate 162 Yes 






End-tidal carbon dioxide 












• D should recognise the rhythm change with hypotension & 
communicate this to N 
• Appropriate initial treatment could include asking for 
amiodarone, verapamil or digoxin to be drawn up. Her 
stated sensitivity to beta-blockers should preclude 
requesting these 










Parameter Value Shown On Monitor 
ECG trace Atrial fibrillation Yes 
Heart rate 181 Yes 






End-tidal carbon dioxide 












• Appropriate treatment could now include any of the following: 
• attempting to raise the patient’s legs 
• decreasing the propofol infusion rate 
• administering a fluid bolus of 500mls 
• administration of a vasoconstrictor at appropriate dose (0.5 to 1mg of 
metaraminol) 
• amiodarone (either 150mg or 300mg via slow push) 
• verapamil (5mg neat via slow push over several minutes) 
• digoxin (250 or 500mcg via slow push over several minutes) 
• increasing the inspired oxygen concentration on the ventilator 
• Administering any of the above medications will cause a 
transient decrease in heart rate (to 140) with subsequent 
rise in blood pressure (to 90 systolic maximum). Patient 
remains in atrial fibrillation regardless. 
• After this patient slowly worsens to vital signs shown in Set 5 
Set 5 
 
Parameter Value Shown On 
Monitor 
ECG trace Atrial fibrillation Yes 
Heart rate 192 Yes 
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• D must now attempt synchronised defibrillation to convert to sinus 
rhythm. This involves: 
• communication with both N & the aeromedical crew 
that the defibrillator needs to be used 
• if asked directly, N will respond with ‘I’ve never used this defibrillator 
before’ 
• finding & correctly placing the adhesive pads onto the 
mannequin & connecting them to the defibrillator 
• selecting ‘Sync’ mode 
• charging to 100J minimum (biphasic) 
• performing appropriate safety checks prior to shock 
delivery (communication with team, ensuring no-
one is touching patient etc.) 
• if shock <100J selected, patient will remain in AF 
until a repeat shock at a higher value is delivered 
• if ‘Sync’ mode is not selected prior to shock delivery, the 
patient will convert to ventricular fibrillation, lose all 
cardiac output & require immediate further 
unsynchronised defibrillation. If this is not immediately 
recognised or a second shock is not delivered or D 
attempts to defibrillate VF with a synchronised shock, 
the patient 
will remain in VF. If shock is unsuccessful, D or N should begin 
CPR for 2 minutes before delivering another (unsynchronised) 
shock 
• If D asks to speak to the ICU Consultant at any point, N 
should reply that the satellite phone is unable to 
connect 
• Once the patient has been successfully defibrillated 
(either synchronised from AF or unsynchronised from VF), 
the patient returns to sinus rhythm, becomes more stable 







Parameter Value Shown On 
Monitor 
ECG trace Sinus 
rhythm 
Yes 
Heart rate 88 Yes 
































APPENDIX 12 STUDY III CARDIAC SIMULATION SCENARIO 
Scenario: Evolving MI, transfer for immediate PTCA 
 
Witnessed arrest at home with bystander CPR. Ventricular fibrillation on arrival of ambulance 
crew with several shocks leading to return of sinus rhythm and spontaneous circulation. Failed 
to wake so intubated on arrival at Hastings Hospital to protect airway. ECG shows evolving 
anterior ST elevation. Unable to be thrombolysed due to recent surgery. Accepted for 
immediate PTCA at Wellington.  Arterial line has been inserted by anaesthetist. 
 
Location: Fixed wing aeromedical simulator 
Patient name: John Thomas 
Gender: Male 
Age: 72 years 
Weight: 90kg 
 
Scenario objectives:  
The overall objective of the scenario is to evaluate the clinical performance of a clinician 
undertaking a critical care aeromedical patient transfer. Specifically the objectives are to: 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to organise and manage aeromedical transfer resources 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of aeromedical clinicians’ teamwork and communication 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to maintain dynamic awareness of the clinical situation and 
aviation environment 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to consider new information and relevant aeromedical 
factors in their decision making 
Abbreviations (ID key): 
D = Participant Doctor 
CN = Confederate flight nurse 
CDB  = Clinical details briefer 
Control room = confederate providing instructions or information from the simulation control 
room. 
Introduction 
The retrieval team consists of two team members, a doctor (D) and a confederate flight nurse 
(CN). The confederate will be introduced as one who is new to the flight service and unknown 
to the clinician they are working with.  The scenario is set in the fuselage of a high-fidelity 
fixed-wing air ambulance at cruise altitude with mannequin intubated and ventilated. The 
main part of the scenario will take place during flight with ‘plane noise’ in operation but D and 
CN able to communicate with each other and with the control room via head-set.  The 
scenario will start with a scripted brief providing most relevant clinical details and a chance to 
request additional meds or information before commencing the ‘in-flight’ stage of the 
scenario.  The confederate nurse will ‘already have connected the patient to the ventilator 
and monitors’.  When the ‘take-over’ interaction has concluded, and the participant has 
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completed requests for further information and/or medication/equipment the scenario will be 
moved forward to the interior of the aeromedical simulator where the aircraft is on ascent, 
the simulated aircraft noise has commenced and head-sets/comms are in situ.    
Environment set-up 
 Intubated male mannequin with a #8.0 Portex endotracheal tube in-situ and lying on 
the transport stretcher 
 Mannequin able to be defibrillated but pads not on 
 De-fibrillator available but placed behind the nurses seat so it is not immediately 
accessible 
 Transport ventilator set to 70% FiO2, PEEP 5, ASV mode with 100% minute volume 
setting 
 Transport monitor displaying ECG, arterial and end-tidal carbon dioxide waveforms 
 Pulse oximeter connected to monitor with probe on mannequin  
 Vital signs - HR 85 sinus rhythm, arterial line BP 140/85, EtCO2 38 mmHg, SpO2 94% 
 Nasogastric tube in-situ (spigoted) 
 Urinary catheter draining into catheter bag 
 18G and 20G cannulae inserted into left and right anterior cubital fossae 
 Arterial line inserted into right radial artery 
 Propofol 10 mg/ml in 50 ml syringe connected to syringe driver infusing at 22ml/hr 
through left cannula 
 12 lead ECG available showing anterior ST elevation (see appendix 3), 2 lead ECG on 
the monitor 
 Chest X-ray available showing a correctly-positioned endotracheal tube  -  otherwise 
normal (see appendix 1) 
 Arterial blood gas (ABG) (taken on 70% inspired oxygen concentration) showing 
normal post-resuscitation values (mild metabolic acidosis & hyperglycaemia) (see 
appendix 3) 
 Troponin (included in ABG) showing elevated levels 
A ‘flight bag’ containing: 
 Crystalloid fluid (3 x 1000 ml bags) 
 Intravenous giving set 
 Amiodarone 150 mg vials 
 Digoxin 500 mcg vials 
 Verapamil 5mg vials 
 Magnesium Sulphate 10 mmol vials 
 Potassium Chloride 10 mmol vials 
 Adrenaline 1 mg vials 
 Metaraminol 10 mg in 10 ml pre-mixed syringes 
 Noradrenaline 10 mg in 100 ml pre-mixed bag 






 To be provided to participants prior to commencement. Participant will be asked ‘have you 
read & do you understand the briefing?’. The simulation should only begin if the answer to 
this question is yes. 
Before the simulation begins, Simulation Suite staff will enter the aircraft to brief the 
participants about the function of the high-fidelity flight simulator and the mannequin 
capabilities, and also to check head-set sound. Participants should be reminded they can 
communicate with the pilot or request contact with the ICU SMO via their headset. 
Next, the pre-scenario clinical information (below) will be provided but this will be done inside 
the aircraft for simplicity’s sake and so it can be recorded on camera. The participant will then 
be given a couple of minutes to examine the patient, ask questions. 
Pre-scenario clinical information  
CDB: You are the doctor in the Intensive Care aeromedical retrieval team sent to pick up this 
patient from Hastings in the fixed wing aircraft and return them to Wellington Hospital. This 
is Raulle, the flight nurse who will be working with you on the flight. In this scenario we 
would like you to assume you have never met Raulle before, and are working with him for 
the first time (up to this point there should be limited opportunities for Dr to communicate 
with CN before the scenario starts).  
CN: Hello I’m new.  
D is expected to (either now or when they are settled and the flight stage of the scenario has 
commenced): 
 introduce themselves and ask about the previous experience of the CN 
 If asked how many previous flights they have done CN should reply that this is just his 
second flight since orientation – then ask the Doctor how experienced they are… 
CDB: I’m going to tell you about the patient, and then you can have a couple of minutes to 
examine the patient, or ask any final questions before we buckle you in for ‘takeoff’. 
 John Thomas is a 72 year old male who lives with his wife 
 He had a witnessed cardiac arrest today at home during which his son performed CPR.  
The ambulance arrived within a few minutes & found him to be in VF. 
 After several defibrillation attempts, sinus rhythm returned.  He did not wake up & was 
transferred to Hawke’s Bay hospital where he was intubated. 
 His ECG shows an ST elevation MI. Recent abdominal surgery for an umbilical hernia 
repair precludes thrombolysis; he has been accepted by Wellington cardiology for 
urgent PTCA.  
 His medical history includes type II diabetes and hypertension 
 His blood sugar was high prior to leaving so was given 4 units of insulin. It hasn’t been 
checked since. 
 He has been given aspirin down his NG tube. 
 Mr Thomas’s son and his wife are driving to Wellington 
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 Before we start the flight stage of the scenario is there any other information you would 
like? After the participant has requested further information (xray, ABGs etc) the briefer 
will say:  
At this stage I am going to leave, and you can have a couple of minutes to examine the 
patient or discuss anything you need to with your flight nurse, just as you usually would if 
you were about to leave the hospital. Then we will start the flight stage of the scenario (we 
will tell you when this happens). 
The folder with results (appendices) will be handed to the confederate flight nurse before the 
clinical briefer exits the aircraft. 
D is expected to:  
 Ask to see ECG, ABG, and CXR is hasn’t already. 
 Ensure they have sedation, paralysis (rocuronium, atracurium, pancuronium all 
acceptable), vasoconstrictor (metaraminol, phenylephrine or noradrenaline) or at 
least discuss with nurse that they might need them, ensure the presence of 
resuscitation drugs (including adrenaline, amiodarone) 
 Ensure a defibrillator is present, functional, that they are familiar with it and state that 
pads should be attached to the patient prior to take-off 
 Ask about the intubation which was “easy or straightforward” (Grade one airway) 
 If the handover clinician is asked whether there are notes they will state “the notes 
are not available to you at this time” 
 
CN: What will the plan be for the transport? (ONLY if Dr hasn’t already stated when asking for 
the information above) 
 
Pause now for D to outline his plan briefly to the CN. We would expect that this should 
include: 
 
 Ventilation plan (aim for normo- or hyperventilation to compensate for metabolic 
acidosis) 
 Normal blood pressure - avoid hypotension and hypertension 
 Possible need for further paralysis 
 Need for continuous ECG monitoring 
 Prepare to treat hypotension with bolus/vasoactive 
 Prepare to give intravenous fluids 
 Plan for arrhythmias including ability to defibrillate/cardiovert if required 
 Need to re-check blood sugar in-transit 
The scenario will now be moved forward in time.  
Control Room: We are now starting the flight part of the scenario. At this time the aircraft is 
ascending to cruise altitude at 17,000 feet with a cabin pressure of 4,000 feet above sea 
level to stay above the weather.  




 Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm with 
anterior ST elevation 
Yes 
Heart rate 85 Yes 
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Arterial wave form & blood pressure 140/85 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
38 Yes 
Respiratory rate 16 Yes 
Pulse oximetry 94% (on 70% O2) Yes 
 
In-flight scenario 
 Begins with aircraft still ascending to cruise altitude 
 D and CN wear head-sets and seated in usual flight positions 
 “plane noise” is switched on so auscultation and alarms will not be clearly audible and 
communication must be done via the head-set 
 The defibrillator is available but ‘hidden’ behind the CN’s seat & is not connected to 
the mannequin 
 
D is expected to: 
 check the monitors and carry out a general assessment 
 either ask CN or look directly to see whether there are de-fib pads already attached to 
the patient , availability of & connection to the defibrillator  
After 3 minutes when there has been time to check the monitor, pads, communicate the plan 
and then settle back there are three short runs of arrhythmia (paired PVCs or bizarre complex 
beats) - 30 seconds apart.  
D should notice these but no intervention is required (other than increasing their anxiety level) 
Once D has had a short time to settle in there is a short period (30s) of severe turbulence. At 
that time Pulse Ox signal disappears.   
 





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace   Sinus rhythm with 
anterior ST elevation 
Yes 
Heart rate 90 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 130/80 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
38 Yes 
Respiratory rate 16 Yes 







Dr is expected to: 
 Check and reposition the Pulse Ox probe or ask CN to do so (when this happens the 
pulse ox reading will return)NB: Confederate needs to get up and do this before the Dr 





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm with 
anterior ST elevation 
Yes 
Heart rate 90 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 130/80 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
38 Yes 
Respiratory rate 16 Yes 
Pulse oximetry 93% Yes 
 
When Sp02 returns to normal nothing else happens for 1 minute to allow assessment. After this 
time, cardiac monitor (ECG) again shows intermittent couplets, 30 s apart (PVCS or bizarre 
beats).  
Whilst these are being displayed, the CN also starts to show signs of sinus pain that rapidly 
progresses to severe (stops looking at the patient, puts his head down to start with, then 
progresses to holding his forehead, frowning, and groaning) 
CN: Wow I’m really starting to get this terrible pain above my eyes…..(also very anxious 
about the pain)……. as it progresses he also notes that his ear is very sore, and mentions that 
the pain is in his sinuses  
D is expected to:  
 Recognise the problem 
 Assume primary responsibility for monitoring the patient, since the nurse is 
incapacitated 
  consider/discuss the possibility of descending 
 Alert the pilot.  If the participant/doctor does not do this immediately, then the nurse 
should wait a bit (ask the doctor, “what can we do”) 
 IF after a long pause the doc still has not alerted the pilots, the CN should say “I really 
think you need to tell the pilots this is really bad” 
Pilot (control room – when alerted by the Dr): What did you want to do? 
There is a pause for the Dr to make suggestions. During the discussion there are also a further 
two sets of couplets 
287 
 
Dr is expected to: 
 Discuss  and decide on cabin pressurisation alteration and schedule (descending) and 
continue on to Wellington as patient needs to cardiology services 
 Re-assure the CN, provide explanation to nurse, who is still unable to ‘work’/monitor 
patient 
If this suggestion is not forthcoming or the Dr asks the pilot what is possible the pilot can 
answer: 
Control room (pilot): The best option is to lower the cabin pressure but that will mean 
changing our flight plan and it will take longer (extend the trip by about 30 minutes if asked 
– and if asked their current cabin pressure is 4000 feet above sea level so can take it down to 
approx. 2000…?) If by some chance the Dr says no we have to turn back and land immediately 
the flight nurse will say that the pain is actually now dissipating so they can carry on… 
 
Pilot (control room): Descending now, cabin pressure lowering to 2000 (or whatever the Dr 
has asked for…) 
Once aircraft has descended slightly the CN’s pain steadily improves (or once D has weighed 
up and decided on the options the CN could convey that the pain has now subsided).  
There is then a period of 30s before the control room again calls to say the cardiology 
consultant is on the phone 
Control Room: I have the cardiology consultant on the phone apparently ‘this patient had 
been accepted by his colleague but he doesn’t know anything about them’.  
At that time there is a further two sets of couplets 
Control room (confederate cardiology consultant): Hi look I understand you are bringing in 
Mr Thomas could you tell me a bit about him my colleague has accepted him but I don’t 
know anything about him… 
D is expected to handover the patient: 
 History including presentation – VF, defibrillation, CPR, ROSC time, ECG findings, 
contraindication to thrombolysis 
 Current condition of patient – cardiovascularly unsupported, ongoing ST changes with 
frequent arrhythmia 
 Medications administered to date 
 Mention the hyperglycaemia 





APPENDIX 13 STUDY III NEUROLOGICAL ICP SIMULATION SCENARIO 
Scenario: Intracerebral haemorrhage, risk for increasing ICP or further bleeding 
 
Witnessed sudden loss of consciousness at home in Nelson. Breathing but minimally 
responsive, GCS of 5. Ambulance transported to hospital – on arrival, intubated for CT scan 
which showed large intracerebral haematoma.  BP starting to increase (risk for increasing ICP).   
 
Location: Fixed wing aeromedical simulator 
Patient name: Jane Thomas 
Gender: Female 
Age: 72 years 
Weight: 70kg 
 
Scenario objectives:  
The overall objective of the scenario is to evaluate the clinical performance of a clinician 
undertaking a critical care aeromedical patient transfer. Specifically the objectives are to: 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to organise and manage aeromedical transfer resources 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of aeromedical clinicians’ teamwork and communication 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to maintain dynamic awareness of the clinical situation and 
aviation environment 
 Evaluate clinicians’ ability to consider new information and relevant aeromedical 
factors in their decision making 
Abbreviations (ID key): 
D = Participant Doctor 
CN = Confederate flight nurse 
CDB  = Clinical details briefer 
Control room = confederate providing instructions or information from the simulation control 
room. 
Introduction 
The retrieval team consists of two team members, a doctor (D) and a confederate flight nurse 
(CN). The flight nurse will be introduced as one who is new to the flight service and unknown 
to the clinician they are working with.  The scenario is set in the fuselage of a high-fidelity 
fixed-wing air ambulance at cruise altitude with mannequin intubated and ventilated. The 
main part of the scenario will take place during flight with ‘plane noise’ in operation but D and 
CN able to communicate with each other and with the control room via head-set.  The 
scenario will start with a scripted brief providing most relevant clinical details and a chance to 
request additional meds or information before commencing the ‘in-flight’ stage of the 
scenario. When the brief has concluded, and the participant has completed requests for 
further information and/or medication/equipment the scenario will be moved forward to the 




 Intubated female mannequin with a #8.0 Portex endotracheal tube in-situ and lying on 
the transport stretcher 
 Mannequin able to be defibrillated, (pads attached but covered so not visible) 
 Pupils equal & normal (size 2) at start of simulation 
 Transport ventilator set to 70% FiO2, PEEP 5, ASV mode with 100% minute volume 
setting 
 Transport monitor displaying ECG, arterial and end-tidal carbon dioxide waveforms 
 Pulse oximeter connected to monitor with probe on mannequin   
 Vital signs - HR 81 sinus rhythm, arterial line BP 145/85, EtCO2 38 mmHg, SpO2 94% 
 Urinary catheter draining into catheter bag 
 Central line placed into right internal jugular vein 
 Arterial line inserted into right radial artery 
 Propofol 10 mg/ml in 50 ml syringe connected to syringe driver infusing at 22ml/hr 
through left cannula 
 Chest Xray available showing a correctly–positioned endotracheal tube and no other 
abnormality (see appendix) 
 Computerised Tomography (CT) report of head describing large intracerebral 
haematoma 
 Arterial blood gas available (taken on 70% inspired oxygen concentration) showing 
normal values (see appendix) 
 12 lead ECG available showing left ventricular hypertrophy (see appendix) 
 
A ‘flight bag’ containing: 
 Crystalloid fluid (3 x 1000 ml bags) 
 Intravenous giving set 
 Amiodarone 150 mg vials 
 Digoxin 500 mcg vials 
 Verapamil 5mg vials 
 Magnesium Sulphate 10 mmol vials 
 Potassium Chloride 10 mmol vials 
 Adrenaline 1 mg vials 
 Metaraminol 10 mg in 10 ml pre-mixed syringes 
 Noradrenaline 10 mg in 100 ml pre-mixed bag 
 Defibrillator pads (adhesive) with connecting cable 
 Mannitol 
 Pen torch 
Pre-scenario brief 
 To be provided to participants prior to commencement. Participant will be asked ‘have you 
read & do you understand the briefing?’. The simulation should only begin if the answer to 
this question is yes. 
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Before the simulation begins, Simulation Suite staff will enter the aircraft to brief the 
participants about the function of the high-fidelity flight simulator, and also the mannequin 
capabilities, and to check head-set sound. Participants should be reminded they can 
communicate with the pilot or request contact with the ICU SMO via their headset. 
Next, the pre-scenario clinical information (below) will be provided but this will be done inside 
the aircraft for simplicity’s sake and so it can be recorded on camera. The participant will then 
be given a couple of minutes to examine the patient, ask questions. 
Pre-scenario clinical information  
CDB: You are the doctor in the Intensive Care aeromedical retrieval team sent to pick up this 
patient from Nelson in the fixed wing aircraft and return them to Wellington Hospital. This is 
Raulle, the flight nurse who will be working with you. In this scenario we would like you to 
assume that you have never met Raulle before and are working with him for the first time 
(up to this point there should be limited opportunities for Dr to communicate with CN before 
the scenario starts).  
CN: Hello I’m new.     
D is expected to (either now or when they are settled and the flight stage of the scenario has 
commenced): 
 introduce themselves and ask about the previous experience of the CN 
 If asked how many previous flights they have done CN should reply that this is just his 
second flight since orientation – then ask the Doctor how experienced they are… 
CDB: I’m going to tell you about the patient, and then you can have a couple of minutes to 
examine the patient, or ask any final questions before we buckle you in for ‘take off’. 
 Jane Thomas is a 72 year old female. She lives alone. Her next of kin is her daughter 
who lives in Wellington & is expecting her arrival 
 She had a witnessed sudden loss of consciousness today at home  
 When ambulance crew arrived she was breathing but minimally responsive, GCS 5 
with pupils equal and reactive to light 
 Intubated on arrival at hospital for low GCS 
 CT head showed a large intracerebral haematoma 
 BP is starting to increase and requires transport to Wellington ICU 
 Her medical history includes type II diabetes and hypertension  
 Current medication is metoprolol, aspirin, metformin & cilazapril 
 She has been paralysed with 50mg of rocuronium 
 Before we start the flight stage of the scenario is there any other information you 
would like? After the participant has requested further information (xray, ABGs etc) 
the briefer will say:  
At this stage I am going to leave, and you can have a couple of minutes to examine the 
patient or discuss anything you need to with your flight nurse, just as you usually would if 
you were about to leave the hospital. Then we will start the flight stage of the scenario (we 
will tell you when this happens). 
 The folder with results (appendices) will be handed to the confederate flight nurse before the 
clinical briefer exits the aircraft. 
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D is expected to:  
 Ask  to see ECG, ABG, CXR & CT report (see appendices)   
 Ensure they have sedation, paralysis (rocuronium, atracurium, pancuronium all 
acceptable), mannitol or concentrated (23%) salt, vasoconstrictor (metaraminol, 
phenylephrine or noradrenaline) or at least discuss with nurse that they might need 
them 
 Construct & discuss a transfer plan with the flight nurse 
 
CN: What will the plan be for the transport? (ONLY if Dr hasn’t already stated when asking for 
the information above) 
 
 
Pause now for D to outline his plan briefly to the CN. We would expect that this should include: 
 Ventilation plan (aim for normoventilation judged by end-tidal carbon dioxide levels) 
 Normal blood pressure - avoid hypotension and hypertension (since it was an 
intracranial bleeding issue) 
 Possible need for further paralysis 
 Prepare to treat hypotension with bolus/  
 Prepare to give intravenous fluids 
 Mention re-checking blood sugar (if not now then they should remember this at some 
stage during the scenario – any time the CN is asked to check the BS they can state 
that it is normal e.g. 6 mmol/l or similar) 
 
The scenario will now be moved forward in time.  
Control Room: We are now starting the flight part of the scenario. You are currently at 
cruise altitude.  





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm Yes 
Heart rate 81 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 145/85 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
38 Yes 
Respiratory rate 16 Yes 
Pulse oximetry 94% Yes 




 Begins with aircraft at cruise altitude 
 D and CN wear head-sets and seated in usual flight positions 
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 “plane noise” is switched on so auscultation and alarms not audible and 
communication must be done via the head-set 
D is expected to: 
 check the monitors and carry out a general assessment/run through the general 
clinical details with the CN 
 Examine the pupils 
 Mention or re-check blood sugar at some stage – if they ask CN to check it the CN can 
state that it is normal (eg 6.mm/l) 
After 3 minutes there should be a run of bigeminy lasting 20 seconds that resolves 
spontaneously. 
ETCO2 levels also rise slightly and require a small ventilator adjustment 





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Bigeminy for 20 
seconds then back to 
normal sinus 
Yes 
Heart rate 90 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 148/85 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
48 Yes 
Respiratory rate 12 Yes 







Dr is expected to: 
 Adjust ventilator – increase % Minute Volume (in ASV mode) to blow off CO2 (if does 





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm  Yes 
Heart rate 82 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 160/90 Yes 





Respiratory rate 16 Yes 
Pulse oximetry 95% Yes 
Pupils Equal N/A 
 
 
One minute after Set 3 vital signs have been displayed, there is another run of bigeminy lasting 
20 seconds. As soon as the 20s run of bigeminy finishes there is a short period (30 seconds) of 
severe turbulence. After this, BP starts to slowly rise & the heart rate simultaneously falls over 
the next 3 minutes until the parameters shown in Set 4 below are achieved. 
 
Dr is expected to: 
 Re-check vital signs including pupils which are now unequal (if pupils are checked 
information will be fed from the control room that one pupil is now at maximum size 
and unresponsive to light). 
 Note increasing BP and decreasing heart rate 
 Declare this is an emergency (once the ‘blown’ pupil is noted) 
 Initiate management for the raised intracranial pressure (ICP). Measures could 
include: 
o  hyperventilation (increasing either the tidal volume, respiratory rate or both 
on the ventilator) 
o  trying to raise the mannequin’s stretcher head 
o checking the ties are loose around the mannequin’s neck 
o requesting CN access, draw-up or administer any of: 
 ‘concentrated salt’ 
 mannitol (by infusion) 
 propofol 
 morphine or fentanyl 
 paralysis (rocuronium, atracurium, pancuronium) 
Pilot (control room): Hi this is the pilot speaking, sorry about that turbulence. They’re 
reporting fog in Wellington and advising its likely landing there will be problematic. We can 
turn back to Nelson and try landing there – or request diversion to Christchurch. I’ll get 





Parameter Value Shown on monitor 
ECG trace Sinus rhythm  Yes 
Heart rate 62 Yes 
Arterial wave form & blood pressure 185/92 Yes 
End-tidal carbon dioxide waveform & 
value 
38 Yes 
Respiratory rate 16 Yes 
Pulse oximetry 95% Yes 
Pupils Unequal. Right pupil is now 
‘blown’ (maximum size) & 




D is expected to:  
 Discuss with CN facilities available in each centre. Christchurch is only option based on 
available neurosurgical facilities even though its further away (If flight nurse or pilot is 
asked if they know how long to ChCh they can say “I think it adds about another 40 or 
50 minutes) 
 Discuss options for ongoing sedation +/- paralysis 
 Re-examine patient & pupils  
 Discussion around further management of the increased ICP expected 
 
Once the Doctor has had a chance to re-examine the patient and discuss as above (eg 
1 minute) the pilot comes back to them. 
Pilot (control room): Hi this is the pilot - landing in Wellington is definitely not an option so 
do you want to divert to ChCh or go back to Nelson? 
 If request return to Nelson (or even Paraparaumu), pilot will state that actually now 
fog is making Nelson and Paraparaumu doubtful but they have permission to divert to 
ChCh.   
Pilot (control room): Thanks confirm we are now altering course and heading for ChCh. We 
will arrive in approximately 50 minutes. 
There is then another run of bigeminy lasting 20 seconds followed by a short wait of 30s to 
let the Doctor settle again and check vitals again 
After this the scenario will be MOVED FORWARD in time: 
Control room:  We are now moving the scenario forward in time.  Your patient has been 
accepted for investigation in Christchurch and you are 15 minutes out. The intensive care 
consultant from Christchurch is on the phone asking for an update 
At that time there is another run of bigeminy lasting 20 seconds   
Confederate consultant (control room): “Hello. This is the ICU consultant from Christchurch - 
I understand you are bringing in Mrs Thomas from Nelson. Can you tell me a bit more about 
her & how she is doing?” 
D is expected to discuss:  
 Presentation to hospital (including GCS, CT findings) 
 Previous history (including type II diabetes & hypertension) 
 Medications & any allergies (none previously stated) 
 Current physiological parameters & signs on examination (pupils should be mentioned 
in the   handover) 
 Management & physiological changes since retrieval including bigeminy, slowly 




 Think about mentioning or re-checking blood sugar at some stage if hasn’t previously 
done so  
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 NTS rating 4 or 5 
(exceptional or 
strong) 
NTS rating 3 
(adequate) 
NTS rating 

















































 John T, 










































5. Introduces self to 
FN giving their name 
and their role eg. ICU 
registrar 
 
4. Introduces self to 
FN giving their name 
3. Says hello  and 


















5. Asks FN about 
experience with 
transport missions 
before the flight 
stage starts 
4. Asks FN about 
their experience 
early into the flight 
stage eg. during 
initial quiet time 
3. Asks FN about 
experience at some 
stage during the 
mission 
 











5. Asks to see 
additional available 
material -  CXR, 
Bloods and ECG 
unprompted AND 
asks about the 
intubation details 
 
4. Misses one of: 
intubation, CXR, 
Bloods, ECG 
3. Misses more 
than one from CXR, 
Bloods, ECG and 
Intubation OR asks 
after has had time 
to think after quiet 
stage and scenario 
start or when there 
is a prompt (eg. 
when is discussing 
with FN at the start 
of the flight stage 
or when the 
arrhythmias start)  
2. Discusses 
or asks for 
the additional 
information 







1. Does not 




















































FN’s seat and 
is not actually 
connected to 
the patient 











5.  Before they start 
the flight stage Dr 
actively checks that 
key medications are 




4. Dr actively checks 
that key meds are 
readily at hand soon 
after they are into 
the flight stage of 
the scenario 
3. Dr organises to 
have key meds 
readily at hand 























5. Dr checks or asks 
about the availability 
of IV access before 
the flight stage of 
the scenario 
 
4. Dr checks or asks 
about the availability 
of IV access at the 
start of the flight 
stage of the scenario 
3. Dr does not 
check availability of 
IV access until they 
are getting ready 
to administer 
medication/interv







check or ask 
FN 
 
1. Does not 
mention 
availability of 








5. Communicates a 
clear transport care 
plan to the FN 
without being 
prompted AND 
confirms the FN is 
happy/has 
understood 
4. Communicates a 
clear transport care 
plan unprompted to 
the FN though does 
not confirm the FN is 
happy/has 
understood 
3. Communicates a 
comprehensible 
and well-structured 
transport or care 
plan but only after 
the FN asks 
2. 
Communicate
s a transport 
plan which is 
unstructured 
or difficult to 
comprehend 
(eg FN has to 
confirm what 
it is) 



















5. The plan for 
transport they 
express includes 
mentioning at some 
point a general goal 
or plan for the 
following: 
 Ventilation 
 Optimal blood 
pressure/circula
tion 
 Need (or not) 
for paralysis 




 Need for 
continuous ECG 
monitoring 













 Need to re-
check blood 
sugar now or in 
transit 
 
4. The plan misses 
only two of the 
above 
3. The plan for 
transport they 
express includes 
four or five of  the 
key actions 
required (bullet 
points as expressed 
in previous column) 




two or three 







1. The plan 
expressed 
includes only 










5. Requests or 
checks that  de-fib 
PADS are readily 
available or on the 
patient before the 
flight stage of the 
scenario begins 
 
4. Requests or 
checks  de-fib PADS 
are on the patient 
3. Mentions that 
de-fib pads will 
need to be on the 
patient (or checks ) 
later in the 

















after entering the 




the pads are 
on patient 
 


















spontaneously for BS 
to be checked during 
the flight 
4. Remembers BS 
issue if prompted 
somehow and plans 
to check it 
3. Mentions BS in 
the plan expressed 
to the FN though 
doesn’t actually ask 
for it to be checked  





























































5. Dr has ensured 
defibrillator is 
connected to, or 
easily able to be 
connected to, the 
patient before they 
leave  
 
4. Dr ensures 
defibrillator is 
connected to, or 
easily able to be 
connected to, the 
patient after take-off 
but before any 
dysrhythmias 
3. Dr asks about 
defibrillator or 
mentions they 
should be prepared 
to do so in the plan 
but doesn’t  
specifically check 
defibrillator is 
connected to, or 
easily able to be 
connected to, the 
patient until after 




2. Dr may 
have 
mentioned 
need to be 
prepared to 
defibrillate in 
the plan but 
does not 
actively check 






1. At no stage 
does the Dr 












































































mentions them each 
time, or mentions in 
consultant handover 




4. Repeatedly scans 
monitors and 
environment notices 
all the dysrhythmias 
(eg. mentions them 
each time or 
mentions in 
consultant handover 




3. Scans and 
maintains attention 
on the monitors 
but not steadily, for 
example  misses 
one or more of the 
dysrhythmia 
episodes (eg. only 
mentions them a  
couple of times or 
tells the consultant 
during handover 
that there have 
only been 3 or 4 
episodes) 










once or twice 
(eg. tells 
consultant 
had only 1 or 
2 episodes) 



























monitors and quickly 
asks FN to check 
pulse ox probe when 
reading disappears  
4. Does not always 
clearly maintain 
attention on the 
monitors but quickly 
asks FN to check 
pulse ox probe when 
reading disappears  
3. There is a short 
delay but then asks  
FN to check pulse 
ox probe when 
reading disappears  












5. Continues to 
monitor patient but 
once they become 
aware the FN has 
issues they 
immediately also 
focus on tasks aimed 
at investigating and 
managing those 






4. Continues to 
monitor patient but 
once they become 
aware of the FN 
issues there is only a 
short delay before 
they also focus on 
tasks aimed at 
investigating and 
managing those 







on tasks related to 
patient care even 
though aware of 
the FN issues, but 
eventually (and 
unprompted to do 
so) changes their 
focus to include 
tasks aimed at 
investigating and 
managing those 





2. Only after 
a prompt 
from FN or 
pilot (eg. they 
ask ‘what can 
we do?’) does 





FN issues  
 
1. Does not 
carry out any 
tasks aimed 
at dealing 










5. Notices FN pain 
unprompted (eg. 
asks if they are 




them about the pain 
(eg. nature and 
location) 
 
4. Notices FN pain 
unprompted  (eg. 
asks if they are 
alright) AND after 




them about the pain 
(eg. nature and 
location) 
3. Notices FN pain 
with a prompt (eg. 
noise from FN) but 
then quickly seeks 
further 
information from 
them about the 
pain (eg. nature 
and location) 
2. Notices FN 
pain with a 
prompt (eg. 
noise from 
FN)  but is 




























continues to assist 
and support FN 
when realises the FN 
is having severe pain  
 
4. A short time after 
realises FN is having 
severe pain shows 
concern and actively 
assists and supports 
FN  
3. There is some 
delay  but once Dr 
realises the pain is 
continuing they 
show concern and 
offer assistance to 
the FN   



















5. Alerts the pilot in 
a timely fashion 
once realises the FN 
is experiencing 
problems AND 
explains or discusses 
what the likely issue 
is with FN  
 
4. Is timely in 
alerting the pilot 
when realises the 
flight nurse is 
experiencing 
problems though 
provides limited or 
no explanation of 
what the likely issue 
is to the FN 
3. Is slow to alert 
pilot even after 
realises the FN is 
having problems 
but eventually does 
so unprompted 
 
2. Does not 
















5. Establishes that 
the FN is not capable 
of working as soon 
their severe level of 
pain becomes clear 
 
4. After a short delay 
Dr shows good 
awareness that FN 
may not be able to 
function  
well enough to care 
for the patient (eg. 
specifically says they 
will take over patient 
care, or tells pilot FN 
can’t function) 
3. After the pain 
has been present 
for a while Dr 
shows awareness 
of  FN incapacity to 
care for the patient 
(eg. takes over care 
of patient, checks 
with FN, tells pilot 
they cannot 
function)      
2. Eventually 
shows a small 
degree of 
awareness 






some tasks  
 






when FN gets 









5. Quickly recognises 
pain may be due to 
pressure on sinuses 
due to their current 
altitude (eg. 
discusses they are at 
4000 feet– or asks 




4. After a short delay 
recognises pain may 
be due to pressure 
on sinuses (eg. 
discusses they are at 
4000 feet– or asks 











pain may be due to 
pressure on sinuses 
(eg. discusses they 
are at 4000 feet– 
or asks about the 
current cabin 
pressure/altitude) 








they are at 







1. Even after 
prompting 
from FN or 
pilot that it is 
sinus pain 
does not 









5. When presented 
with FN incapacity 
dilemma actively 
and immediately 
verbalises what the 
clinical and other 
relevant 
considerations are 
(eg. providing pain 
relief medication 
and carry on -  faster 
- for patient’s sake 
versus  going to a 
lower altitude or 
turning back and 
landing – FN’s sake) 
 
4. When presented 
with FN dilemma 
there is a short delay 
but actively and 
immediately 
verbalises what the 
clinical and other 
relevant 
considerations are 
(eg. providing pain 
relief medication 
and carry on, going 
to a lower altitude, 




3. When presented 
with FN incapacity 





eventually does so 
as they reflect on 
what the likely 
problem may be or 
by discussing it 
with the pilot   








pilot or FN  
 
1. Does not 
verbalise that 
lowering 
altitude is an 
option for 
assisting with 


















increased flight time 
as the appropriate 
option for 
addressing the FN 
incapacity (because 
its important to 
reduce pressure for 
FN health, but 
patient also needs to 
be in Wellington for 
tertiary care) 
 
4. After a short delay 
selects lowering 
altitude and 
increased flight time 
as the appropriate 
option for 





and increased flight 
time as the 
appropriate option 
for addressing the 
FN incapacity (eg. 
expresses worry 
about flight taking 
longer)  
decide what 














feeling it is a 











patient at regular 
intervals. ALSO re-
evaluates FN pain 
AND FN ability to 




patient at regular 
intervals. However 
misses one of the 
following: 


















but does not re-
evaluate FN for 
pain OR ability to 



















 1. Fails to re-
evaluate 










instructions for ALL 
actions or 
interventions 
required during the 
transport such as 
drug administration 
or the exact dosage, 
how it should be 
3. The FN had to 
clarify relatively 
frequently but 
whenever they did 






















- including “who is 
going to do what” 
during the transport 
 
4. Mostly provides 
precise instructions 
for any of the 
actions or 
interventions such as 
drug dosage, “who is 
going to do what” 
but sometimes the 




























required during the 
transport in an 
assured and timely 
manner 
 




required during the 
transport in an 









3. Provides some 




required during the 













































5. Provides handover 
to consultant in a 
logical and clear 
manner and includes 











3. Misses a few 
minor medical 
details only but the 
handover is not 
presented in a 





























 PMH (diabetes 
and 
hypertension) 













 mention the 
hyperglycaemia 
 
4. Provides handover 
in a logical and clear 
manner though fails 
to mention a few 
minor medical 
details (allergies, 
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NTS rating 4 or 
5 (exceptional 
or strong) 
NTS rating 3 
(adequate) 
NTS rating 2 or 

























Jane T, 72  
Lives alone 






























5. Introduces self 
to FN giving their 
name and their 
role eg. ICU 
registrar 
 
4. Introduces self 
to FN giving their 
name 
3. Says hello  and 
















5. Asks FN about 
experience with 
transport missions 
before the flight 
stage starts 
 
4. Asks FN about 
their experience 
early into the flight 
stage eg. during 
initial quiet time 
3. Asks FN about 
experience at 
some stage during 
the mission 
2. Does not ask 
about experience or 







5. Asks to see 
additional available 
material -   CXR, CT, 
Bloods and ECG 
AND asks about the 
intubation details 
 
4. Misses one of 
intubation, CXR, 
CT, Bloods, CXR 
3. Misses more 
than one from 
CXR, CT, Bloods 
and ECG OR only 
asks when there is 
a prompt eg. when 
is discussing with 






2. Discusses or asks 
for additional info 
quite late in the 
scenario when 
realises BP is 
steadily climbing 
 
1.  Does not ask to 
see or even discuss 
the use of 
additional info such 
as CXR, CT, ECG, 













































vital signs worsen  








5. Dr checks or asks 
about the 
availability of IV 
access before the 
flight stage of the 
scenario 
 
4. Dr checks the 
availability of IV 
access at the start 
of the flight stage 
of the scenario 
3. Dr does not 
check availability 
of IV access until 





2. Dr mentions IV 
access but does not 
actually check or 
ask  FN 
 
1. Does not 
mention availability 









5. Before they start 
the flight stage Dr 
actively checks that 
key medications  
are readily at hand 




4. Dr actively 
checks that key 
meds are readily at 
hand soon after 
they are into the 
flight stage of the 
scenario 
3. Dr organises to 
have key meds 
readily at hand 
once they see that 
arrhythmias are 
starting or C02  is 
rising 
2. Mentions having 
medications at 
hand only when 
faced with possibly 
needing to use 
them eg. when BP 
rises  
 
1. Does not 
mention having any 
medication 







5. Communicates a 
clear transport care 
plan to the FN 
without being 
prompted AND 




4. Communicates a 
clear transport care 
plan unprompted 
to the FN though 
does not confirm 
the FN is 




transport or care 
plan but only after 
the FN asks 





comprehend eg. the 
FN has to confirm 
what it is 
 
1.  Does not 
communicate an 
actual care plan at 








































some point a 
general goal or 





ion as judged 
by ETCO2) 





 Possible need 
for further 
paralysis 
















4. The plan misses 
only two the above 
3. The plan for 
transport they 
express includes 
only three or four 





2. The plan for 
transport they 
express includes 
only two of the key 




1. The plan includes 
only one (or none) 








BS to be checked 
before the flight 
 
4. Remembers BS 
issue if prompted 
3. Mentions BS in 
the plan expressed 
to the FN though 
doesn’t actually 
ask for it to be 
checked 
2.  Mentions BS 
when handing over 
to the consultant 
but doesn’t actually 
ask for it to be 






plans to check it 
1. Does not 






































































the initial rising 




scans monitors and 
notices (mentions) 
rising CO2 levels in 
a timely fashion 
3. Scans and 
maintains 
attention on the 
monitors, but not 
steadily, for 
example there is a 
delay before 
notices (mentions) 
rising CO2 levels  
2.  Notices 
(acknowledges) 
rising CO2 levels 
only when 
prompted by FN 
 
1. Does not really 
look at monitors 
even when 









rising CO2 levels 
and thus 
immediately asks 





rising CO2 levels 
and after only a 
short time asks FN 
to adjust ventilator 
3. Asks FN to 
adjust ventilator 
for rising CO2 levels 









questioned by the 
FN -  then requests 
the adjustment 
●  
1. The FN has to 
prompt AND 
suggest making the 










and when the 
ETCO2  first starts 
to rise AND 
consistently 
discusses the likely 
3. Provides some 
verbal updates and 
some explanation 
around 
arrhythmias and  




2. Provides very few 
updates or  
explanations 
regarding 
arrhythmias and  
CO2  rise 
 
1. Provides no 






HR fall over 












4. Gives regular 
verbal reports and 
updates as above 




arrhythmias and  











signs (when BP 
continues to rise) 
in a timely fashion 
 
4. Is not 
consistently 
monitoring but still 
notices (mentions) 
worsening vital 





signs as BP 
continues to rise 
but not until the 
BP is quite high 
2. Does not notice 
(acknowledge) the 
worsening vital 
signs leading to the 
pupil blow until 
prompted by the FN 
 
1. Does not really 
look at monitors 
even when 












signs ie that further 
examination 
including pupils is 
required and then 
intervention for 
raised ICP is 
required 
 
4.  There is a short 
delay but then 
recognises or 
discusses that with 
vital signs 
continuing to 
deteriorate further  
examination 
including pupils is 
required, followed 
by intervention for 
raised ICP  
 




discusses that if 





including pupils is 
required and then 
intervention for 
raised ICP is 
required 
●  
2. Does not appear 
to recognise the 
possible 
implications or that 
further 
examination/interv
ention is required 
until prompted by 
the FN  then re-
examines and 




● 1. Does not re-
examine pupil when 
prompted by the FN 





















5.  Updates 
verbally and 
explains 
significance to the 
FN when the vital 
signs start to 
worsen  AND 
specifically 
discusses how the 
management plan 
may need to 
change/progress 
 
4. Verbally updates 
re worsening vital 
signs but without 
explanation as to 
its significance - 
discusses how the 
management plan 
may need to 
change/progress  
3. Verbally updates 
but does not really 
explain 
significance OR 
discuss how the 
management plan 





























5. Follows standard 
guidelines for 
treating raised ICP 
once notices pupil 
blown including all 
of: 
 Raising of 
head-end 






3. Uses an osmotic 
agent only 
2. Makes some 
attempt to  reduce 
ICP but does not 
use an osmotic 
agent 
 
1. Fails to do 
anything for the 
raised ICP 
 
*(NB: if hasn’t 
examined pupil and 
313 
 






4.Uses four of the 
above in treating 
raised ICP including 
an osmotic agent 
thus doesn’t know 
the ICP is raised 
then just mark this 











instructions for ALL 
actions or 
interventions 
required during the 




in terms of the 
exact dosage, how 
it should be given, 
what ventilation 
settings required) 
- including “who is 




4. Mostly provides 
precise instructions 
for any of the 
actions or 
interventions such 
as exact dosage, 
ventilator settings, 
“who is going to do 
what” but 
sometimes the FN 
has to clarify 
3. The FN had to 
clarify relatively 
frequently but 
whenever they did 
so was provided 
with accurate and 
precise 
instructions/reque
sts or dosages as 
required 
2. Requests or 
instructions were 
consistently 
imprecise or vague 




1. Requests or 
instructions 
remained 
imprecise, vague, or 
contradictory (eg. 
drug dosage or 
administration, 
ventilation settings, 
“who is going to do 
what” during the 
transport) even 













instructions for any 
of the medical 
interventions 
required during the 
transport in an 
assured and timely 
manner 
 
4. Mostly provides 
instructions for any 
of the medical 
interventions 
3. Provides some 





the transport but 
at times appeared 
hesitant or 
indecisive  
2. Is frequently 
indecisive or 











required during the 
transport in an 









5. Re-assesses the 
patient or vital 
signs on a 
consistent basis 
including after all 
interventions  - 
specifically: 









 after noticing 
the blown 










patient and notices 





patient only after 
prompting from 
the flight nurse so 
notices blown 
pupil 
2. Fails to re-
evaluate patient 
after the vital signs 
worsen thus fails to 
notice the blown 
pupil at all 
 
1. Fails to re-











5. Actively splits all 
tasks  required for 
treating the patient 
in advance 
between FN and 
themselves, so 
neither of them is 
overloaded 
 
4. Doesn’t actively 
split tasks in 
advance but does 
so as soon as there 
is potential for one 
of them to become 
overloaded  (eg. 
when needs to 
start treating 
blown pupil) 
3. Takes over some 
tasks but only once 


















2. Only splits or 
takes over tasks 
when actually 
prompted by the FN 
they are becoming 
overloaded 
 
1. Fails to recognise 
when the task load 
is unworkable even 
when prompted 
Midflight 





















































intervene for rising 
ICP but does 
immediately 










on arrhythmias or 
ICP interventions 
but soon attends 








as soon as pilot 
prompts them a 
decision will be 
required 
 
2. Continues to 
focus on treating 
rising ICP or 
arrhythmias even 
after the initial 











treating rising ICP 
or arrhythmias and 
does not give 
















3. When presented 
with diversion 
dilemma does not 
initially discuss the 
pros and cons of 
both destinations  
2. Does not present 
any pros and cons 
in reaching their 
decision (eg. even 





















a short wait 
of 30s 
consider in making 
a decision eg. 
discusses 
difference in flight 
time, discusses 
availability of 




4. Does not 
immediately 
identify the options 
as above but does 
so after a short 
period of time 
- however does so 
when prompted 
for the decision  














destination (due to 
availability of 
neurosurgical 
facilities) and does 
so in a timely 
fashion 
 
4. Selects ChCh as 
the more 
appropriate 
diversion after a 
short delay 
3. Vacillates over 
the decision but 
eventually 
appropriately 
selects  ChCh (eg. 
keeps asking 
questions of the 
pilot or FN such as 
how long to each 
place,  or asking FN 







2. Is very indecisive 
about where to go 
without calling the 
consultant (or it is 
not clear what they 




1. Fails to make an 
active choice (or 
chooses Nelson 













with the pilot and 
FN in a decisive 
and timely manner 
 
4. Is slightly 
hesitant initially 
but then 
participates in an 
assured and timely 
manner 
3. Prevaricates 
somewhat in being 
involved or in 
communicating 
their diversion 
request (eg. asks 
the opinion of the 
FN or pilot) but 
eventually 
communicates 









1. Is extremely 
hesitant or 
unwilling to take 
any active role in 










a short wait 
































consultant in a 































handover in a 
logical and clear 
manner though 
fails to mention a 
few minor medical 
details such as 
allergies or BS 
3. Misses a few 
minor medical 
details such as 
allergies or BS 
only, but the 
handover is not 
presented in a 




2. The handover is 
quite difficult to 
follow and many 
medical details are 
not mentioned such 
as PMH, pre-illness 
medications, and 
allergies) but does 
mention raised ICP 
 
1. The handover is 
inadequate in that 
there are important 
omissions eg. does 
not mention that 






APPENDIX 16 OBSERVED GENERAL CLINICAL PERFORMANCE RATING 
 
 
During the simulated aeromedical transport mission you just observed, how would you rate the participating clinician’s 
performance (please circle): 
 
5 = Excellent   Performed at the highest level; all issues well managed and patient safety enhanced. 
 
4 = Good Performed competently; issues managed adequately and patient safety consistently 
maintained. 
 
3 = Acceptable Performed adequately; at approximately the level of skill and safety required 
 
2 = Marginal Performed slightly below the expected standard; some lapses which could potentially have 
affected patient safety. 
 
1 = Poor Performed well below the expected standard; significant lapses in skills or safety. 
 
 
